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ABSTRACT 
Our political and military leaders consider the efficient deployment and maintenance of 
personnel and hardware to be of equal importance to the task of planning the military 
operation. 
 
However, inasmuch as today’s military budgets are under great financial strain the 
military needs to rely on the civilian merchant navy for the provision of additional 
sealift capability. NATO acknowledges that member countries' ability to meet the 
politically desired levels of strategic sealift could be inadequate. Without a basic 
knowledge of the workings of the merchant navy, the military transportation desk 
officer cannot make an informed decision concerning the sealift capabilities required for 
strategic defence, humanitarian aid or refugee evacuation. 
 
This thesis reviews the range of militarily suitable commercial shipping and the 
different processes for chartering appropriate vessels while also considering the present 
state of civil/military synergies within NATO. It also examines the different types of 
insurance, including hull & machinery, third- party liability and commercial war-risks 
insurance and presents an overview of the problem of piracy.  Its objective is to provide 
an introduction to the complex operational workings of the merchant navy for the 
military transportation officer. 
 
It is hoped that such knowledge could improve the sealift project not only in terms of 
operational effectiveness but also through increasing financial efficiency over a broad 
range of military and civil emergency maritime transportation services. 
 
Finally, two case studies are examined to demonstrate that there exists a plethora of 
solutions to the indicated challenges. A suggested handbook and flowchart are presented 
to assist in the implementation of this study's conclusions concerning the enhancement 
of acquired strategic sealift assets for defence, humanitarian aid or refugee evacuation. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
1.0 Introduction 
The fundamental structure of this thesis focuses on two main areas, namely the civil 
merchant navy and the military sealift capabilities. It researches the potential for the 
seamless integration of these two sealift capabilities for defence, humanitarian aid and 
refugee evacuation. There has been significant research carried out by the NATO 
strategic review in 2000 on the subject of sealift capability: The DM 5 review (LMI, 
2001) demonstrated that the NATO Alliance has a strategic sealift shortfall which, given 
the world-wide cutbacks in military budgets, is expected to become more acute with 
time and may come to jeopardise the integrity of the collective defence of NATO allied 
nations. 
 
The literature review demonstrates that there are a limited number of specialised studies 
that analyse the problem and propose solutions for the integration and use of 
civil/military synergies. Two such studies are the following: 
 
•   Joint Strategy and Strategic Sealift for the next century. This study looked at the 
commercial sealift available in 1998 for use in supporting the US Department of 
Defense, analysing the availability of the 1996 MSA passed by Congress and the 
VISA subsidy project managed by the DOT (Ernest and Bobby, 1998). 
•   Strategic Sealift for Desert Shield not a Blueprint for the Future. This study 
2 
 
examines the Strategic Mobility Policy of the US Department of Defense in the 
1980’s and suggests that the Strategic Mobility Policy should be modified by 
reducing the National Defense Reserve Fleet and revitalising the merchant marine 
industry (Bright and Hale, 1991). 
 
Although both these papers refer to strategic sealift, neither addresses the primary and 
secondary topics of this thesis. Therefore, it is necessary to expand the literature review 
to incorporate key concepts that are directly and indirectly related to the topic at hand as 
well as new elements that form an integral part of the primary and secondary issues 
addressed in this thesis and whose interpretation will affect the answers to the questions 
under investigation. 
 
Dictionary definitions provide a useful way of understanding the meanings of terms and 
concepts but they must be set in the appropriate context in order to demonstrate how 
they should be interpreted. 
•   Cooperation: ‘The act of working together with someone or doing what they 
say’ (Cambridge Dictionary Online, 2015). The main idea of this thesis pertains to 
two totally independent forces, the merchant navy and the military navy, 
cooperating for mutual benefit. These are two bodies with fundamentally differing 
credos and modi operandi: one is rooted in a ‘for profit’ philosophy and the other 
considers cost to be a fairly minor consideration. The notion of working together 
transcends commercially-minded contracted operations and involves the military 
philosophy of: Follow orders, there are lives at risk! This kind of cooperation is 
therefore quite relevant to the proposed integration, inasmuch as the military needs 
to maintain command and control over all operations of a military nature whether it 
be defence or joint civil/military ventures sponsored by a nation. 
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•   Strategic: ‘Helping to achieve a plan, for example in business or politics or 
used to provide military forces with an advantage’ (Cambridge Dictionary Online, 
2015). Within military transportation constraints, ‘strategic’ refers to any movement 
relating to the reception, staging and onward movement facility as opposed to ‘in 
theatre of operations’ movements. Therefore, strategic sealift can be performed by 
civilian assets as they are not directed into areas of direct conflict which would 
violate the insurance and employment conditions of the merchant navy. 
•   Commercial: (When used as an adjective) ‘A commercial product can be 
bought by or is intended to be bought by the general public’ (Cambridge Dictionary 
Online, 2015). This stands in sharp contrast to the military's conception according to 
which nothing is for sale and the cost is of low importance. 
•   Shipping: ‘The act of sending goods from one place to another, especially by 
ship’ (Cambridge Dictionary Online, 2015). 
•   Market: ‘The people who might want to buy something or a part of the world 
where something is sold, [in our case, transport services]. In other words, a business 
or trade in a particular product including financial services. (Cambridge 
Dictionary Online, 2015). 
•   Ship: The physical explanation to be expanded in later chapters but briefly: ‘A 
large boat for travelling on water, especially across the sea’ (Cambridge Dictionary 
Online, 2015). Fully integrated transportation involves multi-modal combined forms 
of transportation such as the services offered by modern freight forwarders such as 
DHL and TNT; this thesis, however, concentrates only on that aspect of sealift 
which involves different forms of vessels (to be described in Chapter Two). 
•   Merchant Ship: ‘A ship used for trading rather than for military purpose’ 
(Cambridge Dictionary Online, 2015). The merchant navy is made up of many 
different types of vessels, some of which are general cargo carriers and others that 
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are purpose-built for specific trades and cargoes such as livestock carriers and LNG 
gas carriers (both of these are irrelevant to the military; however, the type-specific 
of military-friendly vessels considered in this thesis are described in detail in 
Chapter Two). 
•   Synergies: ‘The combined power of a group of things when they are working 
together that is greater than the total power achieved by each working separately’ 
(Cambridge Dictionary Online, 2015). It could be therefore suggested that 
civil/military synergies or cooperation are not restricted to NATO, given that the 
concept is under constant review within the EU especially after the Lisbon Treaty 
(NATO, 2014e). The EU focuses on key issues and developments in the Union’s 
comprehensive crisis management planning, civil/military coordination and 
cooperation. In the period following the Lisbon Treaty the EU reviewed key 
changes in its external action capabilities, particularly the area of Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). 
Furthermore, it looked into the impact of the European External Action Service on 
CSDP–CFSP cooperative planning and on the EU's crisis management. The EU has 
assessed the civil–military coordination in its crisis management structures in order 
to contextualise the most recent transformations within the EU that demonstrate the 
basic concepts and terms and the evolution of civil–military coordination at the EU 
level (Hynek, 2011). 
•   Civil/Military Cooperation: It is useful to start with a civilian definition of 
civil/military cooperation as this will lead to a deeper understanding of the concept 
itself and the consequences (both advantages and disadvantages) from the 
integration of military and civilian operations to the extent that national and 
international legislation and common sense make possible. A plethora of definitions 
exist; one such definition is ‘Cooperation in peace or war between civil and 
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military authorities, both NATO and national, with a view to ensuring an effective 
overall defence of the NATO area’ (Free Dictionary, 2015). 
 
The purpose of civil/military cooperation is primarily to enhance the safety of the area 
in question, but it can be expanded to include humanitarian aid and refugee evacuation 
both of which can benefit greatly from the integration and joint assistance of civilian 
and military entities. For example, the European Defence Agency suggests that military 
and civilian means both must be used in EU’s crisis management operations as well as 
for ensuring the security of EU citizens. Often military and civilian capabilities overlap 
(European Defence Agency, 2011).  
 
NATO has dedicated personnel for civil/military cooperation, known by the acronym 
CIMIC. It is recognised that close cooperation between civilian and military bodies can 
increase the chances for operational success (NATO, 2011a). By the use of dedicated 
CIMIC personnel one can obtain the appropriate expertise to bridge the gap between the 
different civilian and military bodies in a crisis situation. It is important that the 
civil/military cooperation continues post-conflict or post-crisis in order to rebuild the 
social fabric and normalise conditions amongst the population. The military alone 
cannot normalise civilian living conditions in peacetime or even after the stabilisation 
of a crisis is achieved without the assistance of civilian bodies (Franke, 2006). There are 
many ways in which cooperation can benefit a crisis situation and it is necessary for the 
operational commander to recognise the synergies between the military and civilian 
groups, but further to make use of, and benefit from these synergies (Serronha, 2011). 
 
On the other hand, the military have their own definition as described in the NATO 
CIMIC doctrine: 
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The co-ordination and cooperation, in support of the mission, between the 
NATO Commander and civilian actors, including national population and local 
authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental 
organisations and agencies (NATO, 2003d, p. 1-1). 
 
The above definition must be qualified by no less than four additional considerations 
(NATO, 2003d): 
 
1.   The Joint Force Commanders’ (JFC) plans form an integral part of CIMIC 
activities in support of the mission and overall strategy in order to achieve a 
stable and sustainable end-state. 
2.   CIMIC staff must be integrated within the Joint Commanders’ Headquarters and 
be authorised to coordinate CIMIC activities in the Joint Operational Area 
(JOA) theatre or region. 
3.   The NATO forces should co-operate with a multitude of civilian bodies, and 
accommodate and support the civilian activities provided this does not 
compromise the mission. 
4.   One of the essential activities of CIMIC personnel is the transfer of military 
function to the appropriate civilian authorities. 
 
Politicians have long debated the most effective, efficient and sustainable method of 
managing crisis situations. This debate focuses on when, where and how the military 
should be integrated with civilian entities within the overall political strategy 
(Kasselmann, 2012). Despite the political debate, there are two distinct perspectives: 
from the military standpoint, the focus is generally on determining the appropriate 
tactical approach, though from the civilian viewpoint, the resolution of any crisis 
situation should be achieved through civilian tools. 
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During the Italian presidency of the EU in 2013, the EU Civil Military Coordination 
focused on the establishment and role of the EU Civilian Military Cell (CivMil Cell). 
This is a subject of great interest in Europe, as well as within NATO, and deals with the 
obstacles to the creation of such an EU CivMil Cell in the current security-conscious 
European environment. As Khol (2008) argues, the CivMil Cell is entrusted with 
strategic contingency planning and with bringing together the views of EU actors from 
different member states, but also from both sectors (civil and military). In terms of 
crisis response, strategic planning by the CivMil Cell would enhance political-military 
strategic planning promoting civilian/military interface and possible civilian or military 
support (Shepherd, 2016). 
 
Following the French-British Summit held at St. Malo in 1998, the newly developed 
European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) came under review and remained a topic 
of discussion amongst EU leaders. This was further enhanced following the ‘Chocolate 
Summit’ in 2003, which created the ‘Tervuren Initiative’ (France, Germany, Belgium 
and Luxembourg) calling for an autonomous ESDP capability with an emphasis on 
civil/military cooperation (Grant, 2003). The EU CivMil Cell is designed to be flexible 
and thus suitable for handling a broad range of civilian and military challenges such as 
the preparation and deployment of the EUSEC RD CONGO (Vines, 2010), the Aceh 
Monitoring Mission (European Council, 2006) and the EUBAM Rafah (Kaya, 2012). 
Regrettably, the EU CivMil Cell will probably never be able to achieve its full potential 
due to political controversy between NATO and EU members. 
 
On the other hand, civil/military cooperation is not just limited to crisis situations and 
political unrest; there are cases where the military must work jointly with or provide 
assistance to law enforcement agencies. A prime example of this is the US military 
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assistance to border law enforcement (Turbiville and Graham, 1999). In 1999, the US 
Border Patrol celebrated its seventy-fifth anniversary; however, the roles and duties of 
this distinguished federal enforcement organisation have changed dramatically since its 
formation. Its mission is no longer just the patrolling of the two thousand mile 
US/Mexican Border; it currently comprises twenty-two sectors and is responsible for 
the prevention of smuggling and unlawful entry of undocumented aliens into the USA, 
the apprehension of immigration law violators and the interdiction of drugs and 
contraband in US ports. However, this is not a stand-alone organisation inasmuch as it 
often acts as part of a joint task force with other federal agencies and organisations, the 
most controversial of which is the US Military. The involvement of the US Military as a 
augmentees of the US Border patrol sparked protest throughout the 1990s with charges 
that the border was being militarised and reaching a climax in 1997 with the death of 
Esequiel Hernandez at the hands of a US Marine near Redford, Texas. An interesting 
development was the US House of Representatives' amendment to the National Defense 
Authorization Act in 2000 that altered Title 10 rules governing military support to law 
enforcement. The amendment allowed the Secretary of Defense, together with the 
Attorney General and the Secretary of the Treasury, to ‘assign’ members of the armed 
forces to assist the Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS) and the US Customs 
Service with border protection, and explicitly extended the military support beyond 
drug control to include anti-terrorist activities (Turbiville and Graham, 1999). 
 
This is just another example of how cooperation between the military and civilian 
agencies can enhance and control security. 
 
However, debate over the form of crisis management within the EU and NATO is here 
to stay and this will remain a topic of discussion and negotiation especially after the 
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Lisbon Treaty (Hynek, 2011). It is not only NATO that is contextualising basic concepts 
and terms in order to outline the evolution of civil/military coordination, but also the 
EU which views this as the only way for the protection of the Union. 
 
One of the major tools utilised by NATO is the Naval Cooperation and Guidance for 
Shipping (NCAGS), the revised policy document approved by the NATO Military 
Committee (NATO, 2015a), which was created to establish the policy of conducting 
NCAGS operations across the full range of maritime requirements in support of military 
operations involving merchant shipping. The purpose of this policy is to assist NATO or 
individual nations involved in a military operation to optimise the cooperation between 
military and merchant shipping and minimise the disruption to military activities. 
NCAGS operations are applicable both in peacetime and in time of conflict including 
civil emergencies which require an integrated Combined Joint HQ command. The 
NCAGS command structure is very flexible and inevitably has positive effects in 
maintaining maritime security as noted by NCAGS itself (NATO, 2015a). 
 
Benefits for civilian shipping 
1.   Enhanced safety and security 
2.   Reduced delays when transiting through areas of military operations 
3.   Continued operation of commercial maritime transport system 
4.   Improved threat response 
5.   Enhanced understanding of military constraints 
6.   Potential for reduced war-risks premium 
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Benefits for military commanders 
1.   A more comprehensive picture of merchant shipping activity, movements and 
positions (MSA) 
2.   Reduced interference between commercial shipping and military operations 
(deconfliction) 
3.   Enhanced safety and security 
4.   Improved effectiveness of military operations 
5.   Enhanced understanding of commercial shipping constraints 
6.   Improved counter-terrorism capability 
 
It must be recognised that NCAGS is used in an advisory manner only, and the 
information it disseminates is not an order or command (NATO, 2015a). 
 
As mentioned earlier in this section, the cooperation between civilians and the military 
is not intrinsically natural and there are many hurdles and obstacles to be overcome 
(which, however, are beyond the scope of this thesis). Nonetheless, these need to be 
recognised and addressed in order to fully exploit potential benefits. Leaders of both 
civilians and the military are often conflicted as can be seen in several sources; to quote 
but one ‘…the imperative need for military and civilian actors to adapt both culture and 
structure if mission success for all is to be achieved’ (Bollen, 2008, p. XV). The authors 
argue that man-made and natural disasters are so complex in nature that they cannot be 
handled by a single-minded force regardless of funding and that most civil emergencies 
will have a military component requiring the participation of several agencies and 
institutions. This poses the question: Why not secure the commitment of all players to 
the terms of cooperation before the disaster or civil emergency requirement arises? In 
order to lay the foundation of such an agreement for integrated cooperation between the 
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civilian and military sealift agencies, it is necessary to fully understand the mind set and 
operational methodology of each so that the civil/military synergy can yield maximum 
benefits. 
 
The International Red Cross recognises that in recent years, more and more civilian 
‘peace keeping’ and humanitarian aid operations are being carried out by the military; to 
put it succinctly, there is ‘militarisation of humanitarian action’. On the one hand, this 
could be attributed to the efficiency of the military and the fact that no additional 
funding is required; on the other hand, it is true that since the end of the Cold War and 
the removal of the perceived threat from the East, the military have been searching for a 
purpose beyond defence. This trend, according to Rana (2004), was often opposed by 
NGOs and humanitarian aid agencies fearing lack of neutrality given the history of 
military involvement even in peacekeeping missions. The author goes on to examine 
the role of the military within humanitarian aid agencies and the effects of civilians 
embedded into the military on civilian operations; although both topics are beyond the 
scope of this thesis, the above goes to show that the world is changing and that the 
concept of civil/military synergies and cooperation is becoming a reality as opposed to 
just an idea. 
 
The European Commission, DG Enterprise and a consortium led by ECORYS 
Nederland B.V. commissioned an investigation in the context of the Framework 
Contract on Security, ENTR/09/050, which produced the Study on Civil-Military 
Synergies in the Field of Security (ECORYS, 2012). This considered indirect benefits 
derived from civil/military synergies such as, for example, the anticipated transfer of 
technological knowledge that would otherwise be lost or never experienced. 
Additionally, the study looked at economic models relevant to either civilian or military 
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operations which could be performed to mutual benefit and finally suggested other 
areas where civil/military synergies could be exploited to strengthen the community. 
 
It is becoming apparent that cooperation between a civilian agency and the military has 
the potential for providing advantages not only in terms of efficiency but also 
financially and even in the area of humanitarian aid as suggested in an ECORYS report 
(2012) prepared for the European Commission; furthermore, developments in the 
security environment are leading to increased overlap between the military and civil 
security domains and a blurred distinction between the two. In this context, there is a 
clear opportunity for developing and exploiting synergies between the military and civil 
security domains, and to forcefully promote convergence between the two sectors. 
 
Therefore, there is a serious demand for all forms of cooperation between the 
civilian/commercial sector and the military wherever money is not the prime 
consideration and the objective is of paramount importance. Combining these two 
distinct ideologies in maritime transportation is the foundation and central issue of this 
thesis:  How can a military transportation desk officer integrate the commercial 
shipping market assets and services into strategic sealift, in a practical and cost 
effective manner for strategic deployment, re-deployment, sustainment, humanitarian 
aid and refugee evacuation? 
 
1.1 Research Objective and Aims 
That strategic sealift is an integral part of any military or humanitarian operation is an 
undisputed fact, whether it is for purposes of defence, humanitarian aid/relief or refugee 
evacuation. 
Military leaders and planners have always considered the planning of deployment and 
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sustainment of personnel and hardware of equal importance to that of planning the 
military operation proper. The Naval Supply Systems have collected various leaders’ 
views: 
 
Because of my wartime experience, I am insistent on the point that logistics 
know-how must be maintained, that logistics is second to nothing in importance 
in warfare, that logistic training must be widespread and thorough, and that it is 
folly to waste time on mediocre talent 
Vice Admiral Robert B. Carney, USN (Carney, 2005, p. 1). 
 
Logistic considerations belong not only in the highest echelons of military 
planning during the process of preparation for war and for specific wartime 
operations, but may well become the controlling element with relation to timing 
and successful operation 
Vice Admiral Oscar C. Badger, USN (Badger, 2005, p. 1). 
 
During the last war, eighty percent of our problems were of a logistical nature 
Field Marshall Montgomery (Montgomery, 2005, p. 2). 
 
Historically, mass movement by air has assisted successfully in humanitarian aid in 
places with limited or no access to shipping. For example, at the end of the Second 
World War, U.S., British, and Soviet military forces divided and occupied Germany. 
Also divided into occupation zones, Berlin was located far inside Soviet-controlled 
eastern Germany. The United States, United Kingdom, and France controlled the 
western part of the city, while Soviet troops controlled the eastern sector. As the 
wartime alliance between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union ended and friendly 
relations turned hostile, the question of whether the western occupation zones in Berlin 
would remain under Western Allied control or whether the city would be absorbed into 
Soviet-controlled eastern Germany led to the first Berlin crisis of the Cold War. The 
crisis started on June 24, 1948, when Soviet forces blockaded rail, road, and water 
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access to allied-controlled areas of Berlin. The United States and United Kingdom 
responded by airlifting food and fuel to Berlin from allied airbases in western Germany. 
The crisis ended on 12 May 1949, when Soviet forces lifted the blockade on land access 
to western Berlin (The Guardian, 2015). 
 
However, large, heavy objects and machinery for defence, mass movement of 
humanitarian aid and the mass evacuation of displaced populations can only be 
successfully and safely moved by sea. Any other methods of transportation, it is argued,  
namely airlift, train or road transportation, are not only disproportionately more 
expensive but constrained by the limitations of aircraft and the domestic infrastructure 
of participating nations. Aircraft are ‘weight limited’ when transporting heavy objects 
and ‘volume limited’ when transporting light objects. Trains are constrained by the 
direction of their tracks and a plethora of different rail gauges throughout the world, and 
road trucks are simply limited by traffic and cumbersome regulatory restrictions, not to 
mention the torment of border crossings that every traveller, tourist or businessman has 
experienced. Therefore, the slow moving ship essentially provides the fastest mass 
transportation method, tonne-mile for tonne-mile, given current technology (McCann, 
2006). 
 
Today’s military and civil budgets are shrinking at previously unheard-of rates in a 
number of countries (e.g., USA and Russia, both though for different reasons – see 
figure below - although this may not be the case globally), and as yet there is no end to 
the size of reductions that can be expected over the next few years. This, coupled with 
ever-increasing costs and the necessity to take advantage of civil/military synergies, 
raises concern about getting the desired results without compromising the military’s 
command and control of any strategic sealift operation be it military, humanitarian or 
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refugee evacuation. 
 
Money may be in short supply but conflicts and natural disasters are not affected by any 
of the austerity measures taken in light of the world’s financial woes. 
 
Table 1: Trends in US Military Spending, Walker (2014, p.4). 
 
There are many physical, economic and natural constraints in strategic sealift that the 
military is either unwilling or unable to overcome. However, necessity being the mother 
of invention, the merchant navy has, for commercial reasons, found practical solutions 
to these problems. The question arises as to why nations should pay for modernising 
their costly grey hull sealift fleet when the merchant navy has had to annually undergo 
this modernisation in order to remain competitive? All the up-grades and modernisation 
of the commercial fleet come at no cost to the nations who choose to make use of this 
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modern commercial fleet. 
 
An unnamed source in the commercial shipping market suggests that ‘A ship is out of 
date as soon as she glides down the slip-way’. Why should nations bear the financial 
burden of depreciation and problems of reduction in operability while the nationally 
owned grey hull sealift fleet ages and attains obsolete status? 
 
In order to create the foundations for integrated civilian/military cooperation it is firstly 
necessary for the military, the ultimate ‘end-user’ of the service, to have a solid 
understanding of all aspects and advantages of the commercial shipping market and 
some appreciation of the potential benefits of these civil/military synergies. 
 
Therefore, this thesis will introduce to the reader all the essential commercial elements 
that make up the merchant shipping market; its ultimate goal is to create a user-friendly 
tool for the military transportation desk officer and to assist in the appropriate 
utilisation of commercial sealift assets from the market for strategic and humanitarian 
sealift transportation. 
 
With this in mind, the ultimate purpose of this study is to assist nations and the military 
with integrating the immense capacity, versatility and know-how of the commercial 
Merchant Navy with nationally owned sealift assets. The aim is not only to enhance the 
cost efficiency of strategic sealift in today's financially strained environment, but also to 
achieve modes of sealift that would not be possible through the use of current military 
sealift assets alone. 
 
To recapitulate, the main aim of this study is to answer the question: How can a military 
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movement and transportation desk officer integrate the commercial shipping market 
assets and services into strategic sealift, in a practical and cost effective manner for 
strategic deployment, sustainment, re-deployment, and humanitarian aid? 
 
In an attempt to investigate the above question, the researcher will pursue the following 
study objectives: 
i.   To identify the issues at hand 
ii.   To develop a theoretical framework that allows military sealift personnel to 
efficiently and cost-effectively procure shipping assets 
iii.   To validate the theoretical framework, assessing its functional competence and 
iv.   To evaluate the outcomes, process and theoretical framework 
 
1.2 Research Design 
To meet the indicated objectives this study will pursue an empirical investigation of the 
role of strategic sealift as an integral part of any military or humanitarian operation. 
Empirical research focuses on controlled observation and is the dominant element in a 
number of social and business research (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2009; Kumar, 
2011).  The majority of the studies in the field (NATO Reports, European Policy Papers 
but also a number of relevant studies such as: Schank, Mattock, Summer, Grenberg, 
Rothenberg and Stucker, 1991; Yang, Rodin and Amin, 1996; McKinzie and Barnes, 
2004; Weber, 2006; Schoff and Travayiakis, 2007) have employed a phenomenological 
approach as part of their methodology (via participant observation, workshops and 
interviews). This study also employs a similar methodology which combines a number 
of research approaches. In the initial stage, data were collected based on personal 
observation and participation in a number of meetings and committees along with 
historical facts. The next stage involves the design of a theoretical framework, the 
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development of two relevant case studies and finally the testing, via interviews, of the 
proposed theoretical framework. 
 
1.3 Study Limitations 
There are a number of limitations given the nature of this study. Firstly, there is limited 
research in the field of civil/military integration for strategic sealift. Therefore, there is a 
lack of reliable data in previous studies which constitutes a significant obstacle to 
documenting trends and relationships. Another difficulty relates to the restricted access 
to confidential data available from NATO and government officials. In addition, small 
sample size hinders the interpretation of results and makes generalisations more 
difficult. 
 
1.4 Sources of Information 
A number of NATO reports and papers were utilised to access historical facts and 
information. Useful and valuable data were also obtained through personal participation 
in numerous maritime adventures, commercial ventures, seminars, lectures, working 
groups and committees. This included involvement in organisations such as NATO, 
HWR and others. 
 
1.5 Outline of the Thesis   
Chapter Two gives a detailed description of the commercial shipping market and 
appropriate insurance cover.  Chapter Three describes the theoretical background and 
literature review of potential civil and military integration for strategic sealift. Chapter 
Four highlights the different research methodologies and the proposed research design. 
Chapter Five introduces the model of integrating commercial shipping market assets 
and services into strategic sealifts. Later in the chapter, two case studies are presented. 
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The findings are examined to contribute to knowledge in the field of civil/military 
integration for strategic sealift. Finally, in Chapter Six certain limitations of this study 
are discussed along with recommendation for further research and general conclusions. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Merchant Shipping Assets Literature Review 
 
2.1 Introduction into the Commercial Shipping Market 
 
This chapter introduces the complexities of the commercial shipping market in basic 
terms reviewing the realm of the commercial shipping market and the ways in which it 
can assist or augment a military strategic sealift operation or a humanitarian aid 
operation. Without some knowledge of the economics and the terminology of this 
market, it would not be possible to take advantage of the civil/military synergies or the 
far-reaching capabilities and know-how of the commercial shipping market. 
 
2.2 Trading Methods 
 
In simple terms the commercial shipping market can be divided into two sections: 
 
•   The liner vessel 
•   The tramp vessel 
 
These are common terms of the trade as suggested by the World Shipping Council 
(2015): 
 
The Liner Vessel 
The liner vessel trades on a fixed schedule, loading and discharging at pre-designated 
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ports. This creates the opportunity to advertise and offer a repetitive service with a 
known timetable and transportation cost. The cost may vary due to seasonal factors or 
fluctuations in the cost of fuel. Additionally, changes can occur in the port scheduling 
due to congestion, port closure, bad weather or acts of God. Any type of vessel can be 
employed on a liner run.  
 
An example of this is the tanker shuttle service in the Persian Gulf (IMO, 2004b). 
Chapter 1, Regulation 2 (h)  describes where Very Large Crude Oil Carriers (VLCC) 
load at Kharg Island and discharge at Sirri Island. This is a continuous ‘production line’ 
service, where ships follow a prescribed schedule to ensure the continuous flow of 
crude oil for international trade out of Sirri Island. From there other tankers, known as 
‘tramp ships’ (see below) are individually chartered to carry the cargo all over the 
world. They may actually be identical to the shuttle tankers though they differ in the 
way they are commercially operated. 
 
Another example of a liner service is a container ship (IMO, 2004b) calling on fixed 
dates at various ports around the world, in or out of geographical rotation, loading and 
discharging as mentioned in chapter one, regulation 2(g). These liner services are very 
popular today and their schedules can be easily found on the internet. These container 
vessels are usually referred to as mother ships and they load and discharge most of their 
cargo at ‘Hub Ports’ as analysed in the NATO Hub and Spoke concept analysis which 
will be discussed below (NATO, 2004b). From there, tramp container vessels, or feeder 
vessels, are chartered to collect and deliver cargo to smaller ports, or spokes, in the 
vicinity. In general terms, the mother ships are considerably larger than the feeder-
vessels up to an order of magnitude of ten. 
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Bulk liner services also exist: for example, a power station, knowing its monthly coal 
consumption requirements, can charter a bulk carrier to deliver coal on a regular basis. 
The power station company has a regular, known, minimum requirement of coal on a 
monthly or annual basis. For obvious economic and operational reasons, the power 
station company procures the transportation of coal on a liner service basis. This 
guarantees a regular supply of coal and thus an economical and uninterrupted supply of 
energy to their customers. In the event of seasonal fluctuations when additional power 
is required, say, in the winter and summer months with the increased use of heaters and 
air conditioning units respectively, the power station will go into the spot commodities 
market and purchase additional coal and then to the spot shipping market and charter a 
tramp vessel to meet the additional demand. This is a convenient and economically 
sensible way of covering seasonal fluctuations in supply, without having to use 
stockpiles, which are expensive and, in the case of coal, can pose a fire hazard. 
 
The Tramp vessel 
Using the examples as above to describe the tramp vessel: 
 
In the case of a shuttle tanker (e.g. from Kharg Island to Sirri Island) it may be that 
sometimes she is in dry dock for scheduled survey work or damage repair or otherwise 
not readily available for her prescribed trade; nonetheless, the transport of oil must 
continue. So, the oil shipper and/or trader will go to the open spot tanker market and 
charter a tramp ship, a tanker of very similar size and specification, to do a voyage or 
two, until the shuttle ship is back on line. This vessel is known in the market as a tramp 
vessel. 
 
The same example applies to container ships (IMO, 2004b), specified in chapter one, 
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regulation 2(g),  or even to RO/ROs (“Roll on/Roll off” vessels predominantly used for 
rolling stock) on a liner service, in that they can be replaced or the service augmented 
during high season by chartering a tramp vessel that happens to be uncharted, provided 
it is of similar size and specification, and suitably positioned, in order to avoid a large 
ballast voyage cost (the voyage without cargo using ballast water for stability). 
 
In the case of the bulk carrier (IMO, 2004b) as discussed earlier, the power station will 
have a regular coal delivery for its nominal power requirements. In the event of an 
increase in demand, (i.e. caused by seasonal increases in electrical power requirements), 
a tramp vessel can be picked off the market to transport and supply the additional coal 
required. 
 
This concept applies to almost all commodities, and the tramp vessel can be used to 
supplement the buffer shipping tonnage available as required. 
 
One notable and final example of the shipper combining liner and tramp vessels in a 
single commercial venture is that of the oil majors. For the most part, large oil 
companies own their own tankers, or at least they are despondent owners (Packard, 
1980; ICS, 2015) through long term period charters (to be discussed later). With this 
set-up they satisfy their standard supply requirements. Then, when more oil is required, 
(which may result from a seasonal increase in demand or general economic growth by 
an oil-consuming nation or even the closure of nuclear power stations), the oil 
companies can charter the services of tramp vessels to cover the sudden, and probably 
temporary, increase in the demand for oil. If the increase in demand tapers off, then they 
simply redeliver the tramp vessel by terminating the charter and retain the owned, or 
long period chartered, vessels, thus avoiding the expense of owning vessels that will be 
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seasonally idle (OECD, 2015). 
 
Therefore, any customer (e.g. an emigrating family, a power station, a grain house, a 
rice trader or even the military) has several options vessel-wise and a wide range of 
contracts that they could use to satisfy their marine transportation needs. To the ship  
owner and ship operator (IMO, 2004b) any customer is just like any other customer 
provided they make payment on time and the cargo is legal and unsanctioned. 
 
2.2.1 Changes in the Commercial Shipping Market 
 
Over the past fifty years there have been few changes in the commercial shipping 
market more important than the introduction of the shipping container which 
revolutionised the transportation of finished products and general cargo. 
 
The major changes identified by a number of studies are: 
 
•   Regulatory changes 
•   The RO/RO 
•   The container 
•   The Hub and Spoke concept 
•   The passenger ferry boat 
 
Regulatory changes 
The advent of the double skin tanker did not ostensibly change the oil trade but just 
made it more expensive, while conveying to the uninformed a false sense of safety 
against pollution. In fact, the double skin is only protection against very low energy 
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grounding and raking damage (Marineinsight.com, 2016). 
 
However, the introduction of the International Safety Management Code, ISM (IMO, 
2004a) and the auditing of procedures have resulted in the substantial reduction in the 
number of sub-standard ships sailing the oceans. It has gone a long way in levelling the 
competitive playing field, where unscrupulous owners created unfair competition by 
running their vessels with unqualified crews and sub-standard levels of maintenance, 
cutting corners in every department (IMO, 2004a). As a consequence, with reduced 
running costs and no substantial standardised international inspection regime, these 
owners could accept lower freight rates and still increase their profits. The sub-standard 
ship (not to be confused with old ship; age has nothing to do with the quality of a vessel 
or the service provided by its operator) is basically a thing of the past and, with the ISM 
and Port State Control inspections in place (IMO, 2004a), shipping is safer and 
probably the most environmentally friendly form of transport, tonne mile for tonne 
mile. 
 
However, this auditing procedure has existed since before the Second World War: 
Greek flag vessels have, as part of their flag state requirements, a Safety Drill Log Book 
which is updated on a bi-weekly basis recording the condition of safety equipment such 
as the emergency fire pump, lifesaving appliances life boats and flares (IMO, 2004a). It 
also records dates in which safety drills are carried out (e.g. fire drills, abandon ship 
drills, etc.). These log books are audited by the Greek Consular Harbour Masters in 
ports all over the world. 
 
The RO/RO 
The development of the RO/RO (Roll on/Roll off) vessel made the transportation of 
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cars and trucks, the so called ‘Rolling Stock’, much faster and easier; this type of vessel 
was yet a further development of the ferry boat, which existed in one form or another 
all over the world from when man first took to the sea (IMO, 2004b). This type of ship 
has developed greatly over the years. For example, as more people preferred to drive 
SUVs, the car decks in RO/ROs had to be taller in order to accommodate the new type 
of car. Finally, the market was divided into two distinct ship types: the Car Carrier 
RO/RO that can also carry some trucks on its main deck but is mainly designed to carry 
commuter cars on its upper and lower fixed decks, and the Pure Car and Truck Carrier 
(PCTC) that has movable car decks and can carry any configuration of rolling stock, 
cars and trucks. This ship type, the RO/RO, in any of its forms, is the most military-
friendly and practically useful vessel for the delivery of humanitarian aid (IMO, 2004b). 
There are, of course, certain other significant factors as to the suitability of these vessels 
for military and/or humanitarian purposes such as the speed, draft and configuration and 
load bearing capacity of the loading ramps. 
 
The container 
Before the development of the container, most general cargo (basically everything 
except bulk cargo, oil and gas) was carried on general cargo vessels, known in shipping 
terms as the ‘Tween Decker’ - the workhorses of the merchant navy (IMO, 2004). The 
configuration of these ships consists of the same basic design as a bulk carrier but with 
a horizontal second deck about two-thirds of the way up the hold, hence the name 
Tween Decker. These ships have developed over the years from the old wooden sail 
powered ships to the ‘standard type’ three-island ships (with forward, mid and aft 
accommodation) of the pre-war years to the ultra-modern self-discharging multi-
purpose general cargo vessel.  These modern ships can carry all sorts of general cargo 
including containers and rolling stock and, in certain cases, types of bulk cargo. The 
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greatest development along these lines was the wartime ‘Liberty ship’, which 
revolutionised shipbuilding and the shipping trade in general (Chambers, 2011). 
 
The drawbacks of these ships were (a) delays in the loading and discharging of general 
cargo and (b) additional transportation costs to the end user from the port of discharge 
to the final destination. The cargo was generally in crates which were hard to keep 
together during shipping and were usually loaded and discharged with cranes or derrick 
with the lift on/lift off arrangement but this was becoming inefficient as trade 
requirements grew; therefore, efforts were devoted to developing an alternative solution 
and the container was developed. 
 
At first, general cargo ships were converted to carry containers in addition to their 
general cargo, but as the customers began to be comfortable with the use and 
transportation of containers, products were designed to be containerizable and the 
specialized container ship was born. Its success meant that it gradually surpassed the 
general cargo ship in popularity. Nevertheless, several hundreds of these modern multi-
purpose ships still exist and trade very successfully. They are very suitable for military 
or humanitarian aid especially when there are limited port or cargo handling facilities 
either at the loading or discharging ports. In fact, the Falkland Islands crisis witnessed a 
surge in the use of the ‘Tween Decker’ as the port facilities of the south Atlantic islands 
were practically non-existent (Koburger, 1983). 
 
Containers made life much easier and more convenient for the shipper: an empty 
container would arrive at his premises, the container would be loaded (or ‘stuffed’ as it 
is known in the trade), and the standard container would then be transported by road to 
the port of embarkation and loaded by a computerized crane – with gradually 
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diminishing human input. The container ship would then sail at high speed (twenty 
knots plus) to a main hub port and the container would be discharged and delivered to 
the end user and ‘unstuffed’, and finally the empty container would either be used for 
the return trip or returned as an empty twenty to forty foot equivalent unit. 
 
As containers became more popular, the container ships began to grow in size and 
container liner services, as described above, began to develop. 
 
The standard container, known as the TEU, (Twenty foot Equivalent Unit), is twenty 
foot long, eight foot wide and eight foot six inches high. The width of a container is a 
limiting factor with respect to road transportation. There is also the FEU, the “Forty 
foot Equivalent Unit”. There are some other high volume containers which are taller but 
never wider. The container ship is fitted with corner container fittings allowing for 
quick lashing and unlashing. The containers are secured in place by rods as opposed to 
wires to prevent the loosening of the securing arrangements due to strain (IMO, 2004b). 
 
Despite the speed designed into container transportation, the actual speed, from pick up 
to delivery, rarely exceeds one mile per hour, the fastest part of the transportation being 
the sea leg. The slowest-moving part of the arrangement is time spent in port waiting 
for customs clearance or available road transport, and the actual overland 
transportation, which entails all the hazards and delays of today’s congested road 
networks including the increase of vehicular air pollution (NABU, 2014). 
 
The container and RO/RO liner service is a very competitive business, and most 
companies have to reduce the freight rates to maintain the necessary volumes of cargo 
to justify their line. Thus, the only additional service they can offer in order to attract 
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customers is a fast, regular and reliable schedule. Reputation is of the utmost 
importance in this highly competitive business. 
 
The Hub and Spoke concept 
Time is of the essence to the liner operator as they are constantly striving to perfect and 
fine-tune their service. Several years ago liner service operators developed the Hub Port 
concept. This meant that they could expand the number of ports that were serviced by 
the liner company. The large container ‘mother’ ship only calls at the main hub ports 
while the small ‘feeder’ vessels collect and deliver the cargo to and from the hub ports 
to a plethora of smaller ports around the hub port known as the spoke ports (to be 
discussed more expansively in a later chapter). 
 
The passenger ferry boat 
Another type of vessel suitable for military and/or humanitarian aid operations is the 
passenger ferry; this is turning out to be a very useful vessel for strategic sealift, 
humanitarian aid and refugee evacuation. The modern passenger ferry (IMO, 2004b) 
has several militarily useful features; many can accommodate and provide hotel 
services to over eight hundred personnel and at the same time have a garage space of 
about two thousand five hundred commercial lane meters, equivalent to about three 
thousand military lane meters. (The military save space by loading their vehicles end to 
end with ends almost touching, whereas a commercial shipper of new cars will have a 
pre-specified distance between vehicles to prevent costly bumps and scratches). Most 
passenger ferries are fitted with sophisticated communication systems allowing for 
support in command and control functions and most are fitted with helicopter and 
Medevac capabilities. These modern features are combined with high speeds, in excess 
of twenty knots, good maneuverability and high capacity loading ramps. Many of the 
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modern passenger ferries also have the ability to perform Mediterranean mooring, stern-
to, as opposed to the conventional ‘alongside’ mooring, which allows the vessels to 
operate in ports that have been either damaged or are actually suitable for much smaller 
vessels. It is quite common for modern passenger ferries to have more than one access 
door and ramps, and be of a far shallower draft than the older passenger ferries, which 
further increases the versatility of this type of vessel as it is not restricted only to deep 
water ports (Shipping Guides LTD, 2017). 
 
You will note that no reference has been made to specialized trades such a reefer vessel, 
liquefied petroleum or natural gas carriers and heavy lift vessels – this is because these 
types of cargo are not carried regularly by the military, nor used in humanitarian aid. 
 
2.2.2 International Maritime Organization (IMO) Cargo Class 
 
An important detail, which affects military as well as humanitarian cargoes, is the IMO 
cargo classification. The International Maritime Organization (IMO) has classified 
almost all cargoes carried by sea. These classifications are published in a series of 
books and allow the ship operator and the insurance underwriter to assess the risk and 
prepare the vessel for the maritime adventure by knowing the particulars of the cargo to 
be loaded (IMO, 2004b). 
 
Dangerous goods are classified into different classes and subdivisions, with definitions 
and descriptions of the characteristics and properties of the substances, material and 
articles, which would fall within each class or division. General provisions for each 
class or division are given; individually dangerous goods are listed in the Dangerous 
Goods List, along with the class and any specific transportation requirements as 
31 
 
discussed above (IMO, 2004b). 
 
In accordance with the criteria for the selection of marine pollutants for the purposes of 
Annex III of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 
1973, as modified by the Protocol of 1978 relating thereto, MARPOL 73/78, a number 
of dangerous substances in the various classes have also been identified as substances 
harmful to the marine environment, marine pollutants (MARPOL, 2006). 
 
There are dangerous cargoes such as ammunition, which are Class 1 cargoes and are 
carried predominantly for the military. All such cargoes are required to be properly 
labelled, packed and transported in an approved manner as set out in the IMO (2012) 
guidelines. The classes of the IMDG code are: 
 
1.   Explosives 
2.   Gases 
3.   Flammable Liquids 
4.   Flammable Solids 
5.   Oxidizing Substances 
6.   Toxic and Infectious Substances 
7.   Radioactive Material 
8.   Corrosives 
9.   Miscellaneous Dangerous Goods 
 
The above is a very brief introduction of the various types of vessels, trade and services 
offered in the commercial shipping market. However, such an introduction into the 
workings of the commercial shipping market would not be complete without an 
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explanation of how a customer can purchase the various services offered in the market. 
 
2.2.3 Chartering Commercial Vessels 
 
To charter a tramp ship of any description a customer will need to go to a ship broker 
(Packard, 1980; ICS, 2015), i.e., the middleman, and give his cargo and shipping 
requirements. These would include, but not limited to, details of the intended port of 
loading, port of discharge, cargo description and size, a range of possible loading dates, 
the terms of  payment and the preferred standard contract of carriage to be used 
(Packard, 1980; ICS, 2014). There are of course other considerations such as who 
handles loading and discharging and who pays for the intended service and insurance 
costs, flag and draft restrictions, to name just a few (Packard, 1980; Latarche, 2013). 
The broker would then go to the commercial shipping market or directly to an owner or 
operator that he knows and trusts, and offer the business with the expectation of a 
counter-offer (Packard, 1980; ICS, 2015). 
 
Once the broker had collected suitable, available tonnage, he would return to the 
customer with the appropriate offers. This, would be invariably offered at a higher 
freight rate than that suggested by the shipper or cargo owner, with a range of dates 
within which the vessel could present a ‘notice of readiness’ at the port of loading along 
with various alterations to the standard preferred contract (to be discussed later). Of 
course, no ships  may be forthcoming if the proposed payment is unattractive or the date 
range for presentation at the first loading port is too tight, or even if the customer or 
charterer has a reputation for unreliability (Coghlin, Baker, Kenny, Kimball and 
Belknap, 2014). The business can be concluded in one of the following ways; either on 
Time Charter (Packard, 1980; ICS, 2014) or on Voyage Charter (Packard, 1980; ICS, 
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2014) or on Bareboat Charter (Sharp, 2005): 
•   The Time Charter: The Time Charter contract is a common and user friendly 
contract of carriage by sea: basically it requires the customer or charterer to pay all 
port expenses including loading and discharging costs, tug boats, lines men etc. 
Also, the customer would pay for fuel and any canal fees and a rate of so many 
thousand dollars per day to the shipowner (Packard, 1980; ICS, 2014). 
•   The Voyage Charter: In the Voyage charter contract, the shipowner or ship 
operator pays for port, canal and fuel expenses and the customer or charterer makes 
a lump-sum freight payment, which is calculated in dollars per tonne of cargo 
carried (Packard, 1980; ICS, 2014). 
•   The Bareboat Charter: The term bareboat charter denotes an arrangement for 
the hiring of a boat or ship without a crew and the party chartering the ship from the 
owner is responsible for hiring the crew and making all other arrangements. Hence, 
a bareboat charter is a contract whereby the charterer is assigned the rights and 
obligations of “ownership” (Sharp, 2005). The fixed duration of this type of charter 
is typically extends over a number of years. The charterer pays in advance for the 
ship on a monthly or semi-annual basis even if the vessel is laid up or carries less 
than its full capacity. Under a bareboat charter, the charterer assumes total 
responsibility for operating the ship, including manning, provisioning, maintenance, 
navigation, and logistic support (Sharp, 2005). 
 
Cargo handling expenses 
The loading and discharging costs are not always paid by the customer or charterer, 
whether he be the charterer or the shipper or the provider of the commodity. There are 
various systems in place such as liner-in/liner-out, where the shipowner or ship operator 
pays for loading and discharge, and free-in/free-out, where the customer, shipper or 
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receiver pays the loading and/or discharging expenses (Packard, 1980; Latarche, 2013). 
 
There are, of course, various permutations and combinations of the so-called liner 
terms. But these are not relevant to the cargoes discussed in this thesis. 
 
Practical understanding of different chartering methods 
Liner and tramp vessels are often fixed on a long-term time charter, known as period 
charter, to an operator or even directly to the customer, charterer, shipper or receiver. 
The operator then becomes the disponent owner (Packard, 1980; ICS, 2015) of the 
vessel and assumes many of the shipowners’ responsibilities and liabilities with respect 
to cargo and its carriage. He is responsible for the good, clean and timely delivery of the 
cargo according to the terms and conditions of the contract of carriage with respect to 
both quantity and quality. The operator looks in the market for business and assumes the 
commercial contractual obligations and responsibilities of the shipowner when sub-
chartering the vessel. A simple way of understanding these different methods of 
chartering a ship is to imagine yourselves leaving your home to go to work. This is a 
very simple analogy: you are the cargo and the vehicle of choice is the ship. 
1.   Imagine that you own a car; this is equivalent to you being a shipowner or a 
nation owning a fleet of grey hulls. You will pay all capital costs of purchasing 
the car including any associated principal and interest payments, the broker’s 
commission (rather like the car salesman’s cut), insurance, parking, all 
maintenance, the road tax, the MOT, the driver qualification certificate, fuel, 
lubricants and chemicals (anti-freeze, etc.), any fines/tolls, all damage whether 
minor or catastrophic, third party accidents as well as your own, the expected 
wear and tear due to age and use, third party liabilities, modernization, tire 
changes, suffer the consequences of redundancy and finally the cost of 
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ecological disposal. The same arrangement applies to privately and nationally 
owned assets: the shipowner or nation pays for building or purchasing the asset 
on the second-hand market and for other expenses: insurance (hull and 
machinery, third part liability, loss of hire and war risks), berthing and port 
expenses, continuous maintenance, dry dock expenses every 2.5 years, 
classification inspection and certification, crewing expenses and their medical 
bills, victualling expenses for crew and visitors, fuel and lubricant costs, port 
and pilot costs, damage and wear and tear repairs, and, finally, incur the costs of 
unforeseen events e.g., if the military or any other customer  needs a bigger tank 
that does not fit in your now out-of-date vessel. Lastly, there is the political and 
ecological cost of scrapping of the vessel (IMO, 2003) stated in guidelines on 
ship recycling. The main advantage of this is that you have the assured use of 
the asset at a moment’s notice, provided, of course, you are prepared to pay the 
additional costs of maintaining the vessel at a one to five day notice of 
readiness. 
 
2.   If, however, you take a taxi to work, this is the equivalent of a time charter 
(Packard, 1980; ICS, 2014). You hire a means of transportation with a fixed 
capacity; it is available at the place of your choice, it collects you from your 
home and takes you directly to your destination without stopping elsewhere or 
picking up other passengers, basically a door-to-door service. You pay a fixed 
fee per mile travelled and an additional fee for any waiting time. You pay almost 
the same amount whether the travelling party consists of one or five persons 
(five being the maximum capacity of the taxi). Thus, if the taxi is not used to 
capacity, you inevitably pay for empty space. However, the customer is not 
involved in the choice of a driver, in paying for maintenance and insurance, for 
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tolls or parking expenses, MOT, fines or damage repairs, and most importantly 
if the taxi is too small or too old or just simply not up to date, then the cabby has 
to worry about purchasing a new taxi to satisfy the ever changing needs of his 
customers or changes in national and international road and safety regulations. 
In shipping terms, the customer charters (hires) a vessel of a known type, 
capacity, speed and fuel consumption. The vessel comes to load at the 
customer’s preferred port and sails directly to the customer’s preferred port of 
discharge. The fee paid amounts to thousands of US dollars per day and the 
customer also pays for port expenses, tugboats, pilots, canal dues and fuel 
whether the vessel is full or not. If, however, a particular vessel cannot 
accommodate the customer’s cargo, he can simply go to the market and choose 
a better, bigger, faster or more modern ship without any additional costs. Finally, 
when the ship is too old to trade or too small to satisfy the customer’s needs, the 
shipowner has to deal with this problem himself by disposing of the asset, and 
purchasing a new larger, faster, greener asset in the hope that his new acquisition 
will appeal to as many customers as possible. There is an additional up-side for 
the customer user: he may be able to take advantage of fluctuations in the 
charter market if he can wait for a slump when prices are lower whereas the 
shipowner must incur the risk of instability in the commercial charter market 
caused by the fluctuations in the global economy. 
 
3.   If, on the other hand, you take a bus to work, you are doing the equivalent of 
using a liner service. Ostensibly, you only pay for the space you occupy and you 
know the bus itinerary. You have to make your own arrangements for arriving at 
the bus stop, getting there on time, choosing the right bus, and making your own 
arrangements to get from the bus stop to your final destination. This method of 
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transportation is cheaper as you only pay for the seat you use and you don’t get 
involved in the operational expenses of that bus or the route in question; 
however, there is the delay associated with several stops en route to your final 
destination and the sharing of the bus with other passengers. In shipping terms, 
the customer is aware of the published liner service schedule and can make 
arrangements for the cargo to arrive at the load port demarcation area prior to 
the vessel’s departure. The departure and arrival dates are usually available 
online and are therefore known; furthermore, the customer is aware of the cost 
involved stated in dollars per tonne ($/MT) or dollars per cubic meter ($/M3) of 
actual cargo transported. Once the cargo arrives at the prearranged port of 
discharge, the customer must arrange for its onward transportation to the final 
destination or place of business of the end user.  
 
The issue of sensitive cargo as well as the command and control capabilities required by 
the military can be easily solved in the liner business either by allowing the customer to 
accompany the cargo or by fitting GPS trackers to the cargo. Cargo sensitivity may also 
be easily addressed by either segregating the cargo or requesting a particular position 
for the cargo to be stowed. Again, when the ship becomes obsolete or not suitable in 
terms of size, speed and/or fuel consumption, it is the shipowner who must replace the 
vessel in order to retain customers and market share. As discussed above, the 
commercial success of this type of charter is heavily dependent on the liner service 
providers’ reliability and reputation. In recent years the trend is that liner type business 
can be augmented to become a ‘Door to Door’ liner service with the liner operator 
arranging for the transportation of the cargo from the shipper’s premises to the port of  
loading and also arranges customs clearance formalities and delivery of the cargo from 
the discharge port to the receiver’s premises (Merckx and Notteboom, 2004). 
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Market rate fluctuations, rates availability and method of chartering 
It can be seen that supply and demand affect the shipping market to such an extent that 
freight rates can, in extreme cases, increase ten-fold in a good market or even when the 
supply of a certain type of ship becomes scarce and the demand is high. 
 
This is often the case, when, for example the US Great Lakes market opens in the 
spring of each year as the ice melts and the St Lawrence Sea Way and the Welland 
Canal become navigable, and the freight rate for “Lakers” (Great Lakes suitable ships) 
goes up as the demand for these ships rises (US Department of Defense, 2010). 
 
Basically, the same thing happens when the military come into the market with their 
sealift transportation needs for a particular deployment whether military or 
humanitarian. This is because the military need to lift their cargoes on a specific date in 
order to arrive at the theatre of operation by the commander’s required date (CDR) and 
thus they cause a temporary increase in demand, which elevates the freight rates 
considerably in the particular geographical location. This is known as a positional rise 
in the market (Fekpe, Windholtz, Beard and Novak, 2003). The same outcome may 
occur when a nation enters the commercial market for humanitarian sealift 
requirements. These events are usually not planned and occur suddenly, thus requiring 
immediate and decisive action. Again, this may cause a spike in local freight rates. 
 
When one takes a ‘snap shot’ of available ships on the market, the vessels that are on 
long-term time charter do not appear as free. This often leads to the wrong impression 
that there are few ships on the market and that the shipping market could not handle a 
sudden increase in demand, but this is not necessarily the case. Often, the supply of 
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certain types of ships is seasonally dependent; for example, car carriers are more readily 
available in the summer months when most car plants close for employees’ vacations. 
On the other hand, tankers can obtain better employment and are less available before 
the winter months when heating oil requirements rise or even in the summer months 
when oil prices drop due to lack of demand and nations stockpile for their winter needs 
(Samuelson and Nordhaus, 1992). 
 
It must be remembered that shipowners and ship operators are very secretive and quite 
reluctant to reveal the position and availability of their vessels (Zeng, Gong and Ye, 
2007). This is the only way they can keep the supply side of the equation in check as 
the demand side is affected by so many global influences that remain beyond the 
control of market participants. 
 
As freight rates increase, available ships will miraculously appear on the market to 
share in the increased revenues. These ships were always potentially available but the 
owners were just waiting for an improvement in rates before entering the market. 
 
To charter a cargo on a liner vessel, either a RO/RO, a container ship or even the rapidly 
disappearing general cargo liner vessel, the customer would use one of two routes 
(Packard, 1980; Latarche, 2013). 
•   Either go directly to the liner company or look it up on the internet and enquire 
about sailing dates from the port nearest to where the customer has his cargo, cost 
per container on lane meter, delivery time to the port nearest the indicated 
destination. Of course, today, most liner service companies provide a door-to-door 
service, offering to pick up the cargo from the customers’ place of business, stuff the 
container and deliver it directly to the end user’s place of business (Packard, 1980; 
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Latarche, 2013). 
•   Or, approach a Freight Forwarder and give his detailed transportation needs. The 
freight forwarder would then do the required market research and just advise the 
customer as to when the cargo would be collected and delivered, and the cost 
involved (Packard, 1980; ICS, 2014). It is understood that the freight forwarder 
would be entitled to a commission for services rendered. In many cases, despite the 
commission involved, it is more economical to use the freight forwarder than to 
enter the market individually, as he might be able to negotiate better terms and 
conditions with the liner companies by offering higher volumes of regular business. 
 
Chartering contracts 
As mentioned previously there is a variety of standard contracts, or, as they are known 
in the shipping world, ‘charter-parties’ pertaining to the carriage of goods by sea. The 
terms and conditions between shipowner and customer are standardised for ease of use.  
Most of the standard contracts can be readily modified concerning the features of 
vessel, charterer, voyage and terms of payment. As can be imagined there will be 
additional clauses and terms that are irrelevant or just not applicable; these can be 
deleted or modified subject to the agreement of both parties involved in the carriage 
contract. The governing UK Common Law is the Carriage of Goods by Sea Acts (Boyd, 
Burrow and Foxton, 1996). 
 
 
 
Charter-parties govern the contractual relationship between the Owner and Charterer of 
the Vessel. The relationship between the Carrier of the Cargo and the interests in that 
Cargo are governed by the terms of relevant Bill of Landing for that Cargo. Carriage of 
Cargo is regulated by regimes wholly succinct from charter-parties: in English law, the 
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Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1992 sets out the framework thereof, and several 
International Conventions (the Hague Rules, Hague-Visby Rules, Hamburg Rules, etc.) 
may apply depending inter alia on the jurisdictions within and between which the trade 
is made. The terms of a charter-party may be incorporated into a Bill of Lading (with 
express provision required to incorporate any arbitration provisions) such that the 
operational and liability parameters are like for both.  Likewise, a charter-party may 
incorporate the provisions of one or more of the international conventions 
predominantly for the purpose of availing the parties of the exceptions from liability 
(Hill, 1989). 
 
A popular charter-party used today for period charters is the New York Produce 
Exchange (NYPE 93: November 6th, 1913 - Amended October 20th, 1921; August 6th 
1931; October 3rd, 1946; June 12th, 1981; September 14th, 1993). Ships are chartered 
based on a modified form of this contract which will currently include several 
additional clauses referred to as ‘rider’ clauses, or attachments, to allow for specifics of 
the particular trade, cargo restrictions, port restrictions, embargos, legal and commercial 
liabilities, more detailed description of the vessel and of course how disputes are to be 
settled (New York Produce Exchange, 2015). 
 
The Baltic and International Maritime Council Uniform General Charter (as revised 
1922, 1976 and 1994) code name: ‘GENCON’ is a popular contract to be used in those 
cases in which there is no specially approved charter-party for a particular trade. It is a 
contract of carriage where the freight is based on the quantity of cargo loaded as 
opposed to a daily rate of so many US dollars per tonne. Like other types of contracts of 
carriage, it also includes several additional clauses or ‘rider’ clauses to allow for 
specifics of the particular trade, cargo restrictions, port restrictions, embargoes, legal 
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and commercial liabilities, more detailed description of the vessel and how disputes are 
to be settled (BIMCO, 2017). 
 
A final example, which does not, of course, exhaust the list of available contracts, is the 
one prepared by a grain house, known as the Continent Grain charter-party, adopted in 
Paris, 1957  (amended 1960, 1974 and 1990) by Syndicat National Du Commerce 
Extérieur Ded Cereales amended 1960, 1974 and 1990 in agreement with Comité 
Central Des Armateurs De France in cooperation with the French Chartering and S. and 
P. Brokers’ Association, adopted by the BIMCO (Documentary Committee of The 
Baltic and International Maritime Conference) and otherwise referred to as the 
‘SYNACOMEX 90’ (Syndicat National Du Commerce Extérieur Ded Cereales, 2017). 
 
 
This is a very popular contract for the carriage of grain on voyage basis, and its 
popularity not only saves time during the stage of negotiation but also prevents many 
disputes, as most of the industry is familiar with terms concerning conditions and 
liabilities. Again, this is a contract of carriage that is not used for military or refugee 
evacuation but is mentioned as it may be used in cases of humanitarian aid. 
 
This section is a brief introduction of the workings of the commercial shipping market 
and the ways in which the military or humanitarian aid agencies can access and utilise 
the various assets and facilities available in today’s modern commercial market. This is 
not an exhaustive explanation as this thesis is not about chartering in particular, but 
about how the national user can reap the benefits of civil/military synergies available 
from the cooperation of the governmental customer and the commercial shipping 
market. 
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In order for such a maritime adventure to take place all parties need to feel safe and 
secure, hence the need for marine insurance. Even Shakespeare revealed the value of 
insurance in the Merchant of Venice (Skwire, 2007). Without insurance, a sizable 
commercial venture can face the risk of financial disaster, as the capital involved may 
amount to millions. Therefore, the next section introduces the basic concepts of marine 
insurance including the protection of third party liabilities. 
 
Such insurances cover all aspects of the maritime transportation adventure from the 
value of the hull and cargo to the health and welfare of the crew and third parties and 
objects associated with the adventure. 
 
2.3  Marine Insurance 
Maritime adventures in general are a very costly business and risk immense potential 
liabilities associated with the entire enterprise ranging from personal injury to cargo 
damage or environmental pollution. It is essential that adequate and proper insurance be 
in place prior to the commencement of the adventure and, in fact, in some jurisdictions, 
it is a matter of law. This is the insurance of the maritime asset, what the automotive 
industry would refer to as ‘comprehensive’ insurance including ‘third party’ liability 
insurance. In the maritime trade the comprehensive insurance is known as ‘Hull and 
Machinery’ insurance and the ‘third party’ liability insurance is known as ‘Protection 
and Indemnity’ insurance (UK P & I Club, 2017). 
 
If the vessel is mortgaged to a bank or a financial institution, then the requirement for 
insurance will form part of the financial arrangement between the vessel’s owner and 
the lender. The perils of the sea are serious, making the uncertainty of maritime 
adventures - and by extension the risk to the financial institution funding the project - 
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high. If there were a catastrophic loss rendering the maritime asset unworkable and/or 
untradeable and thus economically unable to meet her financial commitments, 
insurance would be required to meet the financial obligations. The residual value, or 
‘scrap’ value, of a maritime asset is often substantially less than the market value of a 
sound, tradeable vessel. 
 
Regardless of whether the maritime asset is mortgaged or not, a prudent owner who is 
accountable to his partners and/or shareholders should insure the maritime asset against 
catastrophic loss, known in the shipping industry as ‘total loss’ insurance.  It makes 
good business sense and will form part of any business plan to insure all acquired 
assets. 
 
It is also practical to take out third party liability insurance; in fact such insurance is 
now required as a matter of law in most countries for international seaborne trade. This 
insurance protects the owner from a whole range of casualties/liabilities for which he 
might otherwise be liable (UK P & I Club, 2016a). 
 
These can vary from damage to port facilities, injury and/or accident to crew or 
‘servants of the owners’ employed for specific duties, errors in navigation leading to 
collisions, damage to the cargo carried by and entrusted to the vessel under the terms 
and conditions of the bill of lading or passenger ticket, legal expenses and fines and 
finally, what is potentially the most expensive liability of all, environmental damage 
and liability insurance for un-seaworthiness of the vessel. The proof of un-
seaworthiness is difficult as it requires meeting three tests satisfactorily: First, an actual 
physical and identifiable fault, which can range from unlicensed crew to a hole in the 
hull of the ship; second, that fault be the ‘proximate cause’ of the casualty that the 
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owner seeks to claim.  
Finally, proof that the owner was privy to the fault.  The above are actually quite 
difficult criteria to satisfy (UK P & I Club, 2016a). 
 
These two types of insurance will be discussed in generic terms so as to give the reader 
a basic understanding of the complexities surrounding the contractual obligations of the 
parties involved in a maritime adventure. 
 
2.3.1 Hull and Machinery Insurance 
The hull and machinery policy, as the name suggests, insures the owner for damages 
sustained by the actual asset and its machinery and is based on the principle of new for 
old. It is predominantly purchased through the marine insurance market such as Lloyd’s 
of London. 
 
The advantage of the maritime hull and machinery insurance policy is that it insures 
various degrees of casualty: In the first case, ‘average damage’ which is basically 
limited to damage that can be repaired at a cost less than the total insured value of the 
vessel. This value is known as the ‘total loss’ value and is based on the market value of 
the vessel. This value is agreed, upon at the inception of the policy, between the 
underwriter and the owner and must be ‘reasonable’ in the sense of not deviating too 
much from the market value of the vessel. This can be adjusted on the anniversary or 
upon the renewal of the policy (Cornah, 2005). 
 
The second case concerns the ‘Total Loss’ whereupon the vessel is lost at sea (‘sunk’) 
and can no longer legally be called a ship. In this case the insurer will settle the owners’ 
claim at the total loss value. The third case is the ‘Constructive Total Loss’ where the 
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repair cost of a ship that has suffered damage higher than the insured value. There is a 
variation of the above case known as the ‘Compromise Constructive Total Loss’ where 
the repair cost is too close to the insured value so that any small error in estimating the 
repair cost will result in excessive repair; thus settling the claim at or near total loss 
value would benefit all parties involved  (Cornah, 2005). 
 
Hull and Machinery insurance policies 
There are two main hull and machinery insurance policies that a shipowner could 
purchase from the insurance market before the commencement of an adventure. Of 
course, there are ‘self-insurance’ schemes available through what are known as 
‘captive’ insurance facilities but this is not relevant to the basic understanding of the 
commercial maritime industry. Most acceptable policies are governed by the 
internationally recognized ‘SOLVENCY’ regime, which regulates the policy 
underwriter, his financial ability to settle claims and his honesty in selling insurance 
policies. 
 
There are two main internationally-recognized and accepted marine hull and machinery 
insurance policies, known as the ‘Institute Time Clauses Hull’ and the ‘American 
Institute Hull Clauses’. These policies constitute the bulk of the hull and machinery  
insurance policies in the case of ocean-going, military-suitable, merchant vessels. These 
policies could then be supplemented by additional clauses. 
 
It is important to have a basic knowledge of these policies in order to understand the 
terms guaranteed by the owner inasmuch as these will affect the ability of the vessel to 
trade. 
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Institute Time Clauses Hull 
The Institute Time Clauses Hull: this policy contains twenty-six clauses and is subject 
to English law. The main clauses that may be relevant to a civil/military maritime 
adventure are given below (Lloyds, 2016). 
 
Clause 1: Refers to the navigation of the vessel and its ability to tow vessels in distress 
or be towed when in distress herself, including when to advise the underwriters of 
changes in the vessel’s conditions. 
 
Clause 3: Refers to breaches of warranty as to “cargo, trade, locality, towage, salvage 
services or date of sailing”, when the vessel is considered covered, provided appropriate 
notice is given to the underwriter. This is quite relevant to civil/military operations for 
humanitarian aid, refugee evacuation and strategic sealift for defence. It is important to 
be able to complete the adventure in parallel with negotiations on modifying the 
insurance policy whether or not this will involve any additional premiums being levied 
against the vessel. 
 
Clause 4.1: Refers to the cancellation of the policy in the event that the classification of 
the vessel is suspended or cancelled unless claims arising from damage are covered 
under a war-risks policy. 
 
Clause 4.2: Refers to cancellation in the event of a change of ownership and/or 
management. However, if the vessel is requisitioned, for title or use, the policy 
cancellation is extended for a period of fifteen days. This is important for civil/military  
 
use as vessels may be requisitioned in order to overcome commercial trading 
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restrictions. 
 
Clause 6: Refers to the insured perils which include those of the seas, rivers, lakes or 
navigable waters, fire, explosion, violent theft by persons outside the vessel, jettison, 
piracy, breakdown of or accident to nuclear installations or reactors, contact with 
aircraft or similar objects, or objects falling therefrom, land conveyance, dock or 
harbour equipment or installation, earthquake, volcanic eruption or lightning; 
additionally, accidents in loading, discharging or shifting cargo or fuel, bursting of 
boilers, breakage of shafts or any latent defect in the machinery or hull, negligence of 
master, officers, crew or pilots, negligence of repairers of charterers, provided such 
repairers or charterers are not an assured, barratry of master, officer or crew. These 
above perils could result in average damage, that is, where the repair cost is less than 
the insured value; while other damage could cause total loss, that is, where the repair 
cost exceeds the insured value.  In any event the claim by the owner or the policy holder 
will be adjusted according to the York-Antwerp rules, more specifically, York-Antwerp 
rules 1974 or 1994 as amended in 2004 (Comité Maritime International, 2004). 
 
Clause 7: Refers to damage to a vessel caused in an effort to prevent a pollution 
incident or efforts made in order to mitigate such a pollution incident regardless of who 
gives the order. 
 
Clause 8: Is known as the three-fourths collision clause, whereby the hull and 
machinery underwriter only assumes three-fourths of the collision liability, leaving the 
owner to cover the other one-fourth in alternative insurance markets. However, today, 
the majority of owners deletes this clause, and handles the indicated risk through a third 
party liability underwriter who assumes the entire four-fourths of liability. 
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Clause 12: Refers to the deductible assumed by the policy owner (known as the ‘excess’ 
in other forms of insurance) where the underwriter will only pay claims above this 
amount. In other words, the owner pays for the first amount of the repair cost, up to the 
deductible, say, one hundred thousand US dollars and the balance is paid by the 
insurance underwriter. (This arrangement has the effect of eliminating small nuisance 
claims for which the administrative cost can be higher than the actual repair cost.) 
 
Clause 13: Known as the ‘sue and labour’ clause, refers to the obligation of the vessel’s 
owners to make every effort to mitigate and/or minimize the loss which would be 
recoverable under the policy. Sue and labour expenses are, for example, efforts made by 
the master and crew to refloat a grounded vessel or save a ship from sinking or efforts 
to extinguish an onboard fire. 
 
Clause 18: Refers to any unrepaired damages. When damages cannot or need not be 
repaired at any particular time but have the effect of reducing the market value of a  
vessel, then, at the termination of the policy, the policy holder may claim the reasonable 
reduction in the market value of the vessel. 
 
Clauses 23, 24, 25 and 26: Below, are the paramount clauses and are intended to 
eliminate inconsistencies in the policy under consideration. 
 
Clause 23: War Exclusion: this clause basically excludes all losses incurred due to war 
or war like acts including civil war, revolution, rebellion or insurrection or any hostile  
 
act by or against a belligerent power including acts of rulers and princes against the 
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owner or the vessel. 
 
Clause 24: Strike Exclusion: no claim arising from a loss will be entertained that arises 
from a strike or lockout of workmen, a terrorist act or any person acting from a political 
motive. 
 
Clause 25: Malicious Acts Exclusion: excludes claims arising from the detonation of an 
explosive or weapons operated by persons acting maliciously against the owner or the 
vessel or from a political motive. 
 
Clause 26: Nuclear Exclusion: In no case will a claim be paid for a loss which arises 
from any weapon of war and/or mass destruction employing atomic or nuclear fission 
and/or fusion or other like reaction or radioactive force or matter. 
 
These four paramount clauses are covered by a separate policy known as War Risks 
Insurance and will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4. 
 
Attached to the ‘Institute Time Clauses Hull’ is the ‘Institute Additional Perils Clause – 
Hull’ which, for an additional premium, will cover the cost of a defective part which 
may be the cause of a casualty which will result in a claim. 
 
American Institute Hull Clauses 
The ‘American Institute Hull Clauses – 1977’ by the American Institute of Marine 
Underwriters (1977) is not divided into separate clauses but consists of two hundred 
fifty-five numbered lines. There are few differences between this policy and the 
‘Institute Time Clauses Hull’ that would affect a civil/military maritime transportation 
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adventure. 
 
The ‘perils’ are arranged in a different format and include those: Of the sea; men-of-
war; fire; lightning; earthquake; enemies; pirates; rovers; assailing thieves; jettisons; 
letters of mart and counter-mart; surprisals; takings at sea; arrests, restraints and 
detainment of all kings, princes and peoples of whatsoever nation condition or quality; 
barratry of master and mariners and all other like perils; loss and misfortunes that have, 
or shall come to hurt, detriment or damage of the vessel, or any part thereof, excepting, 
however, such of the foregoing perils as may be excluded by provisions elsewhere in 
the policy  (Lines 70-74). 
 
The American Hull policy also includes an additional peril known as the ‘Inchmaree’ 
clause; these additional perils include, amongst others, explosions on shipboard or 
elsewhere and include latent defects, excluding the expense of replacing or repairing the 
defective part. Interestingly, this policy includes the breakdown of, or accident to, 
nuclear installations or reactors not on board the insured vessel, contact with aircraft 
and rockets or similar missiles (Lines 75-86). 
 
In the event that governmental authorities directly cause damage or loss to the insured 
asset in an effort to mitigate or prevent a pollution event or in the safeguarding of public 
interest this loss or damage is covered by this policy. (Lines 87-91). 
As in Clause 13 of the Institute Time Clause Hull, the American Institute Hull Clauses 
policy also describes in detail the obligation, lawful and necessary, of the owner to 
make efforts, sue and labour, in order to mitigate and/or prevent the loss for which the 
assured can recover reasonable expenses. (Lines 144-157). 
The American Clauses cover the entire four-fourths collision liability, in contrast to 
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Clause 8 of the Institute Time Clauses Hull. But it excludes: wreck removal and/or 
injury to real or personal property; oil pollution or other chemicals or other substances 
of any description whatsoever; cargo or other property on, or engagements of, the 
vessel; loss of life or personal injury (Lines 158-184). The wreck removal exclusion 
clause has caused great concern over the years as the cost of this was not covered by the 
third party liability insurance; however, this has been addressed by a new stand-alone 
Convention which was written at the IMO: The Wreck Removal Convention 2007 
which came into force in 2016. 
 
There is a whole paragraph pertaining to war, strikes and related exclusions: this is in 
fact a paramount clause similar to Clauses 23-26 of the Institute Time Clauses Hull. The 
main exclusions relate to war and war-like events, such as: capture; seizure; arrest, 
restraint or detainment; any potential threat related along with the taking of the vessel, 
by requisition or otherwise, whether in time of peace or war and whether lawful or not. 
The list of further exclusions covers damage sustained by weapons and/or acts of war 
including civil strife, riots, martial law, uprising, strikes, lockouts, usurped power, 
malicious acts or even vandalism. Also excluded under the American policy are: 
Hostilities or war-like operations whether there is a declaration of war or not. For such 
coverage the assured would turn to a War Risks underwriter as described in Chapter 4 
(Lines 239-255). 
 
There are several additional clauses that can be added to the indicated policy; three of 
these clauses that may be relevant to a civil/military adventure are described below. 
 
The ‘Institute Radioactive Contamination, Chemical, Biological, Bio-Chemical and 
Electromagnetic Weapons exclusion clause’: This is another paramount clause and, as 
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the name suggests, excludes any liability of the underwriter from such damage caused 
by, or contributed to, such equipment, be it a weapon or not. 
 
The ‘Institute Cyber Exclusion Clause’ excludes any liability for loss or damage to any 
computer, computer system, software program, computer virus, unless this is attached 
to a policy that endorses war-risks cover. 
 
This gives the reader a basic understanding of the insurance cover of the hull of the 
vessel and its machinery. However, a civil/military venture will include substantial third 
party risks that should be covered by a prudent shipowner or manager. In most areas of 
the world several of these third party liabilities must be insured as a matter of law and 
evidence thereof must be available before a vessel can enter or trade in their territorial 
waters. 
 
A complete section is dedicated in this chapter to the cover of war or war-like risks as it 
is assumed that most civil/military operations will inevitably require a vessel to enter 
danger zones irrespective of the type of strategic sealift involved, whether it be defence, 
humanitarian aid or refugee evacuation. 
 
The shipping community, in its wisdom, decided that third party liability cover should 
be offered to its members on a mutual, non-profit, pay-to-be-paid basis; hence, the 
Protection and Indemnity (P+I) Mutual Insurance Clubs, all sanctioned by the EU 
competition commission, were established. 
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2.3.2 Third Party Liability Insurance 
 
There are 13 member clubs in the International Group of P+I clubs: 
1.   American Steamship Owners Mutual Protection and Indemnity Association, Inc. 
2.   Assuranceforeningen Skuld (Norway) 
3.   Gard P and I (Bermuda) Ltd. 
4.   The Britannia Steam Ship Insurance Association Limited 
5.   The Japan Ship Owners' Mutual Protection and Indemnity Association 
6.   The London Steam-Ship Owners' Mutual Insurance Association Limited 
7.   The North of England Protecting and Indemnity Association Limited 
8.   The Shipowners' Mutual Protection and Indemnity Association (Luxembourg) 
9.   The Standard Club Limited 
10.  The Steamship Mutual Underwriting Association (Bermuda) Limited 
11.  Sveriges Ångfartygs Assurans Förening (The Swedish Club) 
12.  United Kingdom Mutual Steam Ship Assurance Association (Bermuda) Limited 
13.  The West of England Ship Owners Mutual Insurance Association (Luxembourg) 
 
This does not mean that third party liability cover is not available on the open market, 
though a charterer or user of a vessel can feel much safer when chartering a vessel that 
is covered by an International Group P+I club, given their solid reputation. 
 
The protection and indemnity cover is based on a set of rules issued by each of the 
above mentioned clubs. Cross liability can exist when a time charter is covered by the 
‘Inter Club’ agreement as amended in September 2011, but this is not really relevant for 
a civil/military venture unless the charterer is an NGO that does not already have 
liability cover from its home country. 
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The rules are fairly similar between the clubs; thus, for the sake of simplicity, only the 
rules of the United Kingdom Mutual Steam Ship Assurance Association (Bermuda) 
Limited will be examined below (UK P+I Club, 2016a). The P+I Club divides its cover 
into two main sections; the first is the P+I Third Party Liability coverage and, the 
second is the freight demurrage defence coverage (UK Defence Club, 2016), the latter 
providing cover for legal expenses and fines that may be incurred by a vessel during 
normal operations. 
 
Protection and Indemnity cover 
 The P+I cover is a mutual, not for profit, pay-to-be-paid cover and the premium levied 
is adjusted each year to reflect the owner’s loss record and/or projected financial 
outcome of the previous year. The P+I year starts on the 20 February of each year. If 
total claims are less than the total income of the club then the annual premium call 
remains unchanged or, on rare occasions, may even be reduced; if total claims for the 
year exceed the total income for the club then all members will suffer a proportional 
increase to cover the loss. The premium is based on a US$/GT (gross registered tonne) 
and this is in sharp contrast to the previously discussed hull and machinery cover where 
premium is based on the insured value of the vessel. It is a mutual arrangement as all 
members of the club contribute to the losses incurred by each and, in the long term, is a 
very efficient and economical insurance cover. The cover applies up to a maximum of 
two billion US dollars and claims are settled on a ‘pay to be paid’ basis. In other words, 
the club member is required to settle third party claim and then recover the payment 
outlay from their P+I Club (UK P+I Club, 2016a). 
 
The main events that are covered by P+I insurance are: Damage to cargo; damage to 
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other vessels; damage to docks; wharves and ports and their facilities; accident, injury 
and illness to crew, contractors and visitors on board (UK P+I Club, 2016a). 
 
For a basic understanding of the range and depth of P+I insurance the main items 
covered are listed below: 
1.   Liability to persons other than seamen 
2.   Injury and death of seamen 
3.   Illness and death of seamen 
4.   Repatriation and substitute expenses 
5.   Loss and damage to the effects of seamen and others 
6.   Shipwreck unemployment indemnity 
7.   Diversion expenses 
8.   Stowaways and refugees 
9.   Life salvage 
10.  Collision with other ships 
11.  Loss or damage to property 
12.  Pollution risks 
13.  Liability arising out of towage of, or by, an entered ship 
 
14.  Liabilities arising under certain indemnities and contracts 
15.  Wreck liabilities 
16.  Quarantine expenses 
17.  Cargo liability 
18.  Property on the entered ship 
19.  Unrecoverable general average contributions 
20.  Ship’s proportion of general average 
21.  Special compensation to salvors 
57 
 
22.  Fines 
23.  Enquiry expenses 
24.  Expenses incidental to the operation of ships 
25.  Sue and labour and legal costs 
26.  Expenses incurred by the direction of the association 
 
 
There is a list of twenty-two conditions (A to V), exceptions and limitations (UK P+I 
Club, 2016a). There is some benefit from familiarity with this list and associated 
exclusions inasmuch as it may assist the civil/military planner to avoid issuing illegal 
orders pertaining to the indicated sealift asset, though further in depth analysis will not 
assist the military user of a merchant shipping asset: 
     A.   Payment first by the owner 
     B. Limitation of the Association’s liability 
     C. Set-off 
     D.   Exclusion of sums insurable under hull policies 
     E. Exclusion of war risks 
     F. Exclusion of nuclear risks 
    G. Exclusion of damage to entered ship, loss of hire, etc. 
    H. Exclusion of certain liabilities, costs and expenses of salvage ships, drilling 
ships, dredgers and others 
     I. Double insurance 
     J. Contraband, blockade running, unlawful trade, imprudent or hazardous 
operations 
     K. Classification and statutory requirements 
     L.   Rules subject to Marine Insurance Act 
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    M. Obligations to sue and labour 
    N.    Obligations with regard to claims 
    O. Time bar 
    P. Recoveries 
    Q. Survey of ships 
    R. Survey of ships after lay-up 
    S.   Electronic communication 
    T. Interest 
    U. Certificates and undertakings 
    V. Sanction risks. 
 
Civil/military operations will involve several third-party liabilities, five of which are of 
particular interest and fall under Section U, “Certificates and Undertakings”. These are 
the following (UK P & I Club, 2016a, p. 44): 
 
The Association will discharge on behalf of the owner liabilities, costs [and] 
expenses arising under a demand made pursuant to the issue by the Association one 
of the following: 
•   A guarantee or other undertaking given by the Association to the Federal 
Maritime Commission under section 2 of US Public Law 89-777, or 
•   A certificate issued by the Association in compliance with Article VII of the 
International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage 1969 
or 1992 or any amendment thereof, or 
•   An undertaking given by the Association to the International Oil 
Compensation Fund 1992 in connection with the Small Tanker Oil Pollution 
Indemnification Agreement (STOPIA), or except where such liabilities, cost 
or expenses arise from or are caused by an act of terrorism, the Tanker Oil 
Pollution Indemnification Agreement (TOPIA) 
•   A certificate issued by the Association in compliance with article 7 of the 
International Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution 
Damage, 2001 
•   A non-war certificate issued by the Association in compliance with either 
Article IV bis of the Athens Convention relating to Carriage of Passengers 
and their Luggage by sea, 2002 and Guidelines for its implementation or 
Regulation (EC) No 392/2009 of the European Parliament and of the 
council which gives effect thereto. 
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The last of these items is of particular interest to a civil/military operation as it involves 
the carriage of passengers and/or troops by sea which are not covered by the owners’ 
other policies for acts of terrorism. Owners must, therefore, obtain specific cover from 
the market for this excluded liability. 
 
Defence cover 
The second section concerns defence cover which supports the shipowner and/or 
manager in the event that he needs to take legal action to protect his rights, whether to 
avoid paying a fine or to recover freight from a charterer (UK Defence Club, 2016). 
 
The nature of such cover pertains to costs incurred by a member which arise from a 
member’s interest in an entered ship and in connection with the building, sale, 
ownership, management, chartering or operations of that ship (UK Defence Club, 
2016). 
 
The extent of this cover includes costs that are incurred in order to investigate and/or 
protect a member’s legal position or costs incurred in connection with legal 
proceedings. This also covers costs, including deferred interest, which a competent 
court or tribunal may order the member to pay to another party provided the board of 
the defence association has consented in writing to the indicated litigation to be 
pursued. 
 
There are an additional fifteen (A to O) risks covered by the defence association to help 
with the basic understanding of such cover the main risks are listed below (UK Defence 
Club, 2016, pp. 4-5). They apply to claims and disputes or proceedings concerning: 
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A.   Any charterparty, bill of lading, contract of affreightment or other contract, its 
existence, performance or cancellation and the exercise or enforcement of any 
right or remedy arising or in connection with it; 
B.   The building, purchase or sale of the ship; 
C.   The design, repair conversion or modification of the ship; 
D.   The loss of, damage to, detention, delay to or loss of use of the ship; 
E.   The supply of fuel, lubricants, material or equipment, or other necessaries to the 
ship; 
F.   Salvage or towage services rendered by or to the ship; 
G.   The loading, lightering, stowage, trimming, storage or discharge of cargo; 
H.   General and/or Particular Average contributions or charges; 
I.   Claims by or against passengers intended to be, being or having been carried 
on a ship or their personal representatives or dependents; 
J.   Officers, crew, stowaways and other persons on or about the ship; 
K.   The classification of the ship; 
L.   The representation of the member at official investigations, inquests, or other 
enquiries whatsoever in relation to the ship; 
M.   Amounts due from or to underwriters and any other persons and/or companies 
conducting the business of insurance, other than the Association; 
N.   Charges, disbursements, accounts received from agents, stevedores, chandlers, 
brokers, customs, harbour or other authorities, or other connected with the 
running, management and operation of the ship; 
O.   Claims by or against revenue, customs or other government, municipal or local 
authorities in relation to the ship. 
 
This is to discourage a third party from thinking that because he possesses adequate 
financial backing and can intimidate the shipowner into submission because the 
shipowners’ legal rights are protected by substantial insurance cover. 
 
As in the P+I third party liability cover, there are exclusions from the cover, which 
include: 
 
1.   Minimum dispute amount (usually US$ ten thousand) 
2.   Unlawful trading 
3.   Exclusion of hull and machinery, and charterers liability risks 
4.   Exclusion of war risks 
5.   Exclusion  of  P+I risks 
6.   Exclusion of specialist operations and certain passenger ship risks 
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7.   Exclusion of hotel, leisure or entertainment risks 
8.   Exclusion of  certain nuclear risks 
9.   Double  insurance 
10.  Time  bar 
11.  Joint  members 
 
Again, war risks are excluded from the defence cover as from the third party P+I cover 
(UK Defence Club, 2016). War-risks defence insurance is covered later on in this 
chapter. 
 
A basic understanding of commercial marine insurance is essential to any charterer or 
operator of a vessel whether they be a commercial freight forwarder or a military 
movement officer. Unless all parties involved in such operations are aware of the 
possible liabilities, their consequences and available insurance cover, they will not be 
able to discharge the operation efficiently which could elevate costs and even lead to 
the termination of the operation. 
 
So far our discussion has been limited to the insurance of the asset, per se, and has 
touched briefly on third-party liability and defence cover, all of which specifically 
excluded war risks and war-like acts of rulers and princes and/or belligerent powers 
(UK Defence Club, 2016). 
 
In peace-time, as well as during war, separate insurance is available that covers the 
asset and provides third party liability and defence coverage specifically related to war 
risks. This is known as War Risks Cover and is described in the next section in this 
chapter. No shipowner or his mortgagee bank will allow a vessel to undertake a 
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maritime adventure for military or national service requirements if either the loading or 
the discharge port is in the vicinity of military conflict or war-like acts without the 
protection afforded by war risks insurance for the crew, cargo and asset. 
 
 
2.4 Commercial War Risks Insurance 
 
Next section provides an introduction into the workings of the war-risks insurance 
market, the next step towards understanding the essentials of the commercial shipping 
market. It should be clear that most maritime adventures of the type considered in this 
thesis will be geographically located in an area where there is risk of unrest and/or 
actual conflict of varying degrees of severity. Therefore, a basic knowledge of war-risks 
insurance is not just useful, but indispensable. 
 
The Oxford Online Dictionary (2016) provides the following definitions of  ‘war’:  
1 A state of armed conflict between different countries or different groups within a 
country; 
1.1 A state of competition or hostility between different people or groups; and 
1.2 A sustained campaign against an undesirable situation or activity. 
 
Moreover, Miller (1994) in Marine War Risks quotes Halsbury’s Laws of England 
contained in volume forty-nine, paragraph one hundred and one, which gives the 
following definition: 
At common law, there is no state of war between the United Kingdom and a 
foreign State unless the Crown has declared war or hostilities have commenced 
by the Crown’s authority 
(Miller, 1994, p. 41).              
 
However, Miller (1994) expounds how, over a series of cases, the courts have made it 
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clear that when they are considering a commercial document such as a war-risks policy, 
they are not going to be bound by narrow definitions. According to Miller, they are 
inclined to consider the intention of the parties, as disclosed in the documents, and then 
to interpret the documents in the spirit which the parties had originally intended. 
 
In addition, the Joint War Committee, JWC, includes various authorized representatives 
from Lloyd’s and insurance markets, representing the interests of underwriters who 
write marine hull war business in the London market (Lmalloyds.com, 2016). It usually 
meets on a quarterly basis and receives input from the security advisers it employs to 
advise as to areas of heightened risk. Based on this advice, the JWC draws up a 
schedule of ‘listed areas’. These are used by most, if not all, war-risks underwriters to 
determine which areas of the world should attract an ‘additional premium’ (AP) or 
‘breach’ (of trading warranty) premium which is usually expressed as a percentage of a 
vessel’s insured value. The JWC has no authority to determine AP areas or the rates that 
should apply for calls/transits to/from such areas. Individual underwriters are free to set 
whichever areas should be subject to APs and applicable rates are determined by 
individual negotiation (Lmalloyds.com, 2016). 
 
Satisfactory war-risks insurance cover is essential for the procurement and trading of 
quality commercial-sealift assets. However, if a chemical, biological, radiological or 
nuclear, (CBRN), device is detonated by a belligerent power or terrorist group, 
commercial war-risks cover will be cancelled giving a military customer or a nation, 
providing humanitarian aid, only seven days in which to find satisfactory substitute  
war-risks cover (Hellenic War Risks, 2016). 
 
It is necessary to elaborate on the phrase ‘satisfactory war risks coverage’: This means 
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that cover satisfactory to all interested parties must be in place at the commencement of 
the maritime adventure. Interested parties may include the shareholders of the vessel, 
whether they are individual owners or stock-holders, mortgagees, cargo owners, crew, 
charterers or sub-charterers and general financiers of the maritime adventure. 
 
Basic war-risks cover is not insurance cover to enter a war zone but provides cover for 
war-like risks outside a war zone (Hellenic War Risks, 2016). The basic war-risks cover 
purchased enables a vessel to trade worldwide outside areas of conflict but the 
adventure is insured against unforeseen war or war-like activities. 
 
There are different places from which to purchase war-risks insurance cover, either 
from the commercial market (such as at Lloyd's and other insurance companies) or from 
a pool or mutual society such as the Hellenic, Norwegian and Canadian War Risks 
clubs. Generally, the commercial market offers war P+I cover (third-party liability 
coverage) up to the current hull value total sum insured. The clubs however, generally 
offer higher war P+I limits from US dollars one hundred to four hundred million per 
ship, per incident (Hellenic War Risks, 2016). 
 
War-risks insurance covers three main areas of risk: (a) Concerning hull and machinery 
up to the full value of the insured asset; (b) Detention and deviation expenses in the 
event that the scheduled Port of discharge is inaccessible due to war or war-like events; 
(c)  P+I cover for third-party liability risks (Hellenic War Risks, 2016). 
 
Most war-risks policies are primarily purchased to cover risk posed by war to the hull 
and the machinery (which risk is usually excluded from (marine) hull and machinery 
policies). In addition, war P+I cover is usually provided up to the insured value of the 
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vessel in question. Mutual clubs such as the Hellenic Mutual War Risk Club typically 
provide higher war P+I limits as standard and at no additional charge – for 2017, this 
limit has been set at US dollars four hundred million. The war P+I cover provided by 
both commercial and mutual war risks insurers is adjusted to reflect the P+I clubs 
perception of war risks and assessed costs/benefits. For example, Rule 5E in the UK 
P+I Club’s Rules (2016a, p. 35) reads as follows: 
 
Exclusion of war risks: 
The Association shall not indemnify an owner against any liabilities, costs or 
expenses (irrespective of whether a contributory cause of the same being 
incurred was any neglect on the part of the owner or on the part of the owner’s 
servants or agents) when the loss or damage, injury, illness or death or other 
accident in respect of which such liability arises or cost or expense is incurred, 
was caused by: 
 
i. War, civil war, revolution, rebellion, insurrection or civil strife arising 
therefrom, or any hostile act by or against a belligerent power, or any act of 
terrorism. 
 
ii. Capture, seizure, arrest, restraint or detainment (barratry and piracy 
excepted) and the consequences thereof or any attempt thereat; 
 
iii. Mines, torpedoes, bombs, rockets, shells, explosives or other similar 
weapons of war (save for those liabilities, costs or expenses which arise solely 
by reason of the transport of any such weapons whether on board the entered 
ship or not), provided always that this exclusion shall not apply to the use of 
such weapons either as a result of government order or with the written 
agreement of the directors or the managers where the reason for such use is the 
avoidance or mitigation of liabilities, costs or expenses which would otherwise 
fall within the cover given by the association. 
 
Provided always that: 
 
a) In the event of any dispute as to whether or not an act constitutes an act of 
terrorism, the decision of the directors shall be final; 
 
b) The directors may resolve that special cover be provided to the owner against 
any or all of the risks set out in Rule two notwithstanding that those liabilities, 
costs or expenses would otherwise be excluded by this paragraph; and 
 
c) that such special cover should be limited to such sum or sums and be subject 
to such terms and conditions as the directors may from time to time determine. 
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Mutual war risks insurers in particular usually provide the same coverage as that of the 
P+I clubs (for example liability to crew/third parties/pollution clean-up costs etc.) 
would cover, but for the operation of the war risks exclusions. In practice, it is not 
always easy to determine with absolute certainty whether marine P+I or war P+I cover 
should respond to all aspects of a particular claim though a pragmatic approach is 
usually taken to ensure a member is covered by one or the other insurer either in full or 
in part to avoid shortfalls in the recoverability of claims.  
 
The war P+I cover in excess of that provided by war risks insurers is accepted by P+I 
clubs – with reference to ‘…the Risks set out in Rule 2’ which suggests the P+I clubs 
give US dollars five hundred million of excess war risks P+I cover in excess of the 
‘proper value’ of the entered ship or whatever sum is recoverable from war risks 
insurers, whichever is the greater (UK P+I Circular, 2016).   
 
For its purposes this thesis utilizes the UK Club’s P+ I definition of war. 
 
2.4.1 Hull and Machinery 
 
The ship is covered against total loss or partial damage together with general average 
and salvage charges, where applicable, under the rules and bye laws of Hellenic War 
Risk (2016). 
This part of war risk insurance is in effect hull and machinery insurance, as discussed in 
previous sections. In this context, claims can arise as a result of: 
1.   War, civil war, revolution, rebellion, insurrection or civil strife arising there 
from, any hostile act by or against a belligerent power 
2.   Capture, seizure, arrest, restraint or detainment and the consequences thereof or 
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any attempt thereat 
3.   Mines, torpedoes, bombs or other weapons of war (derelict or otherwise) 
4.   Strikes, locked-out workmen, or persons taking part in labour disturbances, riots 
or civil unrest 
5.   Any terrorist or any person acting maliciously or out of political motives 
6.   Piracy and violent theft by outsiders 
7.   Confiscation or expropriation 
 
It can be seen from the above list that many of the insurable risks are not part of what 
most people would consider war risks. There is a lot more to war-related risks than 
mines, bombs and missiles. It is important to note that piracy, strikes and labour 
disputes are also covered inasmuch as such risks are common in most civil/military 
maritime adventures. 
 
War like Perils 
Examples of risks covered in the case of war, what one might call a real war, can be 
seen in Table 2 below. (One may recall the many ships partially or totally destroyed in 
the Iran/Iraq War of the 1980s.) 
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Table 2: Gulf War List of Casualties, Miller Insurance (1999), unpublished/confidential 
Name Type Flag GT/Built Casualty Details 
LOUISE 1 B/C Panama 10.836 / 1963 Struck by missile during air 
attack and sank in Bandar 
Khomeini channel. Total loss. 
VOLERE VLCC Italian 254.891 /1975 Struck by missiles. Off Kharg 
island causing damage to prow, 
Nos. 1 and 2 cargo tanks – small 
fire load poured into sea. 
SMIT 
MASTAS 
TUG Greek 979 / 1971 Missile attack 55 miles north of 
Saudi Arabia. Fire damage to 
engine room and 
accommodation. 
AVOCET TANKER Cypriot 34.662 / 1966 Hit by Iranian missile. Caught 
fire. Total loss. 
ARISTOTLE 
S. ONASIS 
VLCC Liberian 273.900/ 1976 Ablaze after being hit by 6 
Iranian missiles. 
Source: Personal access to source 
 
Terrorist perils 
Terrorist acts are exemplified by what happened aboard the passenger ship Achille 
Lauro (Pallardy, 2011) and the passenger ferry City of Poros (Anastasi, 1988) both 
boarded by terrorists in the Mediterranean. Also, on 6 October 2002, the MT Limburg, a 
French flagged oil tanker carrying three hundred ninety-seven thousand barrels of crude 
oil from Iran to Malaysia was rammed on her starboard side by suicide bombers in a 
dinghy carrying explosives in the Gulf of Aden off Yemen (Smith, 2002).  The MT 
Limburg caught fire and ninety thousand barrels of oil were spilled into the Gulf of 
Aden. Terrorist attacks are not common in marine adventures, as ships are slow and 
attract little media coverage. On the other hand, aircraft and the aviation industry attract 
heavy media coverage and seem to be a favoured target of terrorists. 
 
Piracy perils 
Piracy will be discussed in a later section, but it should be noted that there are many 
different forms of piracy. In the western Indian Ocean during the year 2014 there were 
one hundred forty-two confirmed incidents of piracy; varying motivations prevailed: 
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seizure of the crew for ransom, theft of cargo, use of high jacked ship for other 
nefarious purposes (Oceans Beyond Piracy, 2015). While planning a marine adventure, 
the risk of piracy must always be considered. 
 
2.4.2 Detention and Deviation 
 
The second main area of war-risks insurance cover is for ‘detention and deviation’ 
expenses. 
 
Detention occurs when a ship is blocked. That is to say, the ship is prevented from 
moving; a good example is the blocking of the Suez Canal after the ‘Six Day War’ in 
1967 when ships were trapped by vessels sunk at either end of the canal (Brenchley, 
2005). More recently, in the Shatt al-Arab waterway during the Iran/Iraq conflict, 
hostilities prevented the authorities from removing wrecks so that free passage was 
blocked and vessels were trapped (Lewis, 1988). If a ship becomes detained for more 
than a year, the owner can put a claim of total loss to his war-risks underwriters, as per 
the above mentioned rule (Hellenic War Risks, 2016). 
 
Deviation expenses are covered by the war-risks insurers in cases where the ship cannot 
complete its intended voyage by reason of war or orders given by its insurers, its flag 
state or any other government having the right to issue such orders (Hellenic War Risks, 
2016). In other words, the vessel is given orders contrary to its contract of carriage 
under the bill of lading. In essence, this means that if the vessel is ordered to discharge 
her cargo in a port other than that stipulated in the bill of lading for the cargo loaded 
then this is considered a deviation, and the associated financial liabilities and 
consequences are both covered by war-risks insurance. 
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Claims can arise as a result of: 
War, war-like operations, civil war, revolution, rebellion, insurrection, civil 
strife, any hostile act by or against a belligerent power, or by conditions brought 
about as a result of the foregoing; 
Caused by compliance with an order, prohibition or direction; and 
Caused by any government department or military authority of a country in 
which the ship is owned managed or registered or any government department  
or military authority of a country having the right, de facto, to do so 
(Hellenic War Risks, 2016, pp 15-16). 
 
2.4.3 Protection and Indemnity 
 
The third area of war-risks insurance under the war-risks policy is the P+I Risk. The 
main relevant risks are the ship’s crew’s contractual liabilities for example, injuries, 
illness, death and wages. 
 
Also covered under the P+I cover are collision, dock damage, oil pollution and wreck 
removal and all these can be classified as third party liabilities (Hellenic War Risks, 
2016). 
 
In reality, these risks are remote because the owner must be deemed responsible for the 
occurrence in order for there to be a claim. 
 
These can arise as a result of: 
Personal injury, illness or death of: any member of the crew whether on board or not, 
any person engaged to handle cargo whilst it is the responsibility of the vessel, or any 
other person by whom such liability is incurred (Hellenic War Risks, 2016): 
 
•   Expenses reasonably incurred in relation to personal injuries, illness or death, 
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such as: hospital, medical and funeral expenses. Expenses of repatriating an 
injured or ill crew member, owner’s representative or consultant, and sending a 
substitute to replace him. Expenses of diverting the ship for the purpose of 
securing treatment of an injured or sick person or while waiting for a substitute.  
Fuel, insurance, wages, stores, provisions and port charges can also be claimed. 
 
For example, in the Hellenic Mutual War Risk Club (2016) the limit of cover for P+I 
risks, such as passenger liability is US dollars four hundred million In certain cases, 
where passengers are high net worth individuals, and liability claims exceed the 
indicated amount, the shipowners’ standard P+I cover (Chapter 3) provides an 
additional layer of cover in the amount of US dollars five hundred million effective as 
of 20 February 2005.  The provider of standard shipowner P+I insurance will always 
avoid being the primary war-risks liability insurer. 
 
The P+I war-risks cover under the rules of, for example, the Hellenic Club, refers to 
cover provided under the UK P+I Club rules. Typically, the P+I rules of war-risks cover 
follow the rules of one of the mutual P+I clubs in the international group of mutuals.  
 
Currently, all vessels trading globally are required by law to have P+I insurance cover. 
This covers a variety of third-party liabilities to which the shipowner might be exposed. 
These range from collision, dock damage, oil pollution and wreck removal to crew 
liabilities and cargo damage (Hellenic War Risks, 2016). 
 
Cover under Rule 2 Section 1 provides the owner with cover concerning liabilities to 
third parties and passengers on board in the event of a marine accident. 
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However, if the owner has a liability to anyone on board, that liability is covered, up to 
the limit of the club cover, subject to any international contract for their passage 
(Hellenic War Risks, 2016). 
 
For example, if the troops have been issued a passenger ticket then the contract is the 
ticket and, most likely, the Athens Convention will apply: Athens Convention relating to 
the Carriage of Passengers and their Luggage by Sea (PAL) Adoption: 13 December 
1974; Date it went into force: 28 April 1987; 2002 Protocol: Adoption: 1 November 
2002; Date it went into force: 23 April 2014 (IMCO, 1974). It is not always certain that 
troops would be issued a passenger ticket but for the Athens convention to apply a fare 
must have been paid and there must be a contract of carriage and a ticket issued. 
 
In the event of the accidents on account of war-like acts with the risk falling on the war-
risks club/underwriter the above stipulations apply and there is nothing in most P+I club 
rules that excludes or qualifies this liability. 
 
There is no indication in the Athens Convention or its Protocols (whether in force or 
not) that it would cease to apply in time of war (IMCO, 1974). 
 
This contrasts with the exclusion of liability following a nuclear incident.  Instead, the 
2002 Protocol of the Athens convention, which came into force in 2012 and the 
protocol of April 2014 make specific provision for incidents resulting from an act of 
war.   
 
The fact that the International Maritime Organization (IMO) felt it necessary to exclude 
carrier liability in such circumstances suggests that the convention would ordinarily 
73 
 
continue to apply.  Consequently, until the 2002 Protocol came into force the 
convention would determine a carrier's war and peacetime liabilities in the same way. 
As far as the carriage of service personnel and equipment is concerned, the key issues 
are whether there is a ‘carrier’ and a ‘passenger’, whether a ‘fare’ was paid to a 
shipowner or ‘the carrier’ and a ‘ticket’ issued (IMCO, 1974, Article 1). 
 
Fundamental to each of these is whether there is a contract of carriage.  The convention 
defines this broadly as ‘a contract made by or on behalf of a carrier for the carriage by 
sea of a passenger...’ (IMCO, 1974, preamble of Convention). 
 
As a matter of English law this must be a contract for reward, i.e. there must be a 
benefit to the carrier for performing the service specified in the contract. The details 
may vary but, as a general rule, if service personnel receive tickets from the carrier, in 
the carrier’s usual form and the carrier is paid by the nation concerned for its service 
then there would be a contract of carriage for reward. The terms of the convention 
would then apply (IMCO, 1974, Article 1). 
 
However, if the vessel were to be requisitioned by the flag state, according to the 
requisition laws of that state, then there would be no remuneration and consequently no 
contract of carriage, hence the convention would not apply. 
 
Depending on the circumstances of the maritime adventure and the cover that the owner 
has selected, other P+I risks can be recovered for a casualty, covered by a war-risks 
incident. Generally an owner will opt for ‘all-risks’ coverage and err on the side of 
caution. 
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2.4.4 War Risks Insurance Rates 
 
The basic rate for war risk insurance fluctuates according to market conditions. Prior to 
11 September 2001, it was very low - approximately 0.0075 percent; the rate is always 
stated as a percentage of the ship’s hull and machinery value - this is equivalent to US 
dollars seventy-five per US dollars one million of value (Hellenic War Risks, 2017). 
 
Since the 11 September 2001 attack on the Twin Towers in New York, U.S.A., the rate 
for basic war-risks insurance has gone up to about 0.03% gross, that is, US dollars three 
hundred per US dollars one million of the ship’s value (Hellenic War Risks, 2017). Of 
course, as stated before, this rate can fluctuate as the insurance market ‘softens’ or 
‘hardens’. There are also other factors that influence this rate. For example, if the 
shipowner is offered an all-inclusive cover from his basic hull and machinery 
underwriter, the war-risks rate as a percentage of the whole may be negligible. 
 
2.4.5 Additional Premium Areas 
 
So far this chapter has dealt with insurable risks and the events which can trigger a 
claim in areas of the world which are not ‘additional premium’ areas – in other words, 
incidents that may occur in areas considered at war and/or not experiencing war-like 
activities. 
 
Additional premium areas are regions of the world where war-risks insurance 
underwriters consider claims arising from the war-risks policy to be likely. Intelligence 
indicates that an incident of the indicated type may occur, has already occurred or is in 
the process of occurring. Most war-risk underwriters follow the advice of Lloyd’s Joint 
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War Committee, but this is not compulsory. 
 
After 11 September 2001, war-risk insurance underwriters identified several new 
additional premium areas. Rates for additional premium areas vary according to the 
insurers’ perceived risk of each area and the frequency and size of any claims that may 
have occurred. 
 
If a ship enters such high-risk areas the owner must pay an additional premium if he 
wishes to maintain his war-risks insurance coverage. He must declare his intention to 
enter before entering any such area and agree as to the rate to be paid, and the period 
the ship will remain within the additional premium area (Hellenic War Risks, 2016). 
 
This additional premium could conceivably be rated at zero, but the underwriter must 
be advised, in writing, 48 hours in advance that the vessel is scheduled to enter an 
additional premium area. In peaceful times the underwriter may quote a rate up to one 
week before the ship enters the additional premium area (Hellenic War Risks, 2016). 
However, in times of high risk and financial volatility, such as after the 11 September 
2001 incident, when national and international security are in doubt, the underwriter 
may only quote a rate forty-eight hours before the ship enters the additional premium 
area. The additional premium cover is, initially, usually limited to between seven and 
fourteen days, which can be extended at further cost. If the vessel is quoted an 
additional premium rate, expressed as a percentage of the ship’s insured value, this will 
be payable over a seven day period, but if the vessel violates this even slightly, a further 
seven-day premium payment must be made. However, for Gulf of Aden and Indian 
Ocean transits where the average transit time is over eight days, the piracy additional 
premium coverage is not limited to seven days but covers the entire transit (Swedish 
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Club, 2010). 
 
For purposes of illustration, in mid-March 2011 the AP rates quoted by the market were 
approximately as follows (Hellenic War Risks Association, 2013): 
 
 
Table 3: Additional Premium AP Rates – Mid March 2011 
Premium AP 
Rates 
Area AP Area 
Classification 
0.00% FOR THE SUEZ CANAL AND RED SEA TRANSIT Not an AP Area 
0.12% FOR SAUDI ARABIAN PORTS ($1,200 FOR $1 M 
INSURED) 
AP Area 
0.10% FOR UM QASR IN THE ARABIAN GULF ($1,000 
FOR $1 M INSURED) 
AP Area 
0.0125% FOR ISRAEL ($125 FOR $1 M INSURED) AP Area 
0.075% FOR BASRAH ($750 FOR $1 M INSURED) AP Area 
0.02 to 
0.175% 
FOR NIGERIAN PORTS ($100 - $175 FOR $1 M 
INSURED) 
AP Area 
0.00% FOR STRAITS OF MALACCA Not an AP Area 
0.0825% FOR GULF OF ADEN TRANSIT ($825 FOR $1 M 
INSURED) 
	  
AP Area 
0.25%to 0.5% FOR LIBYAN PORTS ($2,500 - $5,000 FOR $1 M 
INSURED) 
AP Area 
5.00% + FOR SOMALI PORTS. (VIRTUALLY UN-
INSURABLE) ($50,000 FOR $1 M INSURED) 
AP Area 
 
These figures vary continuously depending on the political conditions around. For 
example, the figures for early 2013, as quoted by Hellenic War Risks Association were: 
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Table 4: Additional Premium AP Rates – Beginning 2013 
Premium AP 
Rates 
Area AP Area 
Classification 
0.00% FOR THE SUEZ CANAL AND RED SEA TRANSIT Not an AP Area 
0.012% FOR SAUDI ARABIAN PORTS, 7 Days ($120 FOR 
$1 M INSURED) 
AP Area 
0.05% FOR UM QASR IN THE ARABIAN GULF, 7 Days 
($500 FOR $1 M INSURED) 
AP Area 
0.0125% FOR ISRAEL, 7 Days ($125 FOR $1 M INSURED) AP Area 
0.05% FOR BASRAH, 7 Days ($500 FOR $1 M INSURED) AP Area 
0.01 to 
0.175% 
FOR NIGERIAN PORTS, 7 Days ($100 - $1750 FOR 
$1 M INSURED) 
AP Area 
0.00% FOR STRAITS OF MALACCA Not an AP Area 
0.024750 to 
0.041250% 
FOR GULF OF ADEN TRANSIT, 14 Days ($247.5 - 
$412.5 FOR $1 M INSURED) 
	  
AP Area 
0.015% FOR LIBYAN PORTS, 7 Days ($150 FOR $1 M 
INSURED) 
AP Area 
5.00% + FOR SOMALI PORTS, 7 Days (VIRTUALLY UN-
INSURABLE) ($50,000 FOR $1 M INSURED) 
AP Area 
 
Please note: these are rates offered by the Hellenic War Risks Mutual to its members 
and actual market rates are generally higher. 
 
2.4.6 Cancellation of Policy 
 
A war-risks insurance policy is very unusual in two respects (Hellenic War Risks, 
2016): 
First, the policy is subject to automatic termination: 
1.   Upon the outbreak of war (whether there be a declaration or not) between any of 
the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council: The United 
Kingdom, The United States of America, France, the Russian Federation and the 
People’s Republic of China 
2.   In the event of the insured ship being requisitioned either for title or use 
3.   In the event of nuclear, chemical, biological or radiological war (CBRN) or 
detonation of such devices. 
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Requisition 
If a ship is requisitioned by its flag state, or in fact by any flag state, the owner is no 
longer insured by his war risk insurer. He must therefore look to the government or state 
organization that has requisitioned his ship for compensation if the ship is destroyed or 
incurs losses and liabilities which would normally have been covered by his Hull and 
Machinery, war-risk or other insurance (Hellenic War Risks, 2016). 
 
The financial ability and willingness of the requisitioning government or state 
organization to pay compensation in such cases is obviously of prime concern to the 
ship owner. This explains why policies such as the UK’s ‘Queen’s Enemies’ insurance 
are so valuable. This long-standing policy covers war risks for vessels requisitioned by 
Her Majesty’s Government as well as for vessels simply chartered for national, military 
and humanitarian sealift transportation requirements, regardless of whether they are for 
military deployment, sustainment or redeployment and regardless of whether war has 
been declared or not. 
 
Policy cancellation re-instatement 
The second unusual feature of war-risks insurance policy as well as the way the insurers 
impose additional premium areas, is that the insurance underwriter can cancel the 
policy at any time after giving a seven-day notice of cancellation (Hellenic War Risks, 
2016). The usual clause in the policy will read as follows: 
 
Such cancellation shall be effective on expiry of seven days from midnight of the 
day on which notice of cancellation is issued by the insurer. The insurer agrees 
to reinstate any insurance cancelled in accordance with this provision subject to 
agreement between the insurer and the owner prior to the expiry of such notice 
of cancellation as to the premium to be paid and/or the terms and/or conditions 
and/or warranties of insurance 
(Hellenic War Risks, 2016, p 38). 
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Further, because most things nuclear are always taken as an ‘exclusion’, the clause may 
also read as follows: 
Caused by ionizing radiation from or contamination by radioactivity. From any 
nuclear fuel or from any nuclear waste or from the combustion of nuclear fuel; 
the radioactive, toxic, explosive or other hazardous or contaminating properties 
of any nuclear. Installation, reactor or other nuclear assembly or nuclear. 
Component thereof; any weapon of war employing atomic or nuclear. Fission 
and/or fusion or other like reaction or radioactive force or matter  
(Hellenic War Risks, 2016, pp. 27-28). 
 
In the past decade, due to changes in technology, a new clause, known as the CBRN 
clause (Chemical, Biological, Radiological or Nuclear), has been introduced. This 
clause has already been incorporated to all war-risks policies and stipulates that if a 
CBRN device is detonated then coverage is automatically cancelled. 
 
As can be easily understood, this cancellation clause can create immense problems for 
any strategic or humanitarian sealift operation because the detonation of a small 
chemical, or more importantly radiological, device can destroy computers or 
communication equipment and at the same time adversely affect war-risks cover 
(Hellenic War Risks, 2016). 
 
 
To illustrate, let us assume that an operation for humanitarian aid to a nation hit by a 
natural disaster has been agreed upon. Let us also imagine that a small group of 
separatist terrorists in that nation wish to take advantage of the confusion brought about 
by the natural disaster. If they decide to detonate a small CBRN devise then war-risks 
coverage in that area will be automatically cancelled and any maritime adventure must 
automatically cease unless a suitable alternative is found. Otherwise, both owner and 
charterer will not be able to assume the risk of prosecuting the adventure. 
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The above applies to a military operation in which, for example, half the equipment has 
arrived at the sea port of discharge (SPOD) while the troops have arrived by air they are 
awaiting the arrival of their equipment by sea. If a CBRN device were then to be 
detonated at the SPOD, the vessel carrying the balance of equipment would not be able 
to approach the SPOD to discharge her cargo unless suitable additional premium war-
risks insurance cover were to be first in place. Such cover must satisfy the owner the  
charterer but also the vessel’s mortgagee and those responsible for any personnel 
onboard whether they be troops or supercargoes. 
 
Maritime and aviation war risk comparison 
Since most military, humanitarian aid and refugee transportation involve both sea and 
air elements, it is interesting to note the differences between the aviation and maritime 
perceived risks and liabilities. 
 
As a matter of contrast, the war risks involved in marine adventures are quite different 
to those war-risks for the aviation industry. Firstly, aircraft go in and out of war-risk 
areas much faster and can leave a potential war-risk area much faster than a vessel. 
Secondly, there are many more ‘additional premium areas’ in the aviation market, 
because it has to consider risks in inland as well as coastal areas. 
 
In the case of aviation, war-risk cover is also considered particularly relevant when 
flying into Third-World countries such as nations in Central and South America. 
Confiscation and seizure are considered to be major perils in the aviation industry 
whereas they are almost non-existent in the commercial maritime industry. 
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The liability of passengers in aircraft is governed by the Warsaw convention, 
(Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by 
Air, signed at Warsaw on 12 October 1929; International Civil Aviation Organization, 
1929) which covers passengers up to US dollars seventy-five thousand. On the other 
hand, ticket holding passengers on vessels are covered by the Athens Convention. This 
cover was set at one hundred seventy-six thousand (SDR) Special Drawing Rights in 
1996 and has been recently raised to two hundred thousand SDR per passenger, but this 
figure has not been ratified by all nations. According to the International Monetary 
Fund (2016) 1SDR=US$1.344330. 
 
Marine war-risk insurance covers particular average damage as well as total loss but 
even though the aviation war-risks policy also covers particular average as well as total 
loss, the frequency of particular average claims in aviation is very low whereas, 
regrettably, there is a higher frequency of total loss. It is in the nature of the aviation 
industry that when there is an accident it is usually catastrophic. 
 
A vessel may be hit by a missile causing immense damage and preventing the vessel 
from completing its intended voyage but with no loss of life or damage to the cargo, in 
which case the vessel will be diverted to a safer port, the cargo discharged and finally 
the vessel will be repaired and the underwriter will pay a finite particular average claim. 
 
On the other hand, if a commercial airliner is hit by a missile whilst in flight the 
chances are that the plane will be a total loss, all the lives on board will be lost and the 
cargo will be destroyed. In this case the underwriter will pay a massive total loss claim 
in addition to a huge personal accident liability claim. 
When assessing the risk there are several factors which vary between marine and 
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aviation: 
1.   Time scale: A vessel is within an additional-premium war-risk area for a period 
of days; it may take days for a ship to approach a port and during which she 
could be in an additional-premium war-risks area. It takes days to discharge and 
days to leave the port or area. For example, to go to the Persian Gulf port of 
Kuwait where the additional-premium war risk begins crossing the twenty-
fourth parallel North (Hellenic War Risks, 2014). This is a distance of about 
seven hundred miles, which at fifteen knots would take about two days. An 
aircraft would fly in, discharge and fly out all in a matter of hours. 
 
2.   Values: A modern RO/RO vessel has a value in excess of US dollars seventy 
million (Horizon Ship Brokers, 2017); the cargo on board may have a value of 
US dollars ten million (which is the approximate value of cargo in Case Study 1, 
Chapter four, below). With about one thousand passengers on board their 
liability would be, according to the Athens convention, roughly US dollars three 
hundred million. Summing it all up makes the total war-risks potential liability 
of the adventure about US dollars three hundred eighty million. A modern 
Jumbo jet has a value of over US dollars two hundred million with a cargo value 
of, say, US dollars ten million. With four hundred passengers on board there is a 
liability of US dollars thirty million according to the Warsaw Convention 
(International Civil Aviation Organization, 1929), bringing the total war-risks 
value of the adventure about US dollars two hundred forty million. This smaller 
overall value is also at risk for a shorter amount of time. However, most major 
airline carriers purchase between US dollars one million five hundred thousand 
and US dollars two billion worth of liability cover to allow for high value 
passengers (International Union of Aerospace Insurers, 2012). 
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3.   Frequency: An entire conventional strategic sealift operation will require, say, a 
total of one hundred vessel-voyages to move the larger, heavier equipment that 
cannot be handled by aircraft, whereas there may be as many as one hundred 
flights in a single day for troops and lighter and more urgently required cargoes. 
4.   Pollution: The pollution from an aircraft is minimal because most of the jet fuel 
will evaporate and the maximum capacity of an aircraft’s fuel tanks is in the 
order of one hundred fifty tonnes for a long haul flight. On the other hand, a 
modern RO/RO will burn about fifty to sixty tonnes a day and will have a 
capacity of over one thousand five hundred tonnes of Intermediate fuel oil, 380 
centistokes. A spillage would require a major, multi-million dollar clean up plus 
litigation defence, and also would also incur a multi-million dollar fine 
(Wickham, 2012). 
 
This brief explanation of the differences between marine and aviation risks and 
liabilities is meant to demonstrate that all such considerations must be taken into 
account before choosing a mode of transportation; it is also meant as an introduction of 
what to expect before embarking on the business of contracting a sealift asset in order 
to perform a sealift maritime adventure. 
 
2.4.7 CBRN Devices and Detonation 
 
As mentioned above, the new CBRN exclusion clause was introduced as recently as ten 
years ago and implies that when chemical, biological, radioactive or nuclear agents are 
used then commercial marine war risks cover is automatically cancelled. 
 
If there were an imminent threat of CBRN weapons being detonated, the radioactive 
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contamination/nuclear exclusion clause would not apply, on the grounds that there 
would not be any loss or damage unless the weapons were actually detonated or used 
(Hellenic War Risks, 2016). The deployment or arming of such weapons would not 
trigger the exclusion clause for the same reason. However, any ‘sue and labour’ costs 
would not be recoverable, because they would be incurred in relation to loss and/or 
damage that was subject to an exclusion from the policy; ‘sue and labour’ costs are, as 
the words imply, expenses incurred by the shipowner acting as a ‘prudent’ uninsured 
shipowner to mitigate and minimise the total exposure to casualty of the insured 
incident (Hellenic War Risks, 2016). 
 
If, on the other hand, the CBRN weapons were detonated, causing loss or damage to a 
ship or ships, again that loss and damage would not be recoverable, because it would be 
subject to the same exclusion. It is possible, however, that the detonation would render 
certain areas in the proximity prohibited or uninsurable so that war-risks cover would 
not be available for ships in that area. Thus, unless a suitable alternative insurance was 
found that was satisfactory to the ship owner, and his financiers and all those involved 
in the maritime adventure, then it would be obliged to cease. 
 
If only a threat persisted, cover would not be cancelled, but would remain available; the 
question would then be, at what rate? This is where the underwriter's risk assessment 
would come into play. It can be assumed that, even if the situation stopped short of 
‘absolute mayhem’, the general situation would be tense and there could well be overt 
or covert operations afoot. In those circumstances, the financial cost of maintaining the 
insurance cover, presumably ultimately by the charterers of the vessel, would have to be 
weighed against the military/political need to deploy forces or equipment in the 
particular area or to pursue the adventure. The dilemma is far easier to answer in the 
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situations where the maritime adventure is predominantly for humanitarian aid or 
refugee evacuation as other political factors are prominent (Chakravarty, 2011). 
 
To summarise, there are some circumstances and possible scenarios in which 
commercial war-risks cover would not be available at all and others where it would 
only be available at rates that would be potentially prohibitive. 
 
A possible scenario to consider is as follows: 
A military or humanitarian force is set to move to a particular hot spot, either to deliver 
military hardware, medical supplies or to evacuate refugees. Ships and aircraft are 
chartered, not requisitioned, and are on their way to the sea port of discharge (SPOD). 
There will most likely be staggered arrival of both aircraft and vessels, since this is not 
only financially sound but also practical because airport aprons and seaports have finite 
storage and demarcation capacity. In the event that a CBRN device is detonated after 
the arrival of the first wave of ships and aircraft, then the cover will be cancelled by the 
war-risks underwriter within seven days, as described previously, and the balance of 
ships and aircraft will be unable to go to destination and deliver their cargo, unless 
alternative satisfactory war-risk cover is made available. In most circumstances the 
market will impose additional-premium rates dependent on the perceived threat and 
predicted future threat, hopefully within the budget restrictions of the adventure. As 
mentioned above, an alternative open to most nations would be the requisition of the 
sealift asset so as to order the adventure to be prosecuted to completion; under such 
circumstances the requisitioning government or state organization will assume all risks 
and liabilities. 
 
It should be noted that on many occasions, a shipowner must obtain the approval of his 
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financial backers, shareholders and/or partners and the consent of the crew to pursue the 
adventure with regard to his choice of war-risks underwriter or alternative war-risks 
cover. In the event that commercial war-risk cover is not available, some nations have 
created alternative arrangements. For example, the Hellenic Republic has contracted the 
Hellenic Shipping War Risks Insurance S.A (Ellinikai) to handle such situations 
(Karamanglis, Papaligouras, Rallis, Mpitsios, Averof-Tositsas, et al., 1975). 
 
Having understood this brief introduction to the basic concept of war-risks insurance 
and the fundamental reasoning behind purchasing such cover, it is also important to 
understand the practical aspects and use of this specialised form of insurance. Piracy is 
a crime that has been perpetrated from the time that man took to water and transported 
goods by sea; regrettably, piracy is still rife all over the world and adversely affects 
many maritime adventures. It has become such an important factor in any maritime 
transportation requirement, regardless of it being civil or military, that armed protection 
of ships is often the norm as opposed to the exception. 
 
2.5  The Issue of General Average 
 
Ships carrying cargo and the masters who operated them were protected by a maritime 
system dating back to the unwritten Lex Maritima. This early type of coverage was 
developed on the island of Rhodes, an important maritime centre, around the ninth 
century BC. Due to the international nature of shipping and the differences in the law’s 
application, however, as a means to introduce international uniformity, the concept of 
general average was formally codified into the York-Antwerp Rules in 1890. The rules 
have been updated numerous times, most recently in 2004 (Comité Maritime 
International, 2004, Rule A, p.4). The rules state: 
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There is a general average act when, and only when, any extraordinary sacrifice 
or expenditure is intentionally and reasonably made or incurred for the common 
safety for the purpose of preserving from peril the property involved in a 
common maritime adventure. 
 
The law of general average is a principle of maritime law according to which all parties 
in a sea venture proportionally share any losses resulting from a voluntary sacrifice of 
part of the ship or cargo to save the whole in an emergency, for instance, when the crew 
throws some cargo overboard to lighten the ship in a storm (Maloof Browne & Eagan, 
2013). 
 
General average is a method that allocates the costs of marine casualties among the 
parties who benefit from the cargo and ship being saved. Claims generally fall into two 
categories (Maloof Browne & Eagan, 2013): 
1.   Losses and sacrifice for the common benefit of the ship, cargo and property 
involved in the adventure and 
2.   Expenses of common safety to complete the voyage which would include ports 
of refuge costs, port dues, wages and maintenance along with repairs of 
accidental damage. 
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The four essential prerequisites for a general average declaration are (Johnson, 2013): 
 
1.   Incurrence of an extraordinary sacrifice or expenditure 
2.   Occurrence of an intentional or voluntary, but not necessarily inevitable, act 
3.   Presence of a real and substantial, but not necessarily imminent, peril 
4.   Resolution must be for the common safety and not merely to salvage part of the 
property involved 
 
Johnson (2013) also stated that the calculation of general average contributions is a 
complex task. Given the rather piecemeal development of the rules, correct 
interpretation continues to be a task for experts who specialise in general average 
adjusting. General average security usually takes the form of a General Average Bond 
signed by cargo owners, together with either a cash deposit for the amount determined 
by general average adjusters or a General Average Guarantee provided by the cargo 
insurers. 
 
Guarantees are usually only accepted from reputable insurers with a strong financial 
backing. Where the insurer does not meet the minimum financial strength criteria, 
additional security may be required before release of cargo. Therefore, cargo owners 
and their brokers, in the current global financial climate, are advised to deal with a 
reputable marine insurer with a healthy solvency margin and a strong international 
credit rating (Johnson, 2013). 
 
According to Johnson (2013), the following are some examples of events and 
expenditures that are likely to be involved in a general average loss: 
•   Grounding/stranding (such as: Damage to vessel and machinery through refloat 
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efforts; loss or damage to cargo through jettison or forced discharge, cost of 
discharging, storing and reloading of discharged cargo and port of refuge expenses) 
•   Fire (e.g., Damage to ship or cargo due to efforts to extinguish a fire on board, 
jettison of cargo and port of refuge expenses) 
•   Cargo shifting in heavy weather (i.e., jettison of cargo and port of refuge 
expenses) 
•   Heavy weather collision or machinery breakdown (port of refuge expenses) 
 
 
2.6 How to Move it 
 
Heavy and bulky military and humanitarian aid hardware can best be moved by sea 
although there are alternatives such as heavy lift aircraft - for example, the Andonov 
124. However, economies of scale versus high fuel consumption and cost together with 
the aircraft’s weight restrictions make transportation by sea the preferred mode of 
transport for oversized and heavy cargoes. 
 
It is clear that virtually anything can be transported by sea in the appropriate type of 
ship, and what is vital in any operation, be it military or civilian, is the ease and speed 
that the particular cargo can be loaded, transported to its destination and discharged. A 
further consideration is cost which is of paramount concern given today’s fiscal 
difficulties and budgetary restraints. Tonne-mile for tonne-mile, shipping is the most 
economical and environmentally friendly means of transportation (NATO, 2008e). 
 
Obviously, when it comes to refugee evacuation and in some humanitarian aid 
situations, the greater speed of aircraft is attractive and more practical; however, 
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airports are often the first area to be under belligerent siege during a conflict and are 
usually not as reliably operational as a sea port. Consequently, suitable ships will be 
required to carry the refugees out of harm’s way and for these situations passenger car 
ferries are ideal. 
 
The choice of ship type is not only dependent on the cargo but also the constraints of 
the maritime adventure, beyond the obvious restrictions that liquid such as diesel fuel 
and fresh water should be transported by tanker, and containers should be transported 
on container ships. Cargo handling equipment on the vessel, making her self-sufficient, 
is desirable. Even these apparently obvious choices of a tanker for liquids and a 
container ship for containerised cargo can impose operational constraints which will 
preclude the use of tankers and container ships. For example, in the situation that there 
is no available means to further transport the liquid to the theatre of operations, such as 
available tanker trucks and such, then the sea transportation of the diesel fuel may need 
to be done in tanker trucks or containers thus affecting the choice of vessel type from 
early on in the planning stage. When cargo handling equipment is required, the choice 
of vessel is affected (NATO, 2008e). 
 
The appropriate vessel can also be determined by the loading and discharging port 
facilities, their non-existence or even their condition post-conflict, including their draft 
restrictions, the berth availability and the existence or condition of the port cargo-
handling equipment. These are all criteria that must be examined early on during the 
planning stage and prior to the selection of vessel type. 
 
2.6.1 Choice of Vessel 
There are many variables that should be examined at the planning stage when selecting 
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the ship type, and below is a non-exhaustive list of the variables: 
•   Ease of loading and discharging  
•   Speed of loading and discharging 
•   Capacity of the vessel (availability and space efficiency) 
•   Physical dimensions of the vessel 
•   Speed of the vessel 
•   Cost of the vessel 
•   Availability of the vessel 
•   Flag and crew nationality 
 
This will then lead to the consideration of the ship type as discussed above.  The basic 
generic ship types are listed below together with their basic description (NATO, 2008e): 
•    RO/RO: with stern and quarter ramps 
•   PCTC: with movable decks 
•    General cargo ship: with military suitable cargo gear 
•   Heavy lift cargo ship 
•    Bulk carrier: with military suitable cargo gear 
•    Container ship: gearless with or without cell guides 
•   Container ship: geared 
•    Container feeder 
•    RO/PAX: ferry boat 
•    Cruise ship: passenger carrier 
•    Float on/Float off: for specialized use 
•   Reefer 
•    Tanker: all sizes, all products 
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•   Tug: off shore supply 
 
In order to assess the suitability of ship type for various maritime adventures, the 
researcher has conducted on-site inspections. A list of the visits is cited in Appendix 1.   
 
A brief description, as provided by the IMO (2004b), of the main details of each vessel 
type will help the user in selecting the appropriate vessel for a particular maritime 
adventure (Kendall, 1979); even a small change in the operational parameters or port 
facilities and equipment can affect the suitability of a particular ship type. 
 
The RO/RO: with stern and quarter ramp 
This type of vessel is the most suitable for military use, as it is specifically designed for 
rolling stock. The roll-on/roll-off (RO/RO) has fixed or moveable flat unobstructed car 
decks to accommodate the rolling stock, usually cars or small SUV’s. Access is 
predominately through a stern ramp, but this requires ‘stern to’ mooring - for ‘side to’ 
mooring the vessels require a quarter ramp. Most RO/ROs sail at the higher speed range 
for ocean-going vessels of between fifteen and twenty-five knots. The majority of 
modern RO/ROs are fitted with bow and stern thrusters thus increasing their 
manoeuverability and their suitability to serve semi-operational ports or ports where tug 
assistance is unavailable. Their versatility also includes the ability to carry containers.  
For military consideration the vessels’ ramps must have the strength to accommodate a 
battle-ready tank, which can be in the order of seventy tonnes; most modern RO/ROs 
are built to this standard or higher (Croatian Shipbuilding Corporation, 2014). 
The researcher visited a RO/RO; see Appendix 1. 
 
Since the RO/RO can accommodate most shapes and sizes of military cargo, including 
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containers that are on trailers or lifted on by crane to topside decks, this is the most 
sought after vessel for military maritime transportation operations. Yet there are many 
other vessels that can do the job and are often far more economical to hire in the open 
market. 
 
The PCTC: with movable decks 
 
The pure car and truck carrier (PCTC) is almost identical to the RO/RO with the only 
difference that these ships are usually designed for longer voyages and have vertically 
moveable car decks so that they can accommodate taller vehicles, trucks, SUV’s or, in 
the case of the military adventure, tanks and armoured cars. Most people have seen 
these vessels plying the seas and remark that they look like floating boxes. Speed is 
important in the car transportation trade therefore, these ships tend to be highly powered 
and can attain the same speeds as the RO/RO (MOL, 2017).  
 
 
This is a new breed of ship and is usually quite large and purpose built for a specific 
trade, so it is unlikely to be readily available or for that matter necessarily suitable for 
military use. The researcher visited a PCTC; see Appendix 1. 
 
 
The General Cargo Ship: with military suitable cargo gear 
 
A dying breed of vessel (Drewry, 2016b), this was the transport workhorse of all major 
conflicts until the development of the container in the 1960’s. This vessel type saved 
Europe during WWII, and the most famous and archetypical general cargo ship is the 
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‘Liberty’ ship (Kendall, 1979), designed in the USA by Keiser, pre-fabricated inland to 
be built in less than a month on the US slipways during the conflicts in Europe. The 
Liberty ship was ostensibly built for a one-off voyage to accompany a convoy across 
the north Atlantic to deliver humanitarian aid to the British Isles. It is often referred to 
as the ‘Tween-Decker’ because it has an intermediary deck between the tank top 
(bottom) and the weather deck (top) so to secure more deck space to carry all types of 
general cargo, including containers, as opposed to bulk cargoes. The success of the 
‘Liberty’ ship led to the development of its more modern counterparts: The UK 
designed and built ‘SD14’ and, likewise Germany had its own ‘GLR’ ,German Liberty 
Replacement. Currently, the more modern version has heavier cargo handling gear and 
is thus suitable for lift-on/lift-off operations handling the sort of heavy equipment 
transported by the military. It can also carry tanks, trucks, helicopters, boxes, containers 
and refrigerated containers. Nevertheless, this is not the military’s first choice of vessel 
type as the lift-on/lift-off loading and unloading of the general cargo ship is much 
slower that the RO/RO. Yet some conflicts are unable to handle the RO/RO as the ports 
were never designed to cater to this type of vessel or type of cargo handling; an 
example of this was in the Falkland conflict where most of the UK strategic sealift 
transportation and sustainment was carried out by general cargo vessels (Koburger, 
1983). The researcher visited a general cargo ship; see Appendix 1. 
 
 
The Heavy Lift General Cargo Ship 
 
As the name implies, these are basically the standard general cargo vessels with the 
addition of exceptionally heavy cargo handling equipment. These ships may be fitted 
with derricks that can handle lifts upwards of three hundred metric tonnes. Although 
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they may not be so useful for the military, they can be of tremendous value in 
humanitarian aid operations when entire food processing factories or complete 
desalination plants need to be transported directly to an area in need. Their most 
common trade is large industrial items such as nuclear reactor core chambers (Tuscor 
Lloyds, 2014). 
 
Though not often sought out by the military, they could be appropriate for specific 
situations requiring the transportation of over-sized cargoes. The researcher visited a 
heavy lift general cargo ship; see Appendix 1. 
 
 
The Bulk Carrier: with military suitable cargo gear 
 
The bulk carrier is currently one of the most commonly used vessels (Drewry, 2016a). It 
is designed to take bulk cargoes (Kendall, 1979), as the name implies, and can vary in 
size from less than one thousand metric tonnes to over two hundred thousand metric 
tonnes (MT). It can also be fitted to take containers in which case it is known in the 
trade as a con-bulker; this would make it more attractive for military use except that it 
usually has cargo handling gear of around twenty-five to thirty-five metric tonnes per 
lift, insufficient for most military equipment cargoes. However, the smaller bulk carriers 
are convenient as a stop-gap solution in a situation where a more militarily suitable ship 
is not readily available. Furthermore, the mere fact that they are more economical to 
charter due to the sheer volume of available tonnage should make them a candidate for 
serious consideration by the military transportation planner. The researcher visited a 
bulk carrier ship; see Appendix 1. 
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The Container Ship: gearless with or without cell guides 
 
The container ship has become one of the main workhorses of the ‘finished product’ 
industry. Most items that can be packaged can also be containerized so the possibilities 
are limitless (thus the dream of all the large container companies must be to 
containerize everything that needs to be transported). Container ships have two main 
configurations: firstly, those with container shoes on the tank tops and hatch covers 
requiring additional fittings and locking devices to keep them together and prevent them 
from falling overboard and secondly, the open hatch type with ‘cell guides’ that simply 
guide and lock the cargo into position. An important feature, of use to the military, is 
that if the cargo (for example, a tank) does not fit into a container twenty foot 
equivalent unit (TEU) with dimensions of 20’ x 8’6” x 8’, then the vessel can be 
reconfigured to take open ‘flat beds’ that can have the surface area of up four TEUs or 
40’ x 8’6” x 16’ and can carry a weight of over eighty metric tonnes  (Drewrey, 2016b). 
 
Large container ships are known as mother ships, and can be as large as fifteen 
thousand TEUs, but these type of ships, however, are not suitable for direct military use 
although they have a use in the liner service trade. Smaller container ships are more 
appropriate for military use. Predominantly, the large container ship is gearless and 
requires shore facilities to load and discharge her cargo (Shipping Guides LTD, 2017). 
The researcher visited a container ship, gearless; see Appendix 1. 
 
 
The Container Ship: geared 
 
The geared container ship is smaller in size than the ‘mother’ ships as her maximum 
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beam is limited by the length of her crane booms. To be considered and marketed as 
geared, this vessel must be totally self-sufficient and able to handle all containers in her 
holds and on her decks. This type of container ship is suitable for direct charter by the 
military; it is also suitable for humanitarian aid and can trade to ports with limited 
facilities, because of its self-sufficiency (Shipping Guides LTD, 2017). 
 
The usual cargo handling gear is in the region of forty metric tonnes per lift, which 
allows for the standard TEU with a weight of twenty-two metric tonnes and the longer 
FEU (Forty foot Equivalent Unit) with a weight of forty metric tonnes. Geared 
container ships also have the advantage of good speeds in excess of eighteen knots. The 
researcher visited a container ship, geared; see Appendix 1. 
 
The Container Feeder 
 
The container feeder vessel is usually small, rarely more than one thousand TEU’s, and 
should be geared in order to be self-sufficient, unless, of course, she is purpose built for 
a particular trade where the ports are fitted with the appropriate cargo handling 
facilities. These vessels are highly suitable for military and humanitarian use and are 
very versatile (Shipping Guides LTD, 2017).  
 
The container feeder vessels are mainly used in the hub and spoke trade configuration 
(NATO, 2004) where they take the containers (delivered by the mother ships to the 
hubs) and deliver them to the spokes. Most of the container feeder vessels are not fitted 
with cell guides and are therefore able to also load non-containerized cargo hence 
making them ideal for military and humanitarian aid use. The researcher visited a 
container feeder vessel; see Appendix 1. 
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The RO/PAX: Ferry boat 
 
The passenger ferry is a very familiar sight to holiday-goers as they ply the 
Mediterranean and Caribbean waters on a regular basis. The standard design principle 
makes them a particularly useful vessel for all forms of maritime transportation from 
strategic defence sealift to humanitarian aid and refugee evacuation. With the addition 
of the garage decks, a passenger ferry can carry a whole battalion together with their 
rolling stock and equipment, retaining unit integrity and command and control. The 
modern passenger ferry is designed to cater to all types of trade and is very flexible 
when it comes to speed and loading axle weight, both features that are useful for 
military sealift. Indeed, today most modern Mediterranean passenger ferries boast 
Medevac facilities together with satellite communication (NATO, 2008e). 
 
The usefulness of this type of vessel for maritime transportation cannot be over-stated if 
one considers the convenience of having passenger cabins and catering facilities when 
evacuating refugees and also having garage space so that they can bring their personal 
belongings. This analogy is also valid for humanitarian aid deployment and 
sustainment, and a valid scenario might be the arrival of a humanitarian team with their 
equipment and, in the event of inadequate or insufficient facilities ashore to house the 
arriving personnel, the passenger ferry can remain in the most convenient port and 
provide accommodation.  The researcher visited a RO/PAX; see Appendix 1. 
 
The Cruise ship: passenger carrier 
 
The cruise ship is very similar to the passenger ferryboat without the luxury of the 
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garage decks. Historically, they have been employed as troop carriers and are ideal for 
refugee evacuation. Obviously, their military uses are limited by the fact that they do 
not have the ability to carry rolling stock. 
 
One disadvantage is the cost, as cruise ships tend to cater to the luxury market and their 
fittings are more expensive than the average passenger ferry. However, in 1982 the 
Queen Elizabeth II took part in the Falkland Islands conflict, carrying three thousand 
troops and a six hundred fifty volunteer crew to the South Atlantic. She was refitted in 
Southampton; works included the installation of two helicopter pads, the conversion of 
public lounges into dormitories, the installation of fuel pipes to allow for re-fuelling at 
sea and the covering of the carpets with two thousand sheets of hardboard (Koburger, 
1983). The researcher visited a cruise ship; see Appendix 1. 
 
The Float on/Float off: for specialized use 
The float on/float off (Flo/Flo) vessel is a very specialized ship. It has limited military 
use save for the transportation of damaged vessels such as the USS COLE which was 
struck by terrorists at the anchorage of Yemen and could not sail home for repairs 
(Burns, 2000). 
 
The operational principle of this vessel is to flood her ballast tanks until her flat, open 
cargo deck is submerged sufficiently to load another vessel, in piggy-back fashion. A 
potential use could be in the event that an operation is taking place up a shallow river 
which would necessitate the use of shallow draft river boats. Since these latter boats are 
not classed for blue water sailing they could be transported on a Flo/Flo vessel with 
great ease (Global Security Institute, 2017). The researcher visited a Flo/Flo vessel; see 
Appendix 1. 
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The Reefer Ship 
 
The reefer vessel is basically a general cargo vessel where the cargo compartments are 
refrigerated. The temperature depends on the cargo being transported, obviously colder 
temperatures for the transportation of fish and meat and less cold for the transportation 
of fruit and vegetables. This is a very useful vessel for operational sustainment and 
humanitarian aid in particular where the theatre of operations is near the sea port of 
discharge (SPOD) and no further transportation over substantial distances is required. In 
the alternative situation where there is a long onward movement to the theatre of 
operations then it is preferable, logistically speaking, to make use of refrigerated 
containers (R.TEU). 
 
The refrigerated configuration of these vessels requires all the deck openings to be 
much smaller than those of an equivalent general cargo vessel, as it is of paramount 
importance to maintain the desired temperature and smaller hatch openings help to limit 
thermal loss (Shipping Guides LTD, 2017). The researcher visited a reefer vessel; see 
Appendix 1. 
 
 
The Tanker: all sizes all products 
 
The tanker is a vessel that everyone is familiar with, designed to carry fluids ranging 
from fresh water to diesel oil or even bitumen (tar). Essentially, the tanker can carry any 
flowing cargo, even grain. The smaller tanker, one thousand to twenty thousand tonne- 
cargo capacity, can be very practical for military use and sustainment by supplying 
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fresh water and all forms of fuels for tanks and aircraft to the SPODS near to the theatre 
of operations where further inland transportation can be performed by tanker-trucks 
(Shipping Guides LTD, 2017). 
 
The modern tanker is self -sufficient in loading and unloading and is easily able to carry 
and deliver many different grades of fuel simultaneously, as it has many sub-divisions 
to enhance stability and increase versatility. 
 
The much larger tankers are neither logistically practical nor useful for the type of 
operation under consideration as they require greatly enhanced port facilities, far deeper 
drafts. Furthermore, they entail very high insurance premiums and are basically a 
moving and vulnerable target for hostile action or piracy (SIGTTO, 2011). 
 
All rapid deployment forces and sustainment forces require the use of tankers to supply 
much needed fuels for equipment ranging from aircraft and tanks to generators for 
hospital and hotel services.  The researcher visited a tanker; see Appendix 1. 
 
 
The Tug/Off Shore Supply 
 
The tugboat is not mentioned here as a vessel to carry out sealift transportation but 
rather as a means to assist other vessels. In situations where, for example, the SPOD has 
been attacked and compromised, then tugboats will be required to assist in entering and 
leaving port and with berthing and un-berthing, especially where port channels are 
dangerous to navigate (Shipping Guides LTD, 2017). The researcher visited a tug; see 
Appendix 1. 
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There is a variety of other vessel types that have not been discussed in this chapter but 
they are not applicable to military or humanitarian aid sealift transportation. 
 
This chapter has given the reader a sufficient understanding of how the commercial 
shipping market works to be able to take advantage of what is available in the 
commercial shipping market and identify the potential for civil/military synergies.  
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CHAPTER 3 
A CIVIL MILITARY INTEGRATION FOR 
STRATEGIC SEALIFT FRAMEWORK 
 
 
3.1   Introduction 
This chapter discusses the theoretical background of this study and presents information 
extracted from various reports and existing studies in the field of civil and military 
integration for strategic sealift. 
 
Prior to examining the strategic cooperation for sealift operations between military and 
civil organisations, this thesis considers various cases where numerous countries have 
deployed strategic sealift in a number of military operations. Logistics capabilities are 
indispensable in determining where, when, how and for whom operational plans are 
executed. Logistics systems support the delivery of the assets required to fight and 
sustain. This involves strategy, operations and tactics. In earlier days, war efficiency 
was only limited by the endurance of crews and armaments. Wars used to be relatively 
limited in duration and geographical extent. With the passage of time, the ambition for 
maritime dominance resulted in the territorial extension of military operations. 
Consequently, the concept of logistics has gained importance and gradually became a 
predominant factor in the waging of wars. 
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3.2   Historical Examples of Civil/Military Cooperation  
 
Since World War II, the world has experienced two wars where logistical factors were 
crucial. In 1982 the UK went on a mission to recapture the Falkland Islands following 
an Argentine invasion some eight thousand nautical miles away. Then, in 1991 a 
Coalition Force led by the U.S.A. operated in the Middle East, some seven thousand 
five hundred nautical miles away from US shores, to free Kuwait from Iraqi occupation. 
From the British point of view, the Falkland Islands war was fought thousands of miles 
away from home where there was no infrastructure for logistic build-up and support. 
Yet the British managed to project their power with remarkable success. Of course, 
maritime supremacy and technological know-how were also crucial in that war 
(Koburger, 1983). On the other hand, the Gulf War is said to have been a logistical 
miracle. The coalition developed a huge logistics build-up during both the ‘Desert 
Shield’ and ‘Desert Storm’ operations.  Projecting a force to a theatre of operations 
thousands of miles away depended on the strategic triad of airlift, sealift and pre-
positioned war materiel. Once a robust strategic triad was in place, the next important 
step was the reception and distribution of capabilities on the spot. The coalition forces 
had no problem as they received support from several other countries around the globe 
(Gustafson, 1992). 
 
The Case of the Military Sealift Command (MSC) 
The replenishment and military transport ships of the US Navy are known as the United 
States Military Sealift Command and they are tasked with providing sealift 
transportation for US military services in addition to other US government agencies. 
 
The MSC was founded in July 1949 to replace the US MSTS (Military Sea 
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Transportation Service), and became solely responsible for the maritime transportation  
requirements of the Department of Defense, renamed Military Sealift Command in 
1970. 
The MSC vessels are made up of a fleet of ships, some owned by the US Navy and 
others are on long and short period chartered in tonnage, and manned by civilians. 
Depending on operational requirements they may carry Navy or Marine Corps 
personnel to perform communication and specialised duties including force protection. 
 
The Military Sealift Command is made up of five units: Sealift, Service Support, 
Special Mission, Prepositioning and Combat Logistics Force.  The Sealift unit is the 
largest of the five and is responsible for the transportation of equipment, vehicles, 
helicopters, ammunition, and supplies by means of tankers, cargo ships and RO/ROs 
(US Navy, 2015).  
 
The Special Mission unit supports military and government operations, such as 
submarine support and missile tracking.  The Prepositioning unit supports US military 
global operations by deploying supply vessels before they are actually needed. The 
Combat Logistics Force unit replenishes US Navy and MSC vessels at sea, enhancing 
the combined naval fleet’s sustainment and independence. 
 
The Case of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA) 
The UK’s Ministry of Defence owns a fleet of vessels, manned by civilians, designed to 
support the Royal Navy (RN). By supplying the RN vessels at sea, RAS (replenishment 
at sea), provides an array of services from fuel, victuals and ammunition to spares and 
repairs thus enabling the RN vessels to carry out global operations over extended 
periods of time without port calls. The RFA vessels further assist by supporting training 
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exercises, anti-piracy and anti-drug operations in addition to transporting Royal Marine 
and Army personnel (Heyman, 2006). 
 
An example of the use of RFAs is provided during the war in the Falkland Islands, a 
small archipelago situated in the South Atlantic Ocean. They have been under British 
rule since 1842 but have been a bone of contention for British and Argentina. 
Possession of these islands enabled the British to extend their reach into the Atlantic. 
On the other hand, Argentina had been claiming the islands since the early nineteenth 
century. In April 1982 Argentine forces occupied the Falklands Island and South 
Georgia. By mid-June the islands had been returned to full British sovereignty after a 
bloody war. Logistics played the key role in this war. The British government ultimately 
assembled twenty-eight thousand men, forty-four warships, twenty-two Royal Fleet 
Auxiliaries (RFAs) and forty-five merchant ships including two hundred aircraft in the 
area of operation. Logistic support was significantly constrained by long distance from 
the UK and harsh, unpredictable weather. With long lines of support and a campaign of 
uncertain duration the logistical challenges became inevitably the overarching concerns 
of operational and tactical commanders. In addition, with the nearest supply base three 
thousand eight hundred nautical miles away from the theatre of operations, the RFA 
could not have been expected to single-handedly cope with the support requirements. In 
the event, some forty-five vessels named STUFT (Ships Taken from Trade) were 
allocated to the task. Two of them were from Royal Marine Auxiliary Services 
(Koburger, 1983). These ships carried more than one hundred thousand tonnes of 
freight, nine thousand personnel, one hundred thousand man-months of food plus over a 
million man days of combat rations, one hundred eighty thousand metric tonnes of fuel 
per month and ninety-five assorted aircraft (Koburger, 1983). All merchant ships were 
modified to carry helicopters, provisions and troops in the shortest possible time. 
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The RFA workforce are all Ministry of Defence civil servants, and in 2003 became 
Royal Naval sponsored reserves: civilians who in some capacity, became part of the UK 
Armed Forces. However, the RFA is not military and its officers wear merchant navy 
insignia though they are under naval command when their vessels participate in military 
operations. Military functions such as medical facilities or operating and maintaining 
military hardware or weapons are performed by RN, either regulars or reserves (Royal 
Navy, 2017). 
 
The Case of Operation Passage to Freedom 
In 1954 to 1955 the Navy transported about three hundred thousand civilians, soldiers, 
and non-combatants (both Vietnamese and non-Vietnamese and members of the French 
Army) from communist North Vietnam to South Vietnam. Roughly five hundred 
thousand were transported by the French forces. The US operation was augmented by a 
humanitarian relief effort, paid for by the US government (Frankum, 2007). 
 
Between six hundred thousand and one million people moved south whereas only about 
one hundred fifty thousand people moved north, both military and non-military and 
both French and Vietnamese.  This mass migration southward was made possible by the 
French Air Force and Navy. US naval vessels supplemented the French efforts in 
evacuating northerners to the capital, Saigon. The movement between north and south 
went on for more than three hundred days ending on 18 May 1955 when the border was 
closed (Frankum, 2007). 
 
The fortunes of French Indochina were sealed by the Geneva Accords of 1954 after the 
defeat of French forces and their coalition partners by the Viet Mihn in the battle of 
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Dien Bien Phu. The Geneva Accords ostensibly divided Vietnam at the seventeenth 
parallel. The north was controlled by Ho Chi Minh’s communist Viet Minh and the 
South Vietnamese government was backed by the French (Frankum, (2007). 
 
3.3   Introduction to the Thesis 
 
The next section develops the researcher’s theoretical framework, to be tested by means 
of case studies. It will pose the questions of the thesis concerning the integration of the 
commercial shipping market into the movement and transportation capabilities of the 
nation and its military, not only for strategic sealift but for humanitarian aid and refugee 
evacuation. Is the integration of the commercial shipping market into the military 
workable? Will this integration provide benefits commensurate to the sacrifices that  
may need to be made, with respect to stealth, security, availability, reliability, 
 
confidentiality and command and control? 
 
These questions will be examined in the context of the requirements of the NATO 
alliance for security and defence within the level of ambition prescribed in the NATO 
Comprehensive Approach introduced during the Bucharest Summit (NATO, 2008b). 
 
3.3.1  Existing Theoretical Framework 
The main question being asked on the subject of strategic sealift for defence, 
humanitarian aid or refugee evacuation is based on the Heads of State decision in the 
NATO Comprehensive Approach, as approved at the Bucharest Summit in 2008 
(NATO, 2008c). 
 
 As a result of operational experience, NATO has concluded that it cannot meet all of 
the complex challenges associated with the level of ambition to maintain the alliance’s 
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security. Therefore, members of the alliance must include other assets, from both within 
and outside the Euro-Atlantic alliance, in all aspects of the alliance’s security, defence, 
humanitarian aid and refugee evacuation and on all levels, be it political, military or 
civilian (NATO, 2008c). 
 
 
3.3.2 The development of the NATO Comprehensive Approach 
To understand the reasoning behind the development of the NATO Comprehensive 
Approach it is necessary to go back in history. In 2004 the government of Denmark, 
with the support of like-minded NATO nations, took the initiative to put the concept of 
the Comprehensive Approach on the alliance’s agenda (Petersen and Binnendijk, 2007). 
It was initially referred to as ‘Concerted Planning and Action’ (CPA). Even then it was 
clear that although NATO had no capabilities for purely civilian use, pragmatic steps 
had already been taken in that direction. Experience had shown that conflict resolution 
required the application of all elements of national and international power: political, 
economic, diplomatic, social, commercial and military. NATO had to adopt a 
comprehensive approach, making use of civil and military elements and take advantage 
of civil/military synergies, not only to end the hostilities and restore order but to start 
reconstruction. In order to achieve this goal, the Danish embassy in Washington, DC 
held an informal workshop in which experts from alliance members to explore the 
options for creating an international comprehensive approach for post-conflict 
stabilization and reconstruction (Petersen and Binnendijk, 2007). 
 
At the Bucharest NATO summit, the Heads of States took the opportunity to move 
forward in their relationship with those organizations and partners willing and able to 
deploy civilian resources, conceding that military means alone were not enough to meet 
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the many complex challenges to the common security (NATO, 2011d). 
 
 
3.3.3 Implementation of the Comprehensive Approach 
 
In March 2011 the Secretary General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, wrote to the NATO 
permanent representatives requesting, under silence procedure, the updated list of tasks 
for the implementation of the Comprehensive Approach Action Plan and the Lisbon 
summit decisions on the Comprehensive Approach (NATO, 2011c).  
 
This action plan, describing NATO’s ability to deliver stabilisation and reconstruction 
targets, was agreed upon at the Lisbon summit in November 2010 along with political 
guidance on ways to improve NATO’s involvement in stabilization and reconstruction. 
 
The updated list of tasks, issued by the Secretary General, is divided into four sections 
and is in part quoted below in order to understand to what extent NATO was willing to 
co-operate with civilian players in order to achieve the desired level of ambition 
(NATO, 2011e, pp. 2-4): 
 
Action 
 
•   Enhance integrated civilian-military planning throughout the crisis spectrum. 
•   Continue to promote consultations with possible relevant players (partners, 
international actors, indigenous national authorities and relevant local actors) 
as needed prior to launching operations. 
•   Continue to develop options to support, upon request, the operational planning 
of other international actors involved on the ground, and exchange officers on a 
temporary basis to support such assistance. 
•   Develop and discuss with other actors proposals to fully and continually engage 
the local actors, where possible, in the preparations and the conduct of an 
overall agreed plan for the resolution of a crisis, including with respect to 
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stabilization and reconstruction, drawing upon experience from existing models 
such as the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) and other models 
in Afghanistan or similar models from the Balkans. 
•   Continue to refine the non-military expertise overseen by NATO’s Civil 
Emergency Planning Committees and enable their better use and provision to 
the NATO Military Authority. 
•   Identify and train civilian specialists from member states, available for rapid 
deployment by Allies for selected missions, able to work alongside our military 
personnel and civilian specialists from partner countries and institutions. 
•   Develop the capacity to train and develop local forces in crisis zones, so that 
local authorities are able, as quickly as possible, to maintain security without 
international assistance. 
•   Address, through the NATO Defence Planning Process, the specialized 
capabilities that are required for potential stabilization and reconstruction 
activities. 
•   Develop and propose to the Council guidelines and mechanisms for leadership 
and coordination within NATO of future operations with a civilian dimension, 
with a view to optimising the role in theatre of the civilian officials alongside 
NATO commanders, taking into account the experience with the concept of the 
NATO Senior Civilian Representative, NATO’s civil military assessment and 
liaison team in the recent Pakistan flood relief operation, NATO gender advisers 
and other appropriate experiences and lessons learnt. 
•   Develop doctrine for stabilization and reconstruction, based on the Political 
Guidance on ways to improve NATO’s involvement in stabilization and 
reconstruction. 
•   Form an appropriate but modest civilian crisis management capability to 
interface more effectively with civilian partners, building on lessons learned in 
NATO-led operations. This capability may also be used to plan, employ, and 
coordinate civilian activities until conditions allow for the transfer of those 
responsibilities and tasks to other actors. 
•   In the NATO command structure, an appropriate but modest number of civilian 
planners, commensurate with operational needs, should be closely integrated 
with existing military planning staff.    
 
Lessons Learned, Training, Education and Exercises 
•   Reinvigorate the collection and analysis of stabilization and reconstruction-
related best practices and lessons learned from operations and reflect them in 
operations, exercise and training activities; encourage Allies to contribute 
national lessons identified to relevant NATO bodies and databases. 
•   Ensure adequate and effectively trained staff within NATO Headquarters who 
are competent to contribute to a Comprehensive Approach, by jointly training 
civilian and military personnel. 
•   Make effective use of Periodic Mission Review (PMR) process as a vehicle for 
lessons learned. 
•   Enhance training opportunities for civilian and military personnel from Allied, 
partner and contact countries, local authorities and civilian and military staff of 
NATO, other IO’s and NGO’s with particular focus on planning of operations, 
lessons learned, sharing of best practices. 
•   Exchange best practices and lessons learned with other international 
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organizations on the respective organizations’ operations training and exercises, 
including on interoperability standards. 
•   Continue to develop proposals for participation of other international actors in 
NATO’s crisis management exercises, and subsequently assess the feasibility of 
joint exercises relevant to our requirements. 
•   Successfully implementing our exercise policy with the EU. 
 
Enhancing Cooperation with external actors 
•   Recognising the respective mandates and roles of international actors, as well 
as their respective decision-making autonomy, ensure that NATO, when 
appropriate, as one of those actors, can make an effective contribution to the 
development of a coherent strategic design for addressing specific crisis 
situations. 
•   Continue to develop modalities for practical cooperation with relevant 
organizations and NGO’s, where necessary. 
•   Continue to conduct regular staff talks, in flexible formats, with relevant 
international organizations and NGO’s. 
•   Continue to exchange regular early warning and assessment information with 
international actors. 
•   Within the relevant international organisations of which they are members, 
Allies should, on an individual basis, indicate their support to expanded 
interaction, in pursuit of a Comprehensive Approach between NATO and these 
organisations. 
•   Hold regular consultative seminars and conferences on the broad context of 
operations with the participation of local actors, partners, non-governmental 
actors and other international actors. 
•   Further strengthen cooperation with the UN through effective use of the NATO 
Liaison Office and promote more regular consultations on political and 
operational issues. 
•   Upon request and subject to Council agreement, establish arrangements with 
relevant entities. 
 
Public Messaging 
•   Substantiate the overall international efforts in an operation by systematic and 
updated information, documenting progress in relevant areas. 
•   Where possible, share information strategies and campaigns regularly to ensure 
complementary and mutual reinforcement with other involved international 
organizations, and local actors. 
•   Facilitate greater coherence in messaging between NATO, the local authorities 
and the international communities. 
•   Carry out active public diplomacy activities to overcome misperceptions about 
the Alliance; encouraging Allies to do the same. 
 
NATO has recognised the need to integrate civilian capabilities with those of the 
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military, and this thesis examines the non-governmental or commercial sealift players. 
Within the NATO framework this is achieved through the NATO subcommittee: 
Transport Group, (Ocean Shipping) formerly known as PBOS Planning Board of Ocean 
Shipping, one of the oldest advisory committees in NATO’s civilian arsenal (NATO, 
2011e). 
 
 
3.3.4 NATO COMPASS programme 
To further enhance this integration NATO created the COMPASS programme, 
‘Comprehensive Approach Specialist Support’ (NATO, 2013). 
 
This document is NATO unclassified and was communicable to EAPC, MD, ICI, 
Afghanistan, Australia, Iraq, Japan, the Republic of Korea, New Zealand, Pakistan, 
Mongolia, Malaysia and Tonga. 
 
Since 2011 the COMPASS programme  has been open to all partners including the 
Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC: Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Finland, FYROM, Georgia, Ireland, Kazakhstan,  Kyrgyz 
Republic, Malta, the Republic of Moldova, Montenegro, Russia, Serbia, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan), the Mediterranean 
Dialogue Countries (MD: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and 
Tunisia), the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative countries (ICI: Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, 
United Arab Emirates), the Global Partners (GP: Afghanistan, Australia, Iraq, Japan, 
Pakistan, the Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Mongolia)  and other operational 
partners contributing to current NATO operations (NATO, 2006). 
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The COMPASS programme is an important tool in fulfilling the strategic concept and 
was devised to: 
identify and train civilian specialists from member states, made available for 
rapid deployment by Allies for selected missions, able to work alongside our 
military personnel and civilian specialists from partner countries and 
institutions  (European Union, 2015b, p. 62). 
 
The training and familiarization of experts (or in layman’s terms, commercial partners) 
is essential to ensure the effectiveness of civil/military synergies in the NATO crisis 
management toolkit. 
 
The NATO COMPASS programme was established in 2009 based on a decision taken 
by Heads of State at the Bucharest summit (NATO, 2008d). Experts’ profiles are stored 
and managed through the COMPASS database which is in turn managed by the NATO 
international staff.  Currently the database is staffed with more than one hundred fifty 
experts from various allied nations, namely: Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark,  
Germany, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States and 
Finland (NATO, 2009a). 
 
The COMPASS programme is facing a number of challenges, the most significant of 
which is, predictably, funding. This is in addition to the problems of location and 
availability of experts in the relevant fields: political, stabilization and reconstruction 
and media. Finally, there is the need to increase the visibility and availability of the 
database to all existing and potential customers (NATO, 2013). 
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3.3.5 Civil/Military Synergies 
 
Great efforts are being made within the corridors of the NATO alliance to integrate all 
aspects of civilian assets to the benefit of military operations. This effort pertains to all 
planning and operational levels given that civilian expertise is vast, continually being 
updated and readily available. 
 
This thesis examines a certain aspect of the use of civil/military synergies not only in 
regard to the military role of NATO and the security of the Euro-Atlantic Alliance, but 
also civil/military integration in individual member states and/or other military or in 
political alliances, such as the European Defence Agency and the United Nations. All of 
these international institutions are involved in military defence to a certain degree, 
whether it be a peace-keeping mission or the defence of sovereign territory, the 
evacuation of civilians in a civil emergency scenario or an international humanitarian 
aid program. This is by no means an exhaustive list. Nevertheless, there seems to be 
enough information both to provide an answer to the question at hand and to test for its 
validity. 
 
Since many of the possible scenarios available for study may be of a nationally 
sensitive nature or even classified as restricted on a national and alliance level, it will be 
prudent not to analyse individual case studies in too much depth for the response to the 
thesis that will be developed and proposed. In the event that a case study is analysed, 
limited sensitive information may be divulged in order to test the thesis. 
 
The NATO Alliance and the military in general, often plan, operate and train on the 
basis of generic scenarios. In many cases, however, to give credence to an exercise 
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scenario, fictitious nations and territories will be created to assist in obtaining the 
maximum benefit and ‘lessons learnt’ without creating political friction within and 
outside the alliance.   
 
This thesis will apply a generic scenario proposal in order to cover a greater exposure of 
the civil/military integration and then compare the individual benefits from the 
available synergies that could be applied in Strategic sealift for defence, humanitarian 
aid and refugee evacuation. 
 
The case study section of this thesis will examine two diverse maritime transportation 
case studies. 
 
Lisbon Summit 
The use of strategic sealift is only a small part of the conclusions from the Bucharest 
NATO Summit in 2008, but it was considered significant enough to be mentioned in the 
NATO Lisbon Summit in 2010 (NATO, 2010c). 
 
This thesis will study the methodology of questioning how to integrate the civilian 
commercial sealift fleet with the military sealift fleet and obtain the benefit of the 
synergies without the drawbacks of duplication of effort. This will include all available 
ship types, from the military’s favoured ship type – the RO/RO that carries rolling 
stock, wheeled or tracked vehicles - to the militarily essential small tanker that is 
capable of carrying a full range of products from motive diesel fuel and jet fuel to fresh 
water. Let us not forget the very popular and tested vessel, the passenger ferry, the 
workhorse of the sea borne tourist industry both in the English Channel and the 
Mediterranean.  This versatile ship type is fast, maneuverable and has the capacity to 
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carry large quantities of rolling stock together with passengers (or in military terms 
armoured cars and troops). This type of vessel is versatile enough to berth alongside 
and stern to; the latter is often referred to as Mediterranean mooring, and this increases 
the number of ports available for reception, staging and onward movement of 
deployable hardware (NATO, 2008e). 
 
Integration of civil/military synergies does not just mean the ability of the military 
sealift fleet to work in parallel to the civilian commercial fleet but the ability and know-
how of the military movement coordinator to make the most efficient and cost-effective 
use of acquired civilian sealift assets in achieving the level of ambition prescribed in the 
operation and meeting the commanders’ required dates. 
 
Wales Summit 
The Wales Summit (2014g) took place in September 2014 against the backdrop of 
serious economic woes amongst the European members of NATO and the prospect of 
worsening conditions caused by the intransigent position of Greece and the prospect of  
an extreme left wing party winning the Greek elections the following year (NATO 
2015c). 
 
The NATO transportation requirements of the summit were discussed extensively and 
were given to the three Transportation Group committees for discussion, evaluation and 
proposals. The core of the discussions was based on the realization that speed was of 
the essence in any operation undertaken by NATO, be it for defence, humanitarian aid 
or refugee evacuation. The conclusions of the meeting, in transportation terms, can be 
summarized as a need for ‘speed, speed and speed’ (NATO, 2015c). The summit 
concluded that the Rapid Action Plan (RAP) was a reality and considered all the 
118 
 
collateral effects and requirements associated with the RAP requirements and the 
desired deliverables for the required level of service to be provided by the NATO allies. 
The summit gave a desired time frame for the reaction time of the RAP on all levels and 
not only for transportation (a small but important part of the whole picture, as the 
success of an operation can turn on the timely transportation on either the deployment 
or sustainment). The RAP requires a five to seven day notice to move. That ostensibly 
means that whatever the form of the operation, it must be in motion towards the theatre 
of operations within the five to seven days prescribed by NATO leaders (NATO, 
2015c). 
 
This is a far more complicated requirement than originally anticipated or assumed. It 
may be easy to activate dormant aircraft contracts within such time frames but ships 
move and react at speeds on a different scale to aircraft. Aircraft can be contracted, 
loaded, flown, unloaded and returned to base in a matter of hours, whereas ships and 
trucks need days to satisfy the same transportation requirement. This puts a different  
responsibility and complexity on the NATO concept of ‘Assured Access’ especially for 
the slower forms of transport such as sea, road and rail. 
 
One can understand the necessity for rapid reaction to the requirements of operations 
such as humanitarian aid and refugee evacuation (NATO 2015c), but this will be 
reflected in the cost. A small but efficient reaction force is the desired conclusion of the 
summit. This concept together with the comprehensive approach described above is 
facilitated by utilizing civil/military synergies to their maximum potential. The 
commercial market already has to operate efficiently within tight time restrictions 
comparable with those implicit in the desires and conclusions of the Wales summit. 
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NATO funding definition 
The North Atlantic Treaty was signed in Washington in 1949 and created an Alliance 
for collective defence as defined under article 51 of the United Nations Charter. The 
treaty is of indefinite duration. According to the rules of the alliance spelled out in the 
handbook (NATO, 2006) and more specifically in Chapter 4 ‘Common-funding 
Resources, Budgets and Financial Management’, strategic sealift is financially covered 
by the nation providing the sealift, while NATO does not own any sealift assets nor 
does it budget for sealift contributions by participating nations. 
 
In the first years of the new millennium, funding was not an issue, the world economy 
was booming, nations were prosperous, sealift freight rates were high and the problem 
was actually the availability of scarce sealift assets. When the freight market is high it is 
difficult to secure the services of any vessel that is enjoying the security of reliable and 
substantial financial returns from the open commercial freight market (Drewry, 2016a);  
in such a situation the military often has to pay a premium to have a vessel released 
from a long-term contract to perform a military sealift requirement. 
 
 
3.3.6 NATO Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI) 
 
In 1999, at the Washington Summit, the Heads of States approved the Defence 
Capabilities Initiative (DCI) where nations pledged to take a number of actions, 
although this thesis will examine only the enhancement of rapid force deployment. The 
DCI involved five decisions. One of these was for the NATO Alliance to undertake an 
analysis of the available nationally-owned transportation assets. This was presented in 
the unrestricted NATO, DM 5 Feasibility Study, Defence Capabilities Initiative- 
120 
 
Deployment and Mobility Decision 5 (LMI, 2001). The relevant extract from the DM5 
report states: 
The Alliance and Nations should explore the feasibility of options for acquiring 
multinationally owned or leased sea and airlift assets for rapid deployment 
forces. Multinational acquisition of airlift and sealift is of considerable interest 
because, in theory, it should save costs and, when combined with centralized 
allocation of lift assets, help to deploy forces more efficiently than national 
approaches (LMI, 2001, p. 21). 
 
The summary conclusion further states: 
In response to DM5, the Movement and Transportation Advisory Group (MAG) 
of the Senior NATO Logisticians Conference identified six options for 
multinational lift acquisition to analyze. The options were not to be ranked 
against each other, but were to be evaluated relative to a number of quantitative 
and qualitative criteria. The options are: (1) ship and air lists; (2) civil and 
reserve air fleet; (3) voluntary intermodal sealift agreement; (4) multinationally 
owned and operated assets; (5) multinationally leased and operated assets; (6) 
multinationally chartered, carrier operated airlift and sealift assets  
(LMI, 2001, p. 24). 
 
To further support this analysis NATO sent out the ‘Bi-Annual Questionnaire’ to all 
alliance member states to list nationally owned sealift assets (LMI, 2001). For reasons 
known only to individual nations, the response to the questionnaire was not entirely 
satisfactory. However, one unmistakable conclusion was reached: the alliance had a 
noticeable sealift shortfall based on the level of ambition at the time. 
 
This analysis was carried out by the consultants LMI based on information supplied by 
the NATO International Staff. One major finding was concerned with the requirement to 
modify the operational methodology traditionally employed by NATO as the ownership 
of the potential assets was sometimes unknown and quite varied. The relevant major 
finding of the DM5 study states, that to be operationally effective, multinational lift 
arrangements require a centralized command-and-control organization to allocate lift 
assets in support of NATO’s deployment plans and it suggests that this kind of authority 
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would require a major revision in the balance of responsibility between nations and 
NATO. 
This major finding led to several desk-top exercises in co-operation between NATO’s 
PBOS (Planning Board of Ocean Shipping), CAPC (Civil Aviation Planning 
Committee), PBIST (Planning Board of Inland Surface Transport) and NATO’s NC3A 
(Consultation, Command and Control Agency) under the auspices of the NATO SCEPC 
(Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee), [Note: all the above committees have 
since changed name] which concluded that a central chartering and operational 
committee was not the appropriate way to go. 
 
European Defence Agency 
This study was considered of great significance and relevance for the members of 
alliance in order to be prepared for defensive asset movements and this was reflected by 
the European Defence Agency (2009) in their report European Third Party Logistics 
Support (TPLS) Platform for Crisis Management Operations. Its conclusion showed 
that there was a requirement for a logistics platform to be created to take advantage of 
third part logistics, i.e. commercial assets. 
 
3.3.7 Other Transportation Solutions 
 
Various solutions were proposed and others implemented by individual nations or by 
groups of willing nations with similar requirements. As freight rates rose and military 
budgets shrank due to the worldwide financial crisis and credit shortage late in 2010, it 
was logically concluded that the sharing of these scarce sealift assets was a logical step 
in the right direction. 
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Allied Movement Co-ordination Centre in Eindhoven 
 
This reasoning led to the creation of the Allied Movement Co-ordination Centre in 
Eindhoven, whose original participants were Norway, the Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom (NATO, 2002). This Centre was based on the correct assumption that sharing 
space on a sealift asset was economically more sensible than hiring the entire asset and 
not fully utilising it. Problems arose due to the nations having many and varied 
procurement procedures and the lack of trust and understanding involved when using a 
commercially owned asset (or even only part of a commercial asset) and these delayed 
the full use and benefit of a truly remarkable tool (NATO, 2002). 
 
However, the fundamental procurement problem, i.e., how to locate and acquire the 
elusive sealift asset in the first place remained unresolved. 
 
Athens Multinational Sealift Co-ordination Centre 
 
The next attempt to deal with this was behind the creation of the Athens Multinational 
Sealift Co-ordination Centre, later up-graded to the Athens Multimodal Strategic Lift 
Co-ordination Centre, AMSCC. The capabilities of this centre were presented to nations 
at the NATO Istanbul Summit, free of charge to the users (NATO, 2004a). The centre 
uses existing national and European Union Procurement legislation in order to acquire 
predominately militarily suitable sealift assets. Nations can approach the AMSCC with 
their sealift requirement and stipulate the procurement legislation necessary to satisfy 
their national requirements; this could be national, European Union or direct acquisition 
in the event that the cargo to be moved is either classified either as ‘strategic’ or 
‘restricted’ as most military cargoes are (NATO, 2013). 
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Danish ARK project 
In addition to the above solutions, the Danish government created and sanctioned the 
‘Danish Ark Project’; the Danish government procured two militarily suitable sealift 
assets from the commercial shipping market on long-term timecharter. These, they used, 
mainly for their own requirements of deployment, sustainment and redeployment for 
their own national activities. This project was introduced by the Danish Navy in 2003, 
at a presentation to NATO PBOS (NATO, 2003c). When this venture became very 
expensive due to the tremendous rise in the cost of fuel, the Danish government offered 
the free space to these vessels to the Eindhoven Centre, mentioned above. 
 
The Eindhoven Centre advises its members of available space on the Ark Project ships 
and, for a fee, offers other nations the possibility to use the spare capacity on these 
assets to satisfy their limited requirements. 
 
When one considers the development of defence and civil emergency requirements in 
sealift movements, the obvious conclusion is the question of how best to integrate the 
civilian Merchant Navy into the military’s sealift requirements, thereby gaining the 
benefits from synergies. 
 
The benefits of these synergies come from usage. In order to be made available to and 
used correctly by nations and their military movement officers, a basic understanding 
and knowledge of the very complex workings of the civilian commercial shipping 
markets is essential. 
 
This thesis has already introduced the reader to the basic workings of the commercial 
shipping market, though only in matters that can affect the selection, procurement, 
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management and contracting of the sealift asset, since the military is not required to 
have a knowledge of ship financing nor crewing or national and international 
regulations. 
Further, it has examined alternative ship types that are available and suitable for 
military sealift requirements beyond the traditional doctrine as to what constitutes 
suitable militarily-useful asset. 
 
Having posed the question, it may be useful to examine two non-classified examples of 
actual sealift requirement.  Each of these is considered step by step, from the initial 
request by the nation to the contractual procurement, use and monitoring of the 
commercial shipping asset in a militarily approved and sanctioned sealift movement. 
 
Notice that our investigation will be of a generic form so as to avoid disclosing 
sensitive military and commercial information. 
 
3.4     Conclusion 
 
This chapter discussed a number of previous research and official reports with the 
purpose of assisting the researcher to highlight the civil and strategic integration for 
strategic sealift operations. Chapter 4 discusses the research methodology and data 
collection methods. A theoretical framework is proposed in Chapter 5 and will examine 
the methodology and investigate the applicability of the proposed theoretical 
framework.  
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CHAPTER 4: 
 
METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
 
4.1   Introduction 
The previous chapter provided an investigation and analysis of the relevant literature in 
the field studied. This chapter outlines the research questions to be tested, the variables 
to be analysed, the methodological approach selected, and finally the research design 
employed to address the issues raised by the critical analysis. 
 
 
4.2   Measures of Study 
The theoretical framework presented in Chapter Two highlights a simple and 
straightforward guide for the marine transportation planner that could assist him in 
deciding which assets from the transportation toolbox should or could be used to 
perform and/or enhance a sealift operation where the benefit of the civil/military 
synergies has been recognised and approved for use. 
 
The usefulness of our theoretical model must be assessed in terms of answering the 
following questions: 
 
•   Is it applicable for NATO sealift operations? 
•   Is it suitable for NATO military operations?   
•   Is it relevant to NATO led operations? 
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•   Can it be used also for humanitarian aid and refugee evacuation? 
•   Does it assist in locating more assets?   
•   Will it be also of financial benefit?   
 
 
4.3   Research Questions/Aims 
To investigate the above questions, the researcher sets the following objectives: 
•   To identify the issues in the aim at hand 
•   To develop a model that allows military sealift personnel to efficiently and cost-
effectively procure shipping assets 
•   To validate the model, assessing its functional competence and 
•   To evaluate the outcomes 
 
The main objective of this study is to examine how a military movement and 
transportation desk officer should integrate the commercial shipping market assets and 
services into strategic sealift, in a practical and cost effective manner for strategic 
deployment, re-deployment and humanitarian aid. 
 
4.4   Methodology 
To meet its objectives and research questions, this study will undertake an empirical 
investigation of the role of strategic sealift as an integral part of any military or 
humanitarian operation. Empirical research focuses on observation, occasionally in 
experimental settings, and constitutes the dominant element in much social and business 
research (Saunders et al., 2009).   
 
There are two broad methodological positions in social sciences: positivism and 
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phenomenology (Saunders et al., 2009).  Logical positivism or empirical positivism or 
just positivism is based on the notions of objectivity (that is, the objective reality of the 
physical world), scientific method and empiricism.  In positivism the researcher plays 
the role of an objective analyst and is independent of the subject of the research 
(Remenyi, Williams, Money, Swartz, 1998). 
 
According to (Remenyi et al., 1998), ‘positivism emphasises quantifiable observations 
that lend themselves to statistical analysis’.  As a result, positivist studies are primarily 
quantitative in nature (Saunders et al., 2009).  Empirical science reflects the positivist 
methods and knowledge is built on deductive reasoning (Hussey and Hussey, 1997; 
Saunders et al., 2009).  Moreover, hypotheses are developed and tested with 
experiments; as more and more facts accumulate, they can be used to construct general 
explanatory theory (Saunders et al., 2009).  Findings are validated when experiments 
are replicated, yield consistent results and tested under original conditions or variants 
thereof (Lee and Lings, 2008).   
 
In terms of a positivist research methodology, researchers employ a deductive approach 
(Lee and Lings, 2008; Saunders et al., 2009) where a conceptual and theoretical 
structure is developed and then tested by empirical observation (Hussey and Hussey, 
1997; Saunders et al., 2009).  The main characteristic of this approach is that a study 
begins with a theory, and then a number of experiments and observations take place in 
order to test this theory (Hussey and Hussey, 1997; Lee and Lings, 2008; Saunders et 
al., 2009).  As a result, researchers need to develop hypotheses to be tested by a 
collection of quantitative data (Saunders et al., 2009). 
 
A quantitative approach involves collecting and analyzing numerical data and applying 
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statistical tests.  This approach plays a confirmatory role in research by studying 
populations and samples.  The explanation of the phenomena under investigation is 
developed through the analysis of numerical data.  The quantitative approach makes it 
easier for the researcher to quantify the data and calculate how many people made a 
particular point (Wilkinson, 2000).  The results of quantitative research are presented in 
the form of descriptive or complex statistics (for instance, tests of significance, 
correlation, and regression).   
 
On the other side of the methodological spectrum is phenomenology.  Phenomenology 
is seen as providing the basis for what is generally called interpretative (or interpretive) 
research where the assumption is that social reality can only be understood through 
social constructs such as language, consciousness and shared meanings.  Interpretive 
research does not predefine variables, but explores human sense-making in naturalistic 
settings (Remenyi et al., 1998).   The aim of phenomenology is to perform a basis free 
or prejudice-free analysis and description of experience.  Phenomenology does not deal 
with the concrete existence of individual things or their characteristics but rather with 
the essence of things.  Thus, phenomenology is defined as the science of the essences of 
things and refers to the meaning of a given fact of experience (Eze, 2006).   
 
Researchers following a phenomenological research methodology employ an inductive 
approach (Saunders et al., 2009).  Inductive reasoning typically moves from general 
truths to specific conclusions.  It opens with an expansive explanation (statements 
known or believed to be true) and continues with predictions for specific observations 
supporting it (Saunders et al., 2009).  Thus, researchers investigating a problem collate 
all the necessary data and analyse them.  Out of this analysis the theory is formulated 
(Lee and Lings, 2008; Saunders et al., 2009).  In essence, ‘theory would follow data 
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rather than vice versa as in the deductive approach’ (Saunders et al., 2009, p.88).  
Thus, the deductive approach builds theory by a collection of qualitative data (Hussey 
and Hussey, 1997; Saunders et al., 2009). 
 
A qualitative approach is more subjective in nature and involves examining and 
reflecting on perceptions in order to gain an understanding of social and human 
activities (Brewerton and Millward, 2001).  This approach assigns a discovery role to 
research through the study of a variety of cases.  The examination of these cases takes 
place through the analysis of narrative data (Brewerton and Millward, 2001). The 
resulting data is presented in the form of quotations or descriptions, though some basic 
statistics may also be presented. 
 
The above research methodologies (positivism and phenomenology) are based on 
different research approaches (deductive and inductive) and methods (quantitative and 
qualitative).  Neither school of thought should be considered as different in their impact 
on research and generalisability of their findings (Remenyi et al., 1998; Saunders et al., 
2009).  Both paradigms have strengths and weaknesses and which method is better will 
depend upon the questions asked by a specific research study (Remenyi et al., 1998; 
Saunders et al., 2009).   
 
The majority of the studies in the field: NATO Reports, European Policy Papers but 
also a number of similar studies in the field (Schank et al., 1991; Yang et al., 1996; 
McKinzie and Barnes, 2004; Weber, 2006; Schoff and Travayiakis, 2007) have 
employed a phenomenological approach as part of their methodology (via participant  
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observation, workshops, and interviews). This study also employs the phenomenology 
methodology along with the finding of a number of previous studies. 
 
This study’s methodology is developed through a two-stage process and is based on a 
variety of research methods: 
 
Phase 1: An inductive approach making use of personal observation of various meetings 
and committees and the analysis of historical facts. Based on this analysis a framework 
is developed. 
 
Phase 2: An inductive approach by using qualitative data analysis with the purpose of 
testing and fine tuning the proposed framework. 
 
 
4.5   Research Design 
For its purposes this study will follow and make use of four well established methods: 
 
•   Historical fact 
•   Case study 
•   Interview 
•   Personal observations 
 
Since these four methods will be used interchangeably, it is necessary to assess their 
relevance with regards to the subject at hand, namely civil/military synergies and 
merchant shipping. 
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4.5.1 Historical Analysis/Research 
A possibly confusing feature of  historical research  is  that  in  most  cases  it  does  not  
involve direct observation or the first-hand collection of data concerning the  
phenomena under study, but this is overcome by the use of reliable evidence  from 
previously recorded observations and data, together with factual information and 
statistics disseminated and accepted by the international shipping market. There is a 
possible exception to this, whereby the market players who witnessed or were somehow 
involved in the case at hand can be directly approached by the researcher. In this sense, 
the function of historical research function is to systematically and objectively locate, 
evaluate and synthesize the available evidence. 
 
Historical research data, in this instance, requires some degree of reconstruction on the 
part of the researcher in order to render evidence compatible with current conditions 
and changing regulations. Although historical analysis defines specific topics of interest 
(e.g., a standard contract of carriage) it tends to include social, cultural, economic, 
political, legal and psychological aspects of the topic. In this sense it is multi-
disciplinary and multi-dimensional. Historical data may not be entirely relevant due to 
the influence of changing regulation and requirements in the commercial shipping 
market or the physical constraints of a particular mission; nevertheless its relevance and 
significance may be sufficient to confirm or reject a theoretical hypothesis. 
 
As indicated above, historical analysis attempts to explain the development of 
observations, made by others, by the examination and/or re-examination of existing 
methods. Additionally, new details may become available which question previous 
methods and systems of understanding. In the evaluation of methods the researcher  
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may formulate hypotheses about the phenomena under examination and subject these  
to test and modification. 
 
In historical research two general sources of data are employed, primary and secondary.  
Primary sources are those items which are original and have a direct relationship to the 
procedure being introduced (e.g., ship types, contracts of carriage, laws, regulations).  
Secondary sources, are those that do not have a direct connection  to  the  event being  
studied (e.g. market trends and changes in the carriage of non-military or humanitarian 
cargoes). 
 
Historical analysis typically involves two stages: 
 
•   Appraisal of the authenticity of sources.  This stage seeks to evaluate the validity 
and reliability of the evidence and/or data. 
•   Appraisal of the meaning/importance of the source.  After establishing the 
validity and reliability of the source, the researcher must evaluate the content of the 
source in terms of its importance and/or relevance and implications for current 
views and understanding about the topic. 
 
There is plenty of evidence and data available in the commercial market and there are 
about sixty thousand merchant ships in service around the world today, including bulk 
carriers, dry cargo vessels, MPP’s, container vessels, tankers, LPG's, LNG's, and cruise 
ships. This figure does not include all the small RO/ROs that service islands (short 
sea/tourism) or river barges, oil barges, floating docks, drill ships, service vessels, tugs, 
AHTS's, crew boats, restaurant vessels, etc. The difficulty is to decide which ship type 
is germane to the topic under investigation. 
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Both Arbnor and Bjerke (1997) and Sahlin-Andersson and Engwall (2002) have 
suggested that historical analysis should be considered in a theoretical context. 
Historical analysis is not just  a retrospective  study  but  also  the  view  that  history  is  
continuous and  that  new  history  is  constantly being  created  from  current  social,  
political and  economic reality; in other words, everyday life, both social and 
commercial, is constantly creating its own history (Sahlin-Andersson and Engwall, 
2002).  Through an understanding of past events one can improve one’s interpretation 
of the present:  the study of the methodological principles of interpretation (Moustakis, 
2003). In the context of this thesis, where historical analysis is basically commercial 
information, such information should not be used to confirm the historical facts and 
figures but rather to demonstrate historical diversity and used in an attempt to learn 
from our mistakes.  In fact, the historical analysis of commercial carriage by sea 
relevant to civil/military synergies may help us in several ways: firstly and most 
importantly, ‘It helps us to avoid reinventing the wheel’ (Moustakis, 2003) because 
someone may have already asked the question and found the answer. Secondly, it is a 
diagnostic tool, to assist in following the development of particular circumstances over 
time thus influencing the conclusion and proof of the proposed hypothesis. 
Furthermore, the saying that ‘history repeats itself’ is true, subject to several caveats, as 
history is constantly being created; in more practical terms and relevant to this thesis, as 
the commercial market improves, more ships are built and when it deteriorates, more 
innovation is required to save costs - as with war, the more intense the conflict, the 
more smart weaponry needs to be developed, therefore history can affect history. By 
utilizing historical analysis, order can be imposed on the information gathered and 
significant events can be identified. The review of historical facts and their independent 
interpretation can prevent the repetition of mistakes; success does not consist of never 
making mistakes but rather of not making the same mistake twice. 
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4.5.2 Case Study Method 
 
The case study method for research, doctoral theses and commercial business studies is 
becoming a popular and useful tool.  The utilization of commercial business events and 
outcomes helps the researchers analyze actual events which have been influenced by a 
much larger number of variables than can be incorporated in a theoretical model.  
However, one can either derive general conclusions from a limited number of cases or 
reach particular conclusions based on a single case. Despite these differences, both 
methods are capable of producing reliable conclusions which can assist in accepting or 
rejecting an hypothesis. 
 
Yin (2014) provides a definition of the case study as a possible approach to research 
appropriate to this thesis.  The author stated that the case study inquiry:  
•   Copes with  the  technically  distinctive  situation  in  which  there  will  
be  many  more  variables  of  interest  other  than  data  points,  and  as  
a  result, 
•   relies  on  multiple  sources  of  evidence,  with  data  needing  to  
achieve  coverage  in a triangulated fashion, and as  another  result, 
•   benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide 
data collection and analysis 
(Yin, 2003, p. 13). 
 
Thus, the case study method covers most methods of analysis enabling the researcher to 
utilize a variety of approaches of data collection and analytical methodology.  
According to Stoecker (2010) the  case  study  is  neither  a  data  collection  tactic  or  a  
design  feature  alone,  nor  a  comprehensive  research  strategy.   
 
Yin differentiates between three categories of case study research namely case studies 
being used for exploratory, descriptive and explanatory purposes.  When arguing the 
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general relevance of the  case  study  method,  Yin  states  that it is  the  preferred  tool  
whenever  “how”  or  “why”  questions  are  being  asked, especially when considering 
actual contemporary situations outside the realm of the researcher.  If the main research 
question is “what?”, then an exploratory study based on a proposed hypothesis is 
preferable (the  goal  here  being  to  develop  pertinent  hypotheses  and  propositions  
for  further  inquiry). Alternatively, if the questions are  “how?” and  “why?”, then time 
becomes a factor and a mere increase in volume of cases is insufficient to reach a 
conclusion; if so, differing cases over a period of time should be analyzed to assess the 
morphological developments and how they might affect subsequent cases. Just because 
several similar cases are analyzed, this does not confirm or refute a hypothesis as our 
research criteria may be too restrictive and thus exclude pertinent data (Yin, 2014). 
 
This concept is increasingly relevant when analyzing commercial shipping case studies 
because factors such as, for example, changing regulations in the environmental field, 
can substantially affect the outcome of a business plan that may be the subject of a 
particular case study. A further factor may be a UN resolution that prevents business 
relations with a national of a targeted nation; this will reduce the size of the pool of 
available sealift assets. Assuming that the “how?” and  “why?” questions are  applicable  
to  this  study,  Yin  confirms the importance, when using the  case  study  method, of  
the influence the  investigator has over factors affecting the events being analyzed.  To 
analyze operations involving civil/military synergies, the case study method is the 
preferred tool  when  examining  contemporary  operations,  but  only  when  the  
operations and end result cannot be manipulated. This ostensibly implies that the case 
study method utilizes similar procedures to the historical analysis method, with the 
added bonus of direct observation and answers to contemporary questions. Therefore, 
the case study technique is appropriate when dealing with a wide range of evidence 
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such as official documents, personal writings, notes, interviews and operational 
outcomes.   
 
Either way, the case study method requires preparation. Firstly, know what you want, 
prepare the plan and collect the appropriate material for analysis, otherwise the 
conclusions may be tainted by variables that are irrelevant to the investigation at hand 
(Yin, 2014). 
 
Gummesson (1991) cites that one of the greatest advantages of case study research  is  
that  it provides  the  opportunity  for  a  universal  view  of  a  process. The case study 
method allows for real life examination of actual events which include all the variables 
and commercial constraints and allows for the comparison between cases with differing 
commercial criteria and social limitations and, furthermore, the collection of data for 
case studies over a time span allows the analysis to observe changes as they develop 
and their effect on the industry under review. The case study method for analyzing 
civil/military synergies is a useful tool and ties in well with the military credo of 
‘lessons learnt’. Some case studies are better than others due to relevance; regrettably 
actual events present very few cases on the specific subject of this thesis, yet it is by far 
the best tool to demonstrate the cause and effect of employing appropriate civilian 
sealift services to carry out non-aggressive/defensive military requirements involving 
strategic sealift. If used correctly, this is a tool suitable for proving or disproving the 
hypothesis of this study. 
 
Hamel, Dufour and Fortin (1993) suggest that the case study method can produce 
flawed results due to bias in the data collection, as bias may be introduced by the 
players in the particular case study: 
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For its lack [of rigor] in  the  collection,  construction  and  analysis  of  the 
empirical  materials  that  give  rise  to  the  study.  This lack of rigor is linked to 
the problem of bias.  Such bias  is  introduced  by  the  subjectivity  of  the  
researcher,  as  well  as  by  the  field  informants  on  whom  the researcher 
relies  to get  an understanding  of  the  case  under  investigation 
(Hamel, Dufour and Fortin, 1993, p. 23). 
In the study of civil/military synergy it is therefore preferable to use data from the 
military side of the equation, where the alleged bias is known and is constant, so 
allowing for the bias to be taken into consideration when drawing conclusions on the 
case study. Whereas when it comes to the commercial side of the equation, however, 
there may be privacy clauses in the contract of carriage that prevent accurate 
information being released for analysis. 
 
Even though the case study method is popular as an analytical tool for commercial 
studies, it has its shortcomings in that the analysis, and, therefore also its conclusions, 
being based on a small number of observations, all of which are similar in nature as 
opposed to a large number of random observations.  Hägg and Hedlund (1978) review 
the shortcomings of the case study method under three headings: 
•   Case studies lack statistical validity 
•   Case studies  can  be used  to  generate  hypotheses  but  not  to  test  them 
•   Generalizations cannot be made on the basis of case studies 
 
However, when posing a commercial question, the relevance of case studies becomes 
more important as the actual result is what the researcher requires in order to compare 
the actual benefit in adopting the inherent strategy being depicted by the case study. 
Thus, though  a  number  of  criticisms  may  be  directed  at  the  case  study  method, it 
retains its  importance  as  a  key  research  strategy.  This becomes evident when 
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considering its applications in qualitative research (Zainal, 2007). 
 
Since this thesis examines the feasibility of civil/military synergies and associated 
benefits derived therefrom, it is evident that practical case studies of actual events will 
demonstrate whether or not the concept or questions posed can be verified.  If found to 
be advantageous to all parties, then how can this process be standardized and the 
benefits of synergy be reaped? 
 
4.5.3 Personal Interviews and Attendance 
 
Primary information can be obtained through personal interviews along with attendance 
at presentations, symposiums and commercial negotiations on related issues. 
 
The advantages of personal attendance are clear as contemporaneous and specific 
questions can be posed that reveal more detailed and specific answers to the proposed 
question (Berg and Lune, 2011). 
 
In order for attendance to be of value and/or for the interview to generate relevant 
answers that advance the thesis, considerable background work must be done. This 
concerns the practical side of research where experience plays a vital role; in non-
theoretical studies where a practical solution or solutions are sought to a real life 
practical problem based on an identified theorem (as opposed to a non-specific 
conjectural question), material from a primary source of information can advance not  
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only the understanding of the non-theoretical academic question but assist in resolving 
and proving or disproving the proposed hypothesis (Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009). 
 
Inasmuch as an important theme of this study is the introduction of the commercial 
shipping market for the military transportation desk officer, a considerable mass of 
information is based on primary sources of information, gathered through personal 
interviews and/or attendance at related presentations, symposiums and commercial 
sealift negotiations. 
 
4.5.4 Personal Knowledge and Attendance 
 
Personal knowledge accumulated over the years should be passed on in any form 
possible. The old adage that ‘one learns from experience’ is true and the sharing of 
experience is a very powerful educational tool. There are, inevitably, several perils in 
the dissemination of experiences; these may vary from erroneous interpretations or 
mistaken conclusions due to inaccuracy. One may have one hundred experiences, all the 
same, yet another has but ten experiences all different; it could be argued the latter has 
far more educational significance by contributing a greater range of experiences 
(Andrews and Delahaye, 2002). 
 
The title of this section also refers to attendance; this pertains to knowledge attained 
whilst attending lectures, seminars or working group meetings, within the relevance of 
this thesis. This is similar in many ways to the previous section on interviews with the 
only difference being the answers are not to the researcher’s chosen questions but to the 
presenter’s choice of questions. In previous chapters, information is taken from either 
papers presented or working group meetings attended within the framework of the 
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NATO unclassified forum. Such attendance has substantially increased the 
understanding of the topics presented or discussed (Polanyi, 1962). 
 
4.5.5 Application of Case Study Method/Historical analysis and personal 
interviews and attendance in this thesis 
 
All four of these analytical methods are appropriate for this study and have been used in 
the research as and where appropriate. The literature review (Chapter Two) mainly 
applied the historical analysis method to give a descriptive, explanatory and exploratory 
introduction to the basic commercial shipping market.  However, this method was not 
used in isolation but instead incorporated personal knowledge and experience obtained 
over thirty-five years in the commercial shipping market. 
 
It is very important to recognize that certain aspects of a military movement case study 
may involve restricted information that may not be copied or disseminated; therefore 
where necessary, generic information will be incorporated in order to prevent 
jeopardizing the secrecy of sensitive information. All sensitive information and data 
used have been approved and received from the Hellenic Navy. 
 
4.5.6 Data Entry 
 
The interview sessions were initially transcribed in Microsoft Word.  Because of the 
complexity of the investigation, the responses were grouped into a single document 
with the purpose of identifying each respondent’s views of the various issues discussed.   
 
In terms of analyzing qualitative data Denscombe (2007) states the following four 
principles: (i) the analysis of the data and the conclusions drawn from the research 
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should be firmly rooted in the data; (ii) the researcher’s explanation of the data should 
emerge from a careful and meticulous reading of the data; (iii) the researcher should 
avoid introducing unwarranted preconceptions into the data analysis; (iv) the analysis of 
the data should involve an iterative process. 
 
To meet the above four principles Denscombe (2007) proposes a number of stages 
when analyzing qualitative data.  This thesis will employ the following steps in 
analyzing the qualitative data: (i) preparation of the data in a readable format with the 
purpose of assisting the researcher to access and analyze the data at a later stage; (ii) 
familiarity with the data to facilitating the researcher in ‘reading between the lines’ and 
thus identifying information implicit in the data; and (iii) interpreting the data by 
developing codes, categories, themes and concepts.   
 
4.5.7 Maintaining Validity and Reliability of the Study 
 
Interviews just as any other research method need to be critically assessed for the 
validity and reliability of data (Remenyi et al., 1998; Gray, 2004; Saunders et al., 2009).  
More specifically, various data quality issues are related to: (i) reliability; (ii) forms of 
bias; and (iii) validity.   
 
The first issue regarding data quality is reliability.  According to Gray (2004, p. 219): 
‘For a research instrument to be reliable it must consistently measure what is set out to 
measure’.  Thus, ‘reliability is concerned with whether alternative interviewers would 
reveal similar information’ (Saunders et al., 2009, p. 250).  In essence, the concern has 
to do with how the study can be replicated.  According to Saunders et al. (2009), to 
overcome the reliability issue, researchers need to provide detailed information of the 
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research study and design so others can replicate the findings.  Similarly, a variety of 
analyses, quotes and transcribed information is provided within the Results Chapter.   
 
Another data quality issue relates to various types of bias.  For instance, interviewer 
bias is created by comments made, tone or non-verbal behaviour in response to 
interviewees’ answer to questions (Saunders et al., 2009).  In addition, interviewers can 
demonstrate bias in the way they interpret responses (Saunders et al., 2009).  Another 
issue is the interviewee or response bias.  In this case, bias is caused by perceptions 
about the interviewer, and lack of willingness to provide answers to sensitive questions 
(Saunders et al., 2009).  Bias can also result from the nature of individuals mainly 
because of personal issues such as time commitments that may result in a reduction in 
willingness to take part (Saunders et al., 2009). 
 
Overcoming bias-related issues is quite complex and requires a positive communication 
between interviewer and interviewee.  Saunders et al. (2009) provides various key 
measures to assist researchers overcome bias in qualitative interviews.  This study 
utilised the key elements to overcome bias throughout the interview sessions.  A brief 
description is given below:  
(i) preparation and readiness for the interview; (ii) level of information supplied 
to interviewees prior to the interview; (iii) appropriateness of the researcher’s 
appearance at the interview.  This increases credibility and is advised to adopt a 
similar style of dress to those to be interviewed; (iv) the nature of the opening 
comments to be made when the interview commences, which can increase 
credibility and the interviewee’s confidence; (v) approach to questioning: 
interviewers’ questions need to be clearly phrased, so the interviewee can 
understand them; (vi) the nature and impact of the interviewer’s behaviour 
during an interview session could also reduce the scope for bias; (vii) 
demonstration of attentive listening skills by providing interviewees with 
reasonable time to develop their responses; (viii) scope to test understanding: it 
is recommended that interviewers should provide summaries of a number of 
explanations provided by the interviewees 
(Saunders et al., 2009, p.257). 
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Finally, data validity relates to what extent the researcher has gained full access to 
knowledge and meanings of respondents (Remenyi et al., 1998; Easterby-Smith, Thorpe 
and Lowe, 1991 cited in Saunders et al., 2009).  In essence, validity refers to whether 
‘the data collected is a true picture of what is being studied’ (Hussey and Hussey, 1997, 
p. 173).  To overcome the validity issue in relation to data quality, the researcher 
followed a twofold approach.  On the one hand, he followed the advice offered by 
Collins and Young (1988, cited in Remenyi et al., 1998) regarding data validation by 
feeding back to respondents’ interview transcripts for verification.  Thus, the researcher, 
after initial agreement with respondents, sent a transcribed copy of the interview for 
further validation and verification.   
 
There are many ethical issues to consider in relation to the participants of a research 
activity. In every discipline it is considered unethical to collect information without the 
knowledge of participants, and their expressed willingness and informed consent 
(Saunders et al., 2009). Seeking informed consent ‘is probably the most common 
method in medical and social research’ (Bailey, 1978, p. 384). Informed consent 
implies that subjects are made adequately aware of the type of information you want 
from them, why the information is being sought, what purpose it will be put to, how 
they are expected to participate in the study, and how it will directly or indirectly affect 
them. It is important that the consent should also be voluntary and without pressure of 
any kind.  
 
The researcher working on this thesis has asked for consent to interview respondents 
and has received all the relevant approvals. 
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4.6   Conclusion 
To conclude, the purpose of this chapter was to discuss the research methodology, 
approach, study setting and methods with the purpose of investigating the research 
questions set by the researcher.  
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CHAPTER 5: 
MODEL OF INTEGRATION OF COMMERCIAL 
ASSETS, ANALYSIS and FINDINGS 
  
5.1  A Suggested Model of the Integration of the Commercial Shipping Market 
Assets and Services into Strategic Sealift 
 
Not only are the requirements continually changing but the entire transportation concept 
is evolving into a multi-modal transportation model. This means that a supplier of 
transportation services will provide a fully integrated and comprehensive door-to-door 
service encompassing air, sea and land transportation, because the military transport 
planners want a simple ‘one-stop shop’ concept for acquiring strategic lift. 
 
The theoretical framework presented below (refer to Figure 1) highlights a simplified 
guide for the marine transportation planner that could assist him in deciding which 
assets from the transportation toolbox should or could be used to perform and/or 
enhance a sealift operation in which the benefit of the civil/military synergies has been 
recognized and approved for use. 
 
This flow chart was developed over the course of researching this thesis and started 
with the premise that a procedure could be formulated and repeated. One of the 
fundamental requirements of a beneficial integration of the merchant navy into military 
operations is the standardization of the operation which not only ensures consistency 
but facilitates cost comparisons, like for like. 
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The starting point is the request for sealift and the end point is ‘proceed’ with chartering 
the selected merchant vessel. The procedure between these two points is formed by the 
research and consideration of the requirements of the military and the capabilities 
offered by the merchant navy. Considering the information learnt from the literature 
review, it is possible to understand the additional nodes required in the path from 
request to proceed. It was found to be useful to combine the facilities offered by nations 
and NATO from a military point of view and the commercial requirements of the 
merchant. A simple ‘YES’ and ‘NO’ question was considered sufficient to guide the 
user down the path of the chart which allowed for both military and civilian 
requirements to be pondered and resolved.  
 
The final version of the flow chart is seen in Table 1. The path through the flow chart is 
tested for the two case studies in chapter 5 where it can be clearly seen that the path can 
be repeated and form a consistent procedure for procurement of commercial sealift 
assets. See Appendix 4 and 5. 
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Figure 1: Model of the Integration of the Commercial Shipping Market Assets and 
Services into a Strategic Sealift 
	  
 
 
 
The framework itself could be operated as a simple flow chart by asking the question of 
whether strategic sealift assets are enough. If not, there are the options of: 
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•   Looking into the market advisory panel report 
•   Going to market for operational sealift assets 
•   Going to AMSCC to determine availability 
If the asset has been available and there is not oversupply, the planners are directed to 
SCC Eindhoven. Should there be oversupply, then they are directed straight into the 
planning phase. 
In the case of the availability of sealift assets then the planner must determine whether: 
•   Grey hull is operational 
•   T/C are available 
•   Can be activated (assured) 
If there is sufficient lift and there is oversupply then the planner must move to the 
planning phase. Here, if the SPOD is satisfactory and is served by the Line Co, the 
planner can get a quote and determine whether the war-risk insurance is high or 
acceptable. If the war-risk insurance is prohibitively expensive, then the planner can 
bring the NATO War Scheme into force and proceed. If the SPOD is not satisfactory, 
then the planner can try hub and spoke (H & S) to determine whether he can be served 
by the Line Co and proceed to requesting a quote and insurance (NATO, 2007d). 
 
5.2   Introduction to the Case Studies 
 
This section discusses the proposed framework in conjunction with the findings 
identified during the analysis of the two case studies. Furthermore, the researcher 
demonstrates the potential use of the framework and considers possible changes. 
Moreover, a handbook is later presented with the purpose of assisting in the 
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implementation of the proposed framework by various parties. Please read through the 
case studies along with the flow chart, Figure 1, p. 147 and Appendix 1 for Case Study 
One;  Appendix 2 for Case Study Two. 
 
5.3 Case Study 1 
The first case study deals with the transportation of an aid cargo from Hungary and 
Greece to Iraq under the auspices of NATO in the spring of 2005. 
 
In March 2005 the Iraqi defence minister accepted the donation of military hardware 
offered by Hungary. This was confirmed by the Secretary General of NATO on 12 April 
2005 (Scheffer, 2005). 
 
On 27 April 2005 the Greek government offered to transport the donated military 
hardware at its own expense from a Hungarian loading port to a discharge port in the 
Arabian Gulf through the Suez Canal (Lancaster, 2005). 
 
Furthermore, the Greek government donated additional used military hardware that was 
in the final stages of overhaul. By 11 July 2005 it was agreed by NATO committee that 
Greece would transport the military equipment from Hungary and Greece to the end-
user in Iraq (Giakoumakis, 2005). 
 
The Athens Multinational Sealift Coordination Center (AMSCC) commenced work, 
together with their commercial shipping advisors, (personal participation, 14 to 20 
August 2005), in preparing an international tender according to the standard European 
Union directives (European Parliament, 2004a; European Parliament 2004b). See 
Figure 1, p. 147.    [GO TO MARKET A, AMSCC  B]. 
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On 22 August 2005 the State Maritime Transport Directorate (SMTD - or in Greek 
ΔΘΚΜ), issued their tender in search of the appropriate commercial vessel to perform 
the transportation as ‘grey hulls’ were neither available nor politically suitable for this 
maritime adventure (AMSCC, 22 August 2005– personal participation). The SMTD is a 
department within the Hellenic Ministry of Mercantile Marine and is run by officers of 
the Hellenic coastguard together with representatives from the Hellenic Chamber of 
Shipping and the State Maritime Inspectorate. 
 
Only one company offered for the tender as the prospect of discharging in a war-like 
zone was not particularly attractive. Vessels suitable for transporting the sort of heavy 
rolling stock which constituted the Hungarian donation tend to be expensive vessels and 
purpose-built for a specific trade. Furthermore, in 2005 the RO/RO market was 
particularly tight with owners enjoying exceptionally high rates never before seen in the 
trade. 
 
Consequently, the Greek government was grateful for the offer of tender (Personal 
participation, 12 September 2005). 
 
The tender was conducted on 12 September 2005 (Goritsas, 2005b). This is the time of 
year when car manufacturers return from vacation and in general any free or 
unchartered RO/RO contract their services for the rest of the year. 
 
According to European legislation, tenders involving strategic cargoes can be awarded 
without tender or competition (European Parliament, 2004a, 2004b). 
 
151 
 
Therefore, on 12 September 2005 the contract was awarded to the only company to 
offer a suitable vessel to undertake this maritime adventure. 
 
The contract was awarded to a Greek publicly listed RO/RO and passenger ferry 
company, ANEK Lines (Michaloliakos, 2005a). See Figure 1, p. 147. 
[FOUND ASSET]. 
 
This is a well-known, reliable and financially sound shipping company that enjoys a 
good reputation in the Eastern Mediterranean; their main business involves passenger, 
car and freight transportation between mainland Greece and the Island of Crete. This 
company has participated in many Greek civil/military sealift operations over the years 
(Personal participation, 2005 to 2014). 
 
The vessel allocated to the transportation was the Greek owned, Greek flag RO/RO 
passenger ferry Aegean Star captained by a Greek national, Nicolas L. Lygizos 
(Michaloliakos, 2005b). See Figure 1 p. 147.   [OVER SUPPLY]. 
 
The vessel was assessed by the State Maritime Transport Directorate (SMTD) panel 
consisting of a Hellenic Coast Guard Commodore, a civilian employee of the State  
Maritime Inspectorate and a representative of the Hellenic Chamber of Shipping 
(Personal communication, 12 September 2005). 
 
The maritime sealift adventure was conducted on a ‘voyage’ basis for a lump sum 
freight of one million, two hundred thousand Euros. This means that the Hellenic State 
paid the owners of the vessel the above stated amount for the entire adventure. 
(Personal participation, September 2005). The owners were in their turn required to pay 
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the following:  See Figure 1, p. 147.   [START PLANNING]. 
 
1. The fuel required for the round trip voyage:  Piraeus to Koper, Slovenia to Suda 
Bay, Crete via the Suez Canal to Shuaiba, Kuwait then return to Piraeus via the 
Suez Canal. 
2. The port expenses at Koper Slovania, Suda Bay Greece, Suez Egypt, Shuaiba 
Kuwait and again Suez Egypt. 
3.  The war-risks additional premium for transiting through the High Risk Area 
(HRA) of the Gulf of Aden and the Gulf of Oman together with the additional 
war-risk premium for the call to Kuwait and of course the additional premium for 
the return trip home. See Figure 1, p. 147.  [IS WAR INSURANCE TOO HIGH] 
4. And finally, the vessel’s own daily running expenses for an international voyage. 
 
5.3.1 The Cargo 
According to Capt. G. Giakoumakis (2005) the Hungarian cargo consisted of: 
• seventy-seven  T-72 tanks each weighing  four MT 
• two tanks UT-55A weight thirty-five MT 
• two JUBT-55A tanks weight thirty-five MT 
• two spare part kits Type 1 (weight 1.2 MT) 
• one spare part kit Type 2 (weight 8.8 MT) 
 
The Greek cargo consisted of: 
• twenty-eight BMP-1 
• four containers (TEU’s) 
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5.3.2 The Voyage 
 
The Hungarian cargo was loaded out of Koper, Slovenia and loading was completed on 
21 October 2005. The vessel then proceeded to Suda Bay in Crete to load the Hellenic 
portion of the cargo. The vessel then proceeded to the discharge port of Shuaiba, 
Kuwait via the Suez Canal. See Figure 1, p. 147.  [IS SPOD SATISFACTORY]. 
 
The Aegean Star  arrived safely in Shuaiba, Kuwait on 6 November 2005 and 
thankfully, the voyage had been without incident. It is interesting to note that, despite 
the insured value of the cargo being US dollars ten million (Tzanetou, 2005).  There 
was no incident when passing the high risk area of the Gulf of Aden. See Figure 1, p. 
147.  [PROCEED]. 
 
Discharge was completed on the 9 November 2005 and the vessel departed for the 
return voyage to the Mediterranean without incident (Lygizos, 2005). 
 
Appendix 3 indicates the path, along the red line, in the process of integrating 
commercial shipping market assets into the strategic sealift for case study 1. 
Throughout the steps of the case study, reference has been made to the proposed model.  
Once it has been shown to be correct and relevant, the path through the model has been 
highlighted. 
 
5.3.3 Points of Interest 
 
NATO’s comprehensive approach concept was conceived and adopted to enable nations  
to benefit from civil/military synergies and further to enhance their security and to 
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compensate for alliance shortfalls. 
The advantages do not exclusively relate to cost effectiveness but also to operational 
efficiency and knowledge sharing. 
 
In case study 1, there was an international donation to a nation torn by conflict in which 
most NATO allies had some degree of involvement. Interestingly, one of the nation’s 
donating hardware was also responsible for arranging and financing the sealift 
operation in addition to acting on behalf of a third nation. Additionally, in this maritime 
adventure the vessel’s flag was the same as the nation organizing the sealift. In the 
second case study this was not a factor that affected either the financial burden or the 
efficiency of the sealift adventure as a whole. Restrictions on flag can either be a result 
of a national or international embargo or a UN and EU sanction. 
 
It is inappropriate to discuss what political motives or benefits that prompted the 
donating nations into action as people ‘outside the loop’ are not privy to such 
negotiations or reasoning. In fact, for the purpose of this thesis, the political motives or 
benefits are irrelevant, the bottom line being that Hungary and Greece donated military 
hardware and Greece offered a means to fulfill the donations by arranging and financing 
the sealift transportation operation. 
 
It is evident that such synergies in the use of commercial sealift assets are possible and 
in fact have been used for centuries to enhance and/or augment nationally owned sealift 
assets (grey hulls) in many military sealift deployment operations. Here, however, a 
different concept is being examined. 
 
Two nations were offering military materials to be used by others in a NATO operation 
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and they were not in fact committing operational contributions or providing ‘boots on 
the ground’. If they had been doing this, then any strategic sealift would have been the 
obligation of the nation making the contribution according to NATO rules so they 
would have been obliged to arrange the sealift themselves, either with grey hulls or by 
contracting a commercial sealift asset. 
 
In this case Hungary made a donation which was accepted by NATO on behalf of Iraq. 
Then, a third nation offered to make their contribution to the NATO led operation by 
financing and arranging the required sealift transportation of another nation’s 
contribution. 
 
In this particular case, Greece – it can be assumed - would not have been comfortable 
providing one of its own naval grey hulls to transport a third nation’s military hardware 
to another nation. The logistics of a Greek grey hull loading in Hungary and passing 
through the Suez Canal, transiting the high-risk areas of the Gulfs of Aden and Oman, 
and subsequently discharging in a war zone such as Iraq would be a nightmare. Not 
only would the logistics be controversial but it would be logical to assume that there 
would be complications over responsibility and liability, let alone the political 
ramifications of such a proposal to send the grey hull crew into a war zone. 
 
The solution was to employ a commercial asset, as set out by the NATO comprehensive 
approach; in this particular case there was a plethora of advantages: 
 
•   Greece was also able to add the transportation of their own donation of military 
hardware at no substantial additional cost save for a minor deviation in itinerary and 
port expenses. 
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•   Furthermore, no Greek troops were put in harm’s way or were involved in the 
war-like activities of this adventure. 
•   No nationally owned Greek sealift asset was at risk. This is an important 
consideration as all nationally owned sealift assets and their crews are covered for 
material loss or loss of life by the national budget. 
•   Since the chartered commercial asset was taken on a lump sum voyage basis, all 
risks fell upon the owners of the vessel. Once loading was completed, the freight 
paid and the Bills of Lading signed, the charterers - the Greek Government - had no 
other responsibility or liabilities for the maritime adventure. 
•   If the vessel and cargo had been lost, then the loss would have been covered by 
the vessel’s hull and machinery insurance, and by the vessel P+I club for the loss of 
life and cargo; whether at war risk or not the whole adventure was covered by a 
commercial underwriter, whereas a grey hull is covered by the flag state. 
•   If the adventure had failed or been delayed due to breakdown of the sealift asset, 
the charterer had no responsibility or consequential cost, as the entire adventure was 
underwritten by commercial insurers. 
•   Any restitution that may or may not have been required would fall squarely on 
the shoulders of the master and owners of the vessel. 
 
There were also some technical challenges that needed to be addressed: 
 
The tanks were delivered to the loading port wearing their caterpillar track and with 
their turrets and barrels in place. The tank top of a commercial vessel is not always 
designed to handle the stress of caterpillar tracks and such high axle weights. 
 
This is an example of how the assistance of commercially-minded people can facilitate 
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the integration of the Merchant Navy into the military sealift capabilities; a simple 
practical solution was required to allow for the loading of the tanks without causing 
damage to the vessel or the very costly removal of the caterpillar tracks. The solution 
given was to line the vessel’s tank top/flooring with used tires (about ten under each 
tank) to distribute the load and protect the steel from the cutting edges of the tanks’ 
caterpillar tracks (Personal communication, 18 October 2005). 
 
This case study has demonstrated that not only is the use of commercially owned sealift 
assets a viable solution, but it can also provide financial and practical benefits for the 
operation as a whole, as well as reducing the responsibility and liability to a minimum 
for the nation making the donation. 
 
 
5.4 Case Study 2 
 
Case Study 2 relates to the transportation of an aid cargo, donated by Poland, from 
northern Europe to the Republic of Chad in central Africa. This case study is to be read 
in conjunction with Figure 1, p. 147. 
 
The Polish government voted, in late 2007, to donate a humanitarian aid cargo to the 
Central African Republic of Chad under the auspices of EUFOR TCHAD/RCA 
(European Parliament, 2004a; European Parliament, 2004b). 
 
In order to arrange the transportation of the goods to the western African port of 
Douala, Cameroon, the Polish government approached NAMSA, the NATO 
Maintenance and Service agency, to propose transportation modes and estimated costs. 
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See Figure 1, p. 147.   [START]. 
 
Douala, Cameroon was the most convenient port chosen by France, the lead in the 
alliance forces, to serve land-locked Chad. When NAMSA was unable to provide a 
transportation option suitable to the Polish needs from a financial point of view, the  
Poles decided to approach the Athens Multi-National Sealift Co-ordination Centre in 
March 2008 (Personal environment, 1-7 March 2008). See Figure 1, p. 147 [DO WE 
HAVE ENOUGH STRATEGIC SEALIFT ASSETS]. 
 
In order for there to be any such co-operation between the Polish military and the 
AMSCC, an agreement was drawn up. On 3 March 2008 a MOU (Memorandum of 
Understanding) and TA (technical arrangements) were signed between the Hellenic 
Ministry of Defence and the Polish government (Bakos, 2008c). At the same time the 
Polish military pre-advised that they would be sending the AMSCC a request for tender 
for the transportation of their aid cargo to the western African port of Douala, 
Cameroon, for onward transportation to Chad (Personal participation, 3 March 2008). 
See Figure 1, p. 147.  [GO TO MARKET (A), AMSCC (B)]. 
 
On the 9 March 2008 the Polish National Movement Coordination Centre Branch Chief 
contacted the AMSCC requesting support for the transportation of their aid cargo from 
Szczecin, Poland to Douala in western Africa (Janasz, 2008). 
 
On the 11 March 2008 the AMSCC initiated market research to ascertain the 
availability of suitable tonnage (Bakos, 2008b) and to obtain a ‘ball park’ figure of the 
cost of such a civil/military adventure. Furthermore, they asked that the Polish 
government send their official request for the transportation in the agreed format as per 
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the TA signed on the 3 March 2008. (Personal Participation, 11 March 2008). See 
Figure 1, p. 147.  [LOOK AT MARKET ADVISORY PANEL REPORT]. 
On the 26 March 2006, the Polish military sent to the AMSCC the official request for 
the sealift adventure in accordance with Annex ‘C’ of the TA (Sowa, 2008b). 
On the 27 March 2006 the AMSCC, sent out an invitation to the civilian participants of 
the AMSCC to prepare for the tender and subsequent allocation of the sealift contract. 
This operation was organized by the Polish military and they handled all the operational 
logistics, but it was to be physically carried out by commercial sealift assets. This 
civil/military cooperation needed to be coordinated to achieve the greatest advantages 
from the synergies at play in this particular maritime adventure (Bakos, 2008a). 
 
The ‘Calling Notice’ went to the Ministry of Merchant Marine, State Maritime 
Transport Directorate, the Hellenic Chamber of Shipping, the author, the maritime 
advisor to the AMSCC and various departments within the Ministry of Defence 
(Personal invitation, 27 March 2008). 
 
The document outlined the Polish requirements as to the loading port, discharging port 
and the preferred range of dates of loading and discharge. The meeting was arranged for 
the following day, 28 March 2008. 
 
The pre-tender advice went out on the 2 April 2008 from the Hellenic Coast Guard, 
Civil Emergency Planning Directorate, on behalf of the SMTD, State Maritime 
Transport Directorate, specifying the dates that offers should be submitted by and the 
ports of loading including details of the proposed cargo (Hellenic Coast Guard, 2008). 
 
On the 3 April 2008 the SMTD of the Hellenic Ministry of Merchant Marine sent the 
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tender out to the three Greek newspapers that handle such tenders for immediate 
publication. Offers had to be in by the 11 April 2008 by 11:30 at the offices of the 
SMTD, in Piraeus, Greece (Georgakos, 2008a). 
 
The tenders were evaluated by the board of the SMTD, made up of the Director and 
Chairman, a Commodore of the Hellenic Coast Guard, a representative of the Hellenic 
Chamber of Shipping and the third member was a civilian from the State Maritime 
inspectorate (Georgakos, 2008c). 
 
On 11 April the ‘Contract of Transportation’ was awarded to a freight forwarding 
company trading under the name ‘Omega Transport Logistics’ (Personal participation, 2 
August 2008). See Figure 1, p. 147.  [FOUND ASSET]. 
 
The price was open subject to the availability of the vessel. The opening offer was 
Euros one million, nine hundred and fifty thousand. 
 
On the 17 April the Polish military advised that the maximum they were prepared to 
pay was an ‘all in’ payment of Euros one million, four hundred thousand. This price 
included the loading costs of the cargo in Szczecin, estimated to be about Euros fifty to 
sixty thousand since the Polish military wanted to contract on liner terms and on 
‘voyage’ basis (Sowa, 2008c). 
 
Two Polish officers attended the AMSCC meeting and negotiations commenced with 
the company that was awarded the contract. Since the proposed vessel was spot and in 
the loading area, the price was reduced and agreed at Euros one million three hundred 
and ninety nine thousand (personal participation, 17 April 2008) (Sowa, 2008a). The 
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final agreement was on voyage basis with the cargo being delivered free alongside the 
ship. 
 
The owners were, therefore, required to pay all: 
1. The fuel required for the voyage; in this instance, from Szczecin, Poland to 
Douala, Cameroon, via Skaw and the English Channel. After discharge the vessel 
could find a return voyage on the commercial market. See Figure 1, p. 147. [IS 
SPOD SATISFACTORY]. 
2. The port and loading expenses in Szczecin, Poland and the port and discharge 
expenses in Douala, Cameroon. 
3. The war-risks additional premium for calling at Douala, for the duration of stay 
within the Gulf of Guinea. See Figure 1, p. 147.  [IS WAR INSUREANCE TOO 
HIGH]. 
4. The vessel’s daily running expenses for this international voyage. 
 
The vessel chosen for the voyage was an Amsterdam registered, Dutch flag, twenty one 
thousand four hundred MT multipurpose cargo ship, fitted to take up to one thousand, 
one hundred and thirty-four TEU containers, with five cargo handling cranes, which 
facilitated the loading and discharge. The 2004 built, M/V “Statengracht S 2”, was 
captained by Capt. Apostolos Voulelikas and successfully completed this maritime 
adventure. See Figure 1, p. 147. [PROCEED]. 
 
The final contract between the shipowner’s representatives, Omega Transport-Logistics, 
and the Polish government was prepared on 21 April for the all in sum of Euros one 
million three hundred and ninety nine thousand (Georgakos, 2008b and personal 
participation, 21 April 2008) with the contract of carriage being signed on the 22  April 
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2008 (Bakos, 2008d). 
 
Appendix 4 indicates the path, along the red line, in the process of integrating 
commercial shipping market assets into the strategic sealift for case study 2. 
Throughout the steps of the case study, reference has been made to the proposed model.  
Once it has been shown to be correct and relevant, the path through the model has been 
highlighted. 
 
5.4.1 The Cargo 
• three hundred ninety TEU containers 
• thirteen TEU refrigerated containers 
• one hundred and three rolling stock and trailers 
• three supercargoes to monitor the progress of the voyage 
 
5.4.2 The Voyage 
The Polish aid cargo was loaded in Szczecin, Poland on the 29 April 2008. The loading 
was uneventful and at no cost to the vessel or the Polish military as it was carried out 
using the ship’s cargo handling equipment. 
 
The vessel was capable of nineteen knots and she proceeded with all due haste to the 
discharge port of Douala, Cameroon being a safe arrival on the 14 May 2008. Discharge 
was completed on the following day without problems or damage to the cargo 
(Ampatzidis, 2008). 
 
The vessel then departed for new business, whilst the cargo was demarcated in Douala 
and prepared for the onward land voyage to Chad. 
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5.4.3 Points of Interest 
Again, this second case study demonstrates that the NATO Comprehensive Approach is 
not only viable but desirable. By combining civil/military know-how in logistics and 
operations it can be seen that there are benefits to all parties involved. 
 
In this particular case, a nation which was a third party to the indicated area and non-
participant in a conflict in central Africa was able to make use of a third party 
facilitator, the AMSCC, in order to arrange a maritime adventure of transportation via a 
vessel of a different flag and ownership to the rest of the players in the adventure. This 
is the essence of a truly international commercial venture. 
 
In this second case study there are no political questions, motives or benefits to be 
examined. This was an aid cargo, pure and simple, donated by one nation to another one 
in need. A point to note is that this need does not necessarily have to be a need created 
by the effects resulting from war, but may well be caused by a natural disaster or viral 
epidemic that may require medical or hotel assistance to alleviate the suffering of the 
population affected. 
 
The NATO Comprehensive Approach is a broad set of proposed approaches for 
benefitting from the exploitation of civil/military synergies; by augmenting military 
and/or humanitarian missions with commercial entities bearing appropriate experience 
and knowledge, it could overcome currently existing shortfalls in nations’ relevant non-
military capabilities. This is an important point: the military arsenal does not only 
consist of weapons and ordinance, it also contains a wide range of ancillary equipment 
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necessary to plan, implement, deploy, re-deploy and conclude a vast array of operations, 
both military and civilian. 
 
As discussed before, the military are often called upon to perform duties other than war-
like activities, which may include policing, patrolling, building, nursing and providing 
general humanitarian assistance in foreign lands. Most of these operations require 
transportation either by land, sea or air, or by a combination of all three modes. This is 
now referred to as multi-modal transportation and this thesis examines the maritime 
transportation aspect of multi-modal transportation complementing the NATO 
Comprehensive Approach. 
 
5.5 Theoretical Framework: Evaluation and Validation 
There are many case studies which could have been chosen in order to demonstrate the 
benefits of synergies from civil/military operations, and the fundamental advantage of 
cooperation in all forms of operations involving civil/military sealift. 
 
One may question whether this thesis starts with a foregone conclusion. Nevertheless, it 
is an examination into whether the incorporation of commercial sealift is beneficial for 
nations when undertaking a civil/military, or purely military, operation. In the present 
climate, it appears that this is accepted to be the case, and that this knowledge is 
fundamental to the NATO Comprehensive Approach. The purpose of this thesis is not to 
reinvent the wheel but to assess and demonstrate that the NATO Comprehensive 
Approach is viable and beneficial; further, it explores how best to benefit from this 
civil/military co-operation and the most efficient method for obtaining these services. 
 
The researcher has participated in many maritime sealift transportation operations over 
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the last fifteen years and in several military operations that utilized civilian sealift assets 
as opposed to nationally owned or controlled sealift assets; this means that the selection 
of case studies was no easy task. 
 
Several assumptions were made and appropriate criteria were adhered to in order to 
select case studies that were appropriate and diverse enough to encompass many of the 
NATO Comprehensive Approach ambitions. Firstly, the multi-national involvement was 
important, secondly, a variety of cargo was selected that was both military and civilian, 
and lastly, third party involvement separated these operations from the simple national 
sealift deployment, which is, according to NATO, a nation’s obligation (NATO, 2006). 
One of the essential conditions was that the particular sealift operation was disclosable, 
not NATO restricted. Also, that it was successfully concluded and involved a purely 
civilian partner not contracted on a long-term basis to any of the nations in the 
operation. 
 
The theoretical framework (as demonstrated in Chapter Two, Section 2.9) was 
presented and discussed with key participants that were involved in Case Study 1 and 
Case Study 2. Several questions were posed to them with the purpose of evaluating the 
possible use of the proposed theoretical framework. The respondents in the research 
were either from the European Defence Agency or the Hellenic Navy.  The strictest 
confidentiality was promised the participants in exchange for total frankness, thus 
negligible background information was disclosed beyond the participants’ general 
involvement in the operations.   The sample questionnaire is included as Appendix 2.  
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Table 5: Questionnaire Distribution  
 
Date Distributed                                                   Number of recipients  
 
18April 2016                                     
 
2 
19April 2016                                     
 
3 
22April 2016                                       
 
2 
25April 2016                                      
 
1 
26April 2016                                      
 
3 
 
According to their responses it appears that the theoretical framework could be 
applicable for NATO sealift operations. Specifically, respondent A stated: 
 
Yes we believe that is applicable for NATO sealift operations if the time limits 
permit it. The Go to Market [(A) option] pre-suppose competitions with duration 
approximately 6.5 months (EU Legislation, if it is required by the user). Only 
AMSCC [(B) option] has additional capabilities with its direct communication 
with the ship-owners [and the political approval] can minimise significant the 
required time. 
 
Similarly, respondent B agreed: 
The flowchart is providing solutions to the Staff Officers, applicable for all the 
NATO sealift operations. The applicability is based upon the fact that both 
supporting Centres, within the flowchart, have arrangements in place with 
NATO, the AMSCC has an MOU with NATO/SHAPE and the MCCE has an 
agreement with NATO/IS. 
 
Concerning the question of whether the framework could be suitable for NATO military 
operations, the respondents agree that is appropriate mainly because it allows a 
combination of tools and procedures. Respondent B stated: 
The flowchart is suitable for NATO operations, because it follows the practice to 
combine tools/procedures/capabilities with civilian origin to support military 
operations. 
 
This method used also before, but the flowchart is a genuine initiative to put the 
relevant tools together. In addition to the NATO military operations it is also 
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suitable for support to EU-CSDP operations. 
 
Respondent A clarifies that merchant fleets can provide better sealift and logistics 
support in case of crisis: 
For some kinds of military sealift operations, we believe that the merchant fleet 
is the one sector which can provide the appropriate capacity for transportation. 
 
 Respondent A explains further:  
 
International and maritime trade has been growing at twice the rate of the 
world’s economy for some time. Large merchant vessels are the most flexible 
and cost-effective modes of intercontinental and coastal transport. Increasingly, 
new markets and new resources are found overseas. As the world evolves from a 
collection of disconnected national and regional economies to one global inter-
linked economy, freedom of commercial transit on the high seas and through 
straits and other navigational choke points becomes ever more important. At the 
same time, the ability of military forces to respond abroad in case of crisis 
requires the sealift and logistic support that can only be provided by the 
merchant fleet. 
 
Respondent A also discusses possible security issues when involvement of merchant 
ships should take place in a time of crisis and raises specific concerns: 
The first, and possibly most obvious problem, is the presence of a large number 
of fully loaded merchant ships at anchor in a major port. Such a gathering over 
several days is an obvious indication that a convoy or major operation is being 
planned, and is almost impossible to keep secure. Somewhat more subtle, but 
still obvious, is the gathering of large numbers of sealift ships at a forward base, 
particularly those ships which can be identified with an assault follow-on 
echelon. The key point here is that, while a large mass of merchant shipping can 
be regarded as a target in and of itself, the presence of certain types of merchant 
ships can indicate a major military operation even when the “military” end of 
the operation has scrupulously observed operations security measures. 
 
The respondents were also asked to discuss whether the theoretical framework could be 
relevant to NATO-led operations. Both parties had been involved in previous operations 
similar to those discussed in the case studies, and both agreed that it could be used as a 
reliable methodology. Respondent B stated that: 
Could provide to NATO a reliable methodology, adoption and systematic use of 
it could better deconflict and prioritise  actions in NATO support….That could 
be from very early, pre-planning  (St-buy), during the planning phase and up to 
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the execution of an operation.  
 
Respondent A went a step further and highlighted a number of factors that should be 
taken into consideration: 
Several factors should be taken into consideration. Firstly, only very few Allies 
are capable of transporting significant relief capabilities rapidly over great 
distances to stricken areas and to sustain the effort. Secondly, NATO's primary 
contribution is the coordinating, liaising and facilitating function that the 
Alliance's military structures provide. These enable smaller Allies to contribute 
capabilities, such as a military hospital or water purification unit, that they 
would not be able to contribute on their own. In addition, this coordination role 
that characterises NATO-led operations has proven useful both to the 
authorities of the receiving country and to the United Nations, who were thereby 
able to deal with a single actor rather than many 
 
According to respondents the proposed framework could be employed for a variety of 
operations. Respondent B stated: 
It could be used also in other cases like humanitarian aid and refugee 
evacuation, where NATO and other international organisations (EU, UN etc.) 
are getting involved. The strategic sealift assets could have a wide range use for 
by the competent organisations/national authorities. That gives to the flowchart 
an added value, as it describes the road to achieve successful results for 
strategic sealift. 
 
Respondent A also agreed and added: 
If one recognizes that military capabilities may usefully be deployed in disaster-
response operations the next issue to address is that of NATO's added value. 
Clearly, military contributions do not have to come via NATO and may be made 
on a bilateral basis. Moreover, decision-making in response to disasters needs to 
be rapid and the Alliance's multilateral approach is in theory slower than that of 
individual Allies. 
 
However, Respondent A emphasized the importance of taking into consideration the 
need for the development of new funding mechanisms: 
Looking ahead, one of the most important issues that needs to be resolved before 
either NATO as a whole or individual Allies again make military capabilities 
available for disaster-relief operations is that of appropriate funding 
mechanisms. If, as at present, the defence ministries of those countries that are 
asked to provide helicopters for a future disaster-relief operation are also 
expected to carry the entire financial burden of their engagement, they may 
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decide that they cannot afford to become involved. Unless new funding 
mechanisms are developed, intervention for disaster relief would eat up a great 
portion of the defence budget. 
 
Both respondents feel confident that the proposed framework could assist in locating 
more assets during a sealift operation. Respondent A stated: 
Of course, because every time we increase the range of options (let’s say: pool 
of assets), we increase the possibilities to have a solution. It is not duplication of 
effort, because the centres have connections to different markets. This should be 
one of our theses (with permission from Mr. Foskolos/AMSCC Dir) at the 
meeting of 06 May 2016. Until now ΝΑΤΟ/ or NATO member deals with NSPA 
in order to find solutions. So if there are more centres which can contribute to 
this target (in cooperation with NSPA), we strongly believe that this would be an 
added value to the Alliance. 
 
 
Similarly, Respondent B agreed: 
Following the flowchart procedure, it provides you the ability to access all the 
available assets through MCCE, the market individually or by AMSCC, but also 
the AMSCC pool of vessels (a genuine capability already in place). 
 
When respondents discussed the possibility that the proposed framework could provide 
a potential financial benefit when employed during sealift operations both agreed that 
that could be a potential outcome. Respondent A gave the following reasons of why 
these could be of financial benefit: 
The larger the pool of solutions, the greater competition will rise and thus 
economic profit for the requesting party. Also the characteristics of the ship will 
be closer to the user's requirements (due to the bigger number of assets). 
 
Moreover, Respondent B identified a number of additional reasons as to why the 
proposed framework could be of financial benefit: 
The financial benefit is a potential result, because the flowchart shows the way 
to avoid duplication of actions, like chartering unnecessary more assets-missing 
opportunity to share spare capacity-miss coordinate the existing assets etc.  
 
Last but not least, respondents were asked to discuss whether they would recommend 
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the use of the proposed framework.  Both A and B agreed that it is useful.  Specifically, 
Respondent B stated: 
 
I recommend its use by the Staff officers in NATO but also in EU for the support 
of the CSDP operations…This flowchart is a mechanism which combines the 
most relevant tools for Strategic Sealift, in support of the planning but also the 
implementation of the Operations. It could be very useful for the deployment-
sustainment-redeployment of forces. 
 
Respondent A agreed and also recommended the proposed framework although he 
raised concerns in relation to the various costs involved in such operations and 
emphasized that there are additional unpredictable factors such as an ‘act of God’. 
 
Thus, it is effectively shown that the civil/military synergy delivers benefits and that the 
flowchart could be of value to any operation as it provides an extra tool in the ‘toolbox’ 
of sealift capabilities of alliances such as NATO. Presently, an answer to the question of 
‘how?’ will be proposed. A practical ‘handbook’ procedure will be introduced with the 
purpose of assisting the alliance or national movement procurement officer in 
completing the required movement task in a cost effective and efficient manner. It will 
aim at taking them through all the steps from assessing the requirement to selecting the 
appropriate vessel together with using the appropriate contract of carriage for the 
procurement and operation of the vessel. 
 
5.6 The Handbook: Based on the Proposed Theoretical Framework 
The question “Can the strategic sealift shortfall be resolved with the tools in our 
toolbox?” can be categorically answered as “yes” although with a caveat. The shortfall 
can be resolved either by governments spending vast amounts of money, far beyond 
their present and predicted future budgets, in order to acquire dedicated sealift assets, or 
alternatively, with the caveat mentioned above, by making use of the commercial 
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shipping market. 
 
5.6.1 The Strategic Sealift Toolbox 
Before progressing with the analysis there are a number of major stumbling blocks 
encountered by nations over the years that need to be addressed. These are basically 
caused by military requirements together with standards and levels of ambition which 
differ dramatically from the requirements of a commercial maritime adventure – largely 
because in the commercial market lives are not at risk. The problem areas are: 
A. Command and control 
B. Unit integrity 
C. Assuredness vs. Availability 
D. Information 
E. Duplication of effort 
 
Each of these five complications warrants an explanation, not only as to what they refer 
but also with respect to their consequences and whether there is a possible solution that 
could facilitate the maritime adventure. While each is important, it is not as significant 
as the overall effectiveness of the final sealift transportation operation (NATO, 2007d). 
 
A.   Command and control 
A central tenet of any strategic defence movement, whether by land, sea or air, is the 
military commander’s requirement to retain ‘Command and Control’; in layman’s terms 
this means that the participating nation supplying the military hardware is in touch with 
its hardware until it is delivered to the operational commander in the arena of operations 
or the field of combat. This is because most military equipment is both expensive and 
sensitive, and in some cases, extremely dangerous. An obvious risk of not retaining 
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command and control over such equipment is that it is either damaged beyond use or 
falls into the wrong hands.  (Let us not forget the hijacking by Somali pirates of the 
container ship Maersk Alabama with a cargo of military hardware whilst transiting the 
Indian Ocean in 2009 (Weaver, 2009)).  Both the damage and loss scenarios can have 
dire results and can negatively affect any strategic operation or create bigger problems 
than the operation was intended to resolve. Thankfully, most militarily-suitable 
commercial sealift assets capable of carrying such equipment also have the capability of 
carrying up to twelve passengers according to the International Convention for Safety 
of Life at Sea, 1974 and its protocols of 1988 (IMCO, 1974). These passengers can 
easily be military personnel, armed or unarmed, depending on flag state requirements 
and permits, and this offers the ability to retain command and control on paper and in 
practice. (More than twelve passengers on a commercial vessel would designate it as a 
‘passenger ship’ and seriously affect its SOLAS status requiring additional safety and 
lifesaving appliances (IMO, 2004a)). 
 
B.   Unit integrity 
Clearly it is desirable to maintain unit integrity; essentially, this means that, for 
example, a battalion will always retain the integrity of personnel and equipment. But 
this can create great difficulties in the maritime transportation of equipment to and from 
remote or damaged sea ports of embarkation (SPOE) or sea ports of disembarkation 
(SPOD).  In the situation that a sea port has been under attack and its facilities are 
compromised or impaired, either by a draft restriction or wharf or crane restriction, then 
it is possible that the operational equipment may need to be delivered in a staggered 
formation and demarcated at the theatre of operations. This is referred to in NATO 
circles as Reception Staging and Onward Movement (RSOM).  However, it will not be 
examined in this thesis. It can easily be understood that when personnel and equipment 
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are not simultaneously delivered there is an increased probability of loss and delays 
especially adding the elevated stress levels that are associated with conflict or disaster 
control. 
However, this is only relevant at the point of demarcation at the SPOE prior to loading 
and at the SPOD prior to transfer to the actual theatre of operation and the handing over 
of command and control to the operational commander. 
 
Since both items A and B above can be maintained to a certain degree at some 
important times during the sea transit, but possibly not at all times, the question is: 
Are the participating nations prepared to make some sacrifices on command and 
control and unit integrity, as described above, to increase their available 
choices of commercial sealift solutions? 
 
There are several advantages to flexibility including that of increasing available sealift 
choices you can expect to be able to obtain at more competitive prices and more reliable 
service providers. Additionally, there will be a shorter notice of activation and 
deployment time and a greater flexibility on the collection, loading and delivery dates. 
 
C.   Assuredness vs. Availability 
What do these words mean? 
According to the Collins Dictionary (2000, p. 63), when you ‘assure’ someone of 
something, you make certain that they will get it. Therefore, assuredness provides 
confidence and certainty. Similarly, ‘available’, according to Collins Dictionary (2000, 
p. 71) is when something can be obtained, therefore making it convenient and 
accessible. 
In any military or civilian operation, be it strategic defence sealift, humanitarian aid or 
refugee evacuation, a certain degree of assuredness is desired by the decision makers. 
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When political leaders agree on dates for an operation, they need to be assured that the 
operation will take place on, or near, the indicated dates. By owning sealift assets, a 
nation can be reasonably assured that the strategic lift can, and will take place, but at 
what cost? By contracting in commercial sealift tonnage there is still, of course, a 
chance that the operation may fail; for example, a breach of contract could result in the 
failure or, at best, a lengthy delay in the particular operation. Furthermore, the term 
‘assured access’ needs to be defined, so that all the users and providers of the sealift 
assets know exactly where they stand commercially, legally and financially. 
 
At present NATO suggests it should be defined as: 
The guaranteed right of a pre-defined group or entity to use pre-defined site, 
facilities, asset or services, in accordance with a prior written agreement 
between NATO and the provider (NATO, 2014). 
 
It is feared that this definition will lull military users into a false sense of security, 
which may result in disastrous consequences for a planned and agreed operation. There 
are several flaws in the definition. Firstly, what is the consequence of failure to provide 
the assured asset? There might be some financial retribution after a protracted legal 
battle, yet the fact of the matter is that the operation itself failed. In point of fact and 
law, the provider of the asset can claim force majeure or ‘act of God’ and not be 
financially liable for any consequential losses. So, in truth, there is no significant 
detrimental consequence for the sealift asset provider. A stricter definition is therefore 
essential. 
 
Nonetheless, there is some doubt as to whether, having agreed to a contractual term, the 
breach of that term will automatically entitle the party innocent of the breach to seek 
specific performance of the contract or to the award of damages as a result of the 
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complained breach.  In interlocutory terms: If, for example, a shipowner undertakes to 
make his vessel available within 5 days of a contractual notice so to do, will a failure to 
make the vessel available automatically expose the shipowner to a claim in damages? 
 
The answer is no – there are exigencies which would protect a shipowner from a 
damages claim.  In shipping, indeed in very many commercial ventures, there are 
innumerable events that may disable one party from effecting immediate performance 
of a contractual obligation.  Some of those events are predictable, whether as 
unavoidable fact or potential risk, and most contracts will contain, within their text, 
provisions to deal with certain foreseeable exigencies. 
 
The issues under consideration here are those where a breach has occurred (in this case, 
where an owner and/or sealift asset provider is unable to fulfill obligations regarding 
the availability of a ship), but where the reason for the breach is an event which was not 
foreseen, nor provision made for it at the time the contract was entered into.  In such 
circumstances, English law allows that the party apparently in breach may seek to 
defend that breach, invoking ‘the doctrine of frustration’, (Law Reform (Frustrated 
Contracts) Act, 1943) on which topic many text books have been written.  The 
essentials of this doctrine have not been codified into UK statute law, but have derived 
from a great many decisions of the UK courts over the past one hundred fifty years, the 
doctrine having first been touched upon in 1853. 
 
The essence of the doctrine is this:   
 
Irrespective of the non-performance of a legal obligation, if that non-
performance arises as a result, without fault of either party, of an unforeseen 
supervening event making it impossible for the obligation to be fulfilled or 
makes the fulfilment of the contract radically different to the original venture, 
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then the party nominally in breach may claim that the contract is frustrated, the 
consequence of which is that the contract immediately terminates and all 
performance obligation thereunder immediately ceases  
(Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act, 1943, c. 40, ss.1-3). 
 
Whether an event relied upon by a party nominally in breach is sufficient to invoke 
frustration is an objective test determined by consideration of the facts of each 
individual case.  If a contract is determined to have been frustrated, then the financial 
consequences thereof are determined in accordance with the terms of the Law Reform 
(Frustrated Contracts) Act (1943). While this makes commercial sense, however, it 
does not make ‘military sense’ as reducing cost is not the main objective there but rather 
the success of a maritime mission on which lives may depend. 
 
 
The researcher suggests that the definition should be amended: 
‘Assured access’ to become: ‘Priority usage’ 
 
And thus the definition would read: 
 
The contractual right of an identifiable group or entity to use pre-defined sites, 
facilities, assets or services, in accordance with any prior agreement or understanding 
between NATO and the provider. 
 
Once the appropriate interpretation has been chosen, then the levels of assuredness that 
nations wish to maintain can be determined. The level is related to the cost; the higher 
the level, the higher the overall cost, and, unfortunately, the relationship between level 
and cost is not linear but exponential, so that little extra assuredness will cost a 
considerable amount more. However, the relationship between the level of assuredness 
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and the availability is neither linear nor exponential; it is, in fact, cyclical so that when 
the commercial freight market goes up the costs of availability go up. The question is: 
how can a price factor be put on assuredness and availability to enable the M+T staff 
officer to choose the desired level of assuredness that satisfies operational needs? 
 
D.   Information 
Despite the efforts of PBOS over the years to properly enlighten their military 
customers, it is plainly clear that the military sealift customer is very badly informed 
about the workings, availability and cost structure of an ever changing and complex 
merchant shipping asset. This ignorance leads to military operations not utilising all the 
available commercial solutions nor any of the civil/military synergies, and thus it affects 
not only the financial/budgetary aspects but also the military efficiency of operations. 
 
E.   Duplication of effort 
Although duplication of effort can lead to higher cost, it can also lead to increased 
reliability, healthy competition and new markets. Are there not two hydraulic systems in 
an aircraft and two circulating pumps in a vessel’s cooling system? In a practical way 
duplication of effort can also enhance reliability and increase the number of available 
options. 
 
5.6.2 The Tools in the Toolbox 
Next, we identify and examine all currently available sealift transportation tools that 
presently exist in the strategic sealift transportation ‘toolbox’ (NATO, 2007d). 
 
Before this question can be answered, the practical side of the question needs to be 
addressed by identifying and investigating all the tools that exist in the strategic sealift 
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toolbox. 
1.   Nationally owned assets (grey hulls) 
2.   Nationally controlled assets (long term chartered-in vessels) 
3.   The commercial shipping market (spot vessels) 
4.   The Athens Multinational Strategic Lift Coordination Center 
5.   The liner companies 
6.   The SCC Eindhoven (NATO, 2002) 
7.   The hub and spoke concept (NATO, 2004b) 
8.   The NATO War Risk Scheme 
9.   The NATO Market Advisory Panel 
10.  Cooperation with CAPC and PBIST (NATO Transport Group committees) 
 
By analyzing each of the above assets or tools, it will be possible to identify the 
potential for integrating these individual tools into a transportation solution for most 
sealift transportation scenarios while taking advantage of civil/military synergies in 
accordance with the NATO Comprehensive Approach and by use of the model of the 
integration of the commercial shipping market assets and services into strategic sealift, 
Figure 1, p. 147. 
 
At this point, it is important to recognize the fact that these tools can also be easily 
transposed into a multimodal transportation solution for road and air transportation. 
Once the sealift transportation solution has been created, the next step would be to 
integrate all the modalities to create a multi-modal strategic lift solution. With today’s 
NATO requirements as stated in the ‘Comprehensive Approach’, it will be necessary to 
resolve complicated movement requirements to the desired level of ambition despite 
potentially remote and difficult to approach theatres of operation at the commander’s 
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required date. These solutions will probably require a multi-modal approach, land, sea 
and air, all integrated and managed by one entity. This subject requires lengthy 
investigation and discussion but does not form part of this thesis. 
 
Logically, in order to recognise the benefits of the vast range of available civil/military 
synergies, the military transportation desk officer must be aware of what is available in 
the commercial market and how it works, so as take best advantage of the benefits and 
savings in both time and money (NATO, 2007d). 
 
1.   Nationally owned assets 
Several NATO nations own strategic sealift assets or grey hulls. These are vessels 
specifically designated for national military and humanitarian operations but they can 
satisfy only a part of their national requirements although their importance is vital as a 
part of the whole picture (LMI, 2001). Despite the fact that this level of comfort and 
misleading sense of assuredness is enjoyed at a very high cost, nations persist in 
funding such projects. The apparent assuredness and availability is fairly high, but is 
conditional upon these assets being well-maintained as discussed in section 2.2.4, fully-
crewed, class-maintained, functional, up-to-date with all new national and international 
regulations and requirements, provisioned, stored and bunkered ready to go and not 
undergoing repair and/or routine maintenance or half way around the world on another 
national civil or military operation at the critical time. 
 
2.   Nationally controlled assets 
Several nations have realized that owning a sealift asset as mentioned above is a very 
costly proposition that no longer gives value for money, so in order to maintain the level 
of assuredness that they have enjoyed to date they have taken on vessels with long-term 
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time charter. This course of action has some merit as it leaves all the requirements for 
maintenance, crewing, class maintenance, as the responsibility of the owner of the asset 
as opposed to the nation. As of 2014, France has two RO/ROs; the UK has six; 
Denmark, two; Germany, one and Norway one on an ad hoc basis as presented at the 
NATO Ship Availability Seminar in Athens June 2014 (NATO, 2014f). All these 
chartered vessels can perform a service for regular peacetime movements such as 
sustainment and re-deployment; then, and in times of crisis, not only can they perform 
military defence strategic sealift operations but humanitarian aid and in some cases 
(with slight modification and additional safety equipment such as lifejackets), refugee 
evacuation. However, these vessels alone cannot resolve the strategic sealift shortfall 
problem (LMI, 2001). 
 
3.   The market 
One interesting finding of this thesis is that a single solution alone cannot resolve the 
strategic sealift shortfall and that a combination of alternative means is required to 
allow for a reasonable level of assuredness. One such solution is the integration of the 
commercial sealift market into the militarily controlled sealift operation for defence, 
humanitarian and refugee evacuation, thus reaping all the financial and operational 
benefits of the civil/military synergies. 
 
The commercial shipping market has a huge reserve of available military suitable 
tonnage of all shapes and sizes. As stated previously, the level of availability is cyclical; 
for example, in the summer months in the northern hemisphere, many car factories 
close for summer vacation time making the RO/RO more readily available, whereas the 
car/passenger ferries are relatively scarce as they are at the height of their seasonal 
cycle of employment carrying the summer holidaymakers and family cars around the 
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Mediterranean islands.  However, availability is not the only hurdle to overcome when 
trying to secure any type of merchant ships from the commercial market and the way to 
approach the market is of paramount importance. 
 
Unfortunately, there is no hard and fast ‘golden’ rule as to how to approach the 
commercial shipping market, because it is continually changing, not only from a cost 
point of view, but because each different type of asset requires a different approach. 
This is further complicated by the fact that vessels are continually evolving; what was 
considered an ideal or suitable ship for last year’s operation may no longer exist or it 
may have been replaced by one that is, in fact, better.  What is a military suitable vessel 
today may be incompatible tomorrow.  Even in the open commercial market, an old 
adage says:  ‘A ship is out of date the moment it glides down the slipway’.  One fact is 
beyond dispute: the governing factor in obtaining the appropriate merchant-shipping 
asset for any type of operation, whether it be strategic defence sealift or humanitarian 
aid or refugee evacuation, is knowing what you need and knowing exactly when you 
want it. The continuing misconception that the RO/RO is the only military suitable asset 
is a blind spot that not only restricts the choice of sealift asset but also potentially 
increases the cost. Chapter 2 introduced a plethora of other military suitable vessels 
equally adept at handling many different operational scenarios. It may be helpful to 
explain exactly what is available from the market. 
 
As explained in detail in chapter 2, a simple way of understanding different methods of 
utilising a ship identified above is to imagine yourselves leaving your residence to go to 
work. The choice is whether to travel by your own car, by taxi or by bus with their 
different advantages and drawbacks reflected in the different ways of accessing sealift.  
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It should be stressed that supply and demand affect the shipping market to such an 
extent that freight rates can, in extreme cases, go up tenfold in a good freight market or 
when the supply of a certain type of ship becomes scarce or it is in great demand or 
perhaps to satisfy a well-publicized national or NATO led sealift requirement. These are 
situations where the method and timing of approaching the market can not only affect 
the price but also the availability of the most suitable asset; the appropriate strategy for 
achieving the best possible commercial deal is to act early, discreetly and rapidly, none 
of which are easily accomplished by the government of any nation. 
 
4.   The Athens Multinational Sealift Coordination Center (AMSCC) 
Despite its bumpy start due to adverse comments by misinformed allies, the Athens 
Multinational Sealift Coordination Center is thriving (Personal participation, 2003-
2015). The Center provides an easy conduit to a large part of the global merchant 
shipping fleet; it provides this ready access through close cooperation with ship owners 
and ship operators, by methods used for over seventy-five years.  Standardized charter-
parties, pre-translated for European tenders allow for shorter contractual time frames.  
Over two hundred military-suitable vessels with a comprehensive range of ship types 
are contracted into the centre on a non-binding Letter of Intent (L.O.I.), which creates 
the no-cost environment of the AMSCC. This L.O.I. is non-binding inasmuch that the 
owner has no obligation to provide his vessel and the center has no obligation to charter 
the vessel for any of its operations.  As previously mentioned, availability and 
assuredness are cost-related and inversely proportional to market volume.  The larger 
the market pool from which to choose a vessel, the lower the overall cost.  This is the 
philosophy of the AMSCC with its ever-growing pool of vessels contracted in on a non-
binding L.O.I.. By providing access for member nations to this pool of military-suitable 
sealift assets, it can increase the probability of finding a suitable asset at the  
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appropriate time and at a competitive rate. This is not a panacea for the NATO sealift 
shortfall problem; it is just one more tool in the solution toolbox. 
 
 
5.   The liner companies 
As described earlier, the liner shipping companies are like buses on their fixed and 
scheduled routes. When used in conjunction with the NATO hub and spoke concept 
(NATO, 2004b) the liner companies can easily handle all types of military 
transportation operation including - but not limited to - deployment, redeployment and 
sustainment. However, liner shipping services are not really suitable for humanitarian 
aid or refugee evacuation, as they cannot easily break from their scheduled 
commitments and their liner services. 
 
All major liner companies have the flexibility to reconfigure their cargo spaces to 
accommodate all types, shapes and sizes of military cargoes.  From a cost point of view 
liner shipping is probably the most cost effective form of maritime transport available 
today. Liner companies use the larger and deeper ports as hubs for the larger mother 
ships and then distribute their cargo through their own network of owned and chartered-
in feeder vessels. Since most customers are now demanding a total transportation 
package this translates into a door-to-door service which involves the company 
collecting the cargo at the shipper’s designated place of business, transporting it either 
by sea, land or air and delivering the cargo at the recipient’s designated place of 
business. It is interesting to note that the military is probably one of the smallest 
customers of marine transportation, albeit, one of the most reliable (Personal 
experience). 
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6.   The SCC Eindhoven 
The concept of the SCC Eindhoven (NATO 2002) was born in the NATO Planning 
Board of Shipping Working Group, in 2002. At the time, the idea of the military of one 
nation sharing a merchant-shipping asset of another nation was abhorrent.  The military 
commanders required the retention of command and control over their equipment and 
their men and this would be very difficult if there were two commanders in the same 
maritime adventure or even on the same ship.  Then the military budgets of all nations 
shrank just as there was an increase in new demands upon them so that new methods of 
cost saving needed to be developed and employed. The SCC Eindhoven concept 
provided a quick, clean and sound solution in all modes of transportation in the private 
sector.  In only a few years of operation the SCC Eindhoven has proved a great success 
as a multimodal, multinational operation. It has had the advantage of dedicated 
management and personnel during its fledgling years, which will lead to long-term 
success.  The problem seems to be the usual resistance to a novel idea; it is hoped that 
such resistance will be overcome, and that most nations will probably use the SCC 
Eindhoven for smaller marine strategic transportation, deployment, sustainment and 
redeployment. The basic concept is very simple: when a nation, or its military, charter 
in a sealift asset, it is likely that its capacity far exceeds the actual requirement of the 
particular transportation operation. When the SCC Eindhoven is made aware of the 
details of the charter, including the route and the remaining free space available, they 
can provide this free space to other nations participating in the operation and requiring 
sealift to the same vicinity. Hopefully, they can sub-let the residual capacity, thus 
increasing the efficiency of the particular sealift adventure for all concerned. 
 
Despite the fact that the SCC Eindhoven ostensibly provides a different service than the 
Athens Multinational Sealift Coordination Centre, they both suffer from the same 
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vulnerability, and this is loyalty.  The more you use the centres the more cost effective 
they become.  If you start by-passing the centres either by going directly to the ship 
owner (AMSCC) or directly to the other nation, you undermine their fundamental 
philosophy of reduced cost via economies of scale (NATO, 2014e).   
 
7.   The hub and spoke concept 
The shipping hub concept for NATO can be used to transport military cargoes from the 
Ports of Embarkation (SPOE) (direct ports) to an existing commercial hub port (trans-
shipment port) near to the theatre of operation and then from the hub port to its final 
destination. The establishment of a shipping hub system for NATO does not preclude or 
pre-empt the use of other means of obtaining sealift - such as chartering vessels directly 
from the market. It is only another means for obtaining the required services to satisfy 
the prescribed operation (NATO, 2004b). 
 
A hub is the point (sea port) at which material and equipment required for an operation 
is assembled and readied prior to dispatch to the theatre of operations. 
 
The use of a hub system could provide better utilisation of existing scarce sealift assets. 
It would be used in addition to direct strategic transportation, thus resulting in shorter 
voyages over shorter routes (Lines of Communications (LOCs)) and allowing these 
assets to be used for more voyages in a shorter period of time. This concept is especially 
applicable where the port facilities at the theatre of operations are unable to handle large 
RO/ROs and large container vessels, or where the infrastructure of the port has broken 
down. These deficiencies include lack of, or inoperable, cargo handling equipment and 
cargo storage facilities or even restrictions on the available draft in the Seaports of 
Debarkation (SPOD) for whatever reason (i.e. sunken vessels, and/or disabled vessel) 
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and inadequate security facilities (NATO, 2004b). 
 
The major liner companies have created hub ports all around the world with suitable 
cargo handling equipment with demarcated parking areas able to handle large volumes 
of standard and outsized cargo well in excess of most NATO deployment requirements. 
However, if suitable cargo handling equipment and labour are not available at the final 
discharge ports, they may have to be deployed during the early stages of the operation. 
 
Each nation participating in an international operation of any kind can elect to have 
military or civilian representatives at the hub port to provide coordination for their 
cargo at all times, thus retaining the desired command and control. 
 
The handling and storage of large quantities of Class 1 (hazardous) cargoes in most 
ports could be a problem as there are limitations on the retention and throughput of 
dangerous cargoes. Such limitations on the movement and storage of these cargoes at 
hub ports have to be identified and to be taken into account at the planning stage of the 
operation. However, in order to overcome this operational difficulty specialized, 
chartered-in vessels could be used solely for the transportation of Class 1 (Ordinance) 
cargoes directly to the SPOD. 
 
How a NATO hub would work 
The NATO hub concept is designed to ensure that the right material will arrive in the 
right quantities and at the right time at the theatre of operations as requested by the 
operational commander (NATO, 2004b). All NATO countries and partner nations 
participating in the operation will be responsible for delivering their cargo to the hub 
port according to the NATO strategic sealift doctrine, either by regular liner vessels or 
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by individually chartered-in vessels (NATO, 2006). A participating nation may choose 
to make its own arrangements for deploying the cargo to the hub port with a chartered-
in vessel as is the procedure used today.  However, it is recommended that nations use a 
regular liner service, which can be a door-to-door service (collection from a military 
base or from the Seaport of Embarkation (SPOE) directly to the Seaport of Debarkation 
(SPOD) via the hub) as discussed before. The liner company could provide the smaller 
feeder vessels to provide the service for all the cargo, both the cargo the liner vessel 
transported to the hub and also the cargo brought in by individually chartered-in 
vessels.  Feeder vessels can be chartered-in individually on a time charter basis or the 
service can be purchased from a liner company. Military organic assets could also be 
used for feeder services. Predominantly smaller feeder vessels, as the name implies, are 
able to enter smaller ports and are well equipped with adequate cargo handling gear to 
discharge their cargo in unfriendly ports. 
 
At the NATO hub port, areas may be demarcated for each member to place their 
containers, rolling stock, etc. Hence, each nation can retain command and control until 
such time as the allied commander requests the appropriate material at the theatre of 
operations (NATO, 2004b). 
 
The built-in advantage of using the NATO hub system is that all relevant and related 
equipment that needs to be deployed as a combined unit can be prepared and sent in 
self-contained units/cargo blocks and thus remains intact until it all arrives at the theatre 
of operations. Other material that may be required at a later stage of the operation or for 
sustainment, say in colder weather, and can be delivered much faster than if ordered 
from one’s nation. 
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To transport the equipment, etc. to the theatre of operations, small feeder vessels will be 
selected according to the restrictions and conditions ruling at the SPODs, whether there 
be draught restrictions or infrastructure restrictions.  If military organic vessels are 
being used by a particular nation to deliver their cargo to the SPOD or NATO hub port, 
they can also be used as feeder vessels between the SPOD and hub port, thus making 
far more efficient use of this owned asset. 
 
Thus, the allied commander can ensure that he will receive the right material in the right 
quantities at the right time and therefore obtain the most efficient use of his available 
SPOD facilities. 
 
With current technology, each container is assigned an identification number enabling 
the allied movement and transport, M+T, personnel to locate the whereabouts of each 
individual container or unit of cargo or rolling stock. Additionally, the same container 
or individual piece or rolling stock can be fitted with a GPS tracker. The liner company 
will allocate a security password to each nation and they can track their cargo on the 
liner company’s website. The NATO hubs can also have an electronic tracking system 
linking the carrier, cargo and military planners, as is current practice in commercial 
environments (Avante, 2017). 
 
It is emphasized that all the equipment can be containerized or carried on heavy flat 
racks and can thus be placed in self-contained units whose exact location can be 
verified at any time. 
 
Another possible means to develop a hub system is to request a freight 
forwarder/shipping company to arrange for the transportation of the cargo. Using the 
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principles of the Movement Coordination Centre Europe, a body could be established 
that could coordinate via a transportation cell and arrange a contract of transportation 
for all participating countries. Alternatively, transportation could be arranged by a liner 
company on the principle of door-to-door delivery.  They would pick up the cargo at 
places nominated by the nation, such as a military base, and deliver it by scheduled 
liners to the NATO hub while also assuming responsibility for transporting the cargo 
from the hub to the theatre of operations. By this method, the nation will not be required 
to have all its cargo ready in one big shipment as liner vessels call on a regular and 
frequent basis. 
 
A supercargo, military escort for the cargo, could be placed on board the liner vessel to 
accompany the cargo. This way the nation does not relinquish command and control 
over their cargo.  At the hub port command and control is retained by the nations by 
having military personnel on site at the allocated areas. 
 
Once the cargo arrives at the NATO hub port, the allied commander, together with each 
participating nation, can define and set priorities and the order or sequence of delivery 
movements based on operational requirements. This can include requesting specific 
containers or items of rolling stock to be loaded on feeder vessels or RO/RO feeder 
vessels, and delivered to any of the SPODs, to prevent congestion of unnecessary 
equipment at the SPODs and the theatre of operations.  In hub ports cargo could be 
under the control of the national military authorities, the allied commander, or a lead 
nation (NATO, 2004b). 
 
There is a minor drawback in that the use of the hub might result in additional cargo 
handling efforts and the need for additional military personnel in the ports to coordinate 
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operations, to provide any additional security and to provide specialist drivers. 
 
As a logical observation, the hub concept also works exceptionally well for 
redeployment. Unused ordinance and equipment that is no longer necessary at the 
theatre of operations can be returned and stored at the hub port. It can then be 
transported back to the nation of origin either by liner service or by an individually 
chartered vessel when the quantity is sufficient, thus uncluttering the theatre of 
operations and allowing the redundant equipment to be returned to the nation at a 
convenient time. 
 
Advantages to using a NATO hub system 
The NATO hub concept will assist to ensure that the right material will arrive in the 
right quantities and at the right time at the theatre of operations. The consequence of 
using a commercial liner service is that all participating countries may benefit from the 
following civil/military synergies: 
•   Combine their contracts of carriage with one carrier 
•   Start moving equipment almost immediately 
•   Add unforeseen cargo at a later stage 
•   Be aware of the exact location of their cargo at all times 
•   Have a reliable delivery schedule 
•   Be able to re-deploy part cargo 
•   Save money because of lower war risk insurance premiums 
•   Other savings resulting from more effective utilization of shipping assets and 
obvious economies of scale 
 
The collection of the cargo at the NATO hub port by feeder vessels will work better 
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than chartered-in ships, even if the entry into the market is coordinated, because ships 
that are in high demand and scarce supply will be better utilised and port congestion 
will be minimised or eliminated. A further advantage is that a larger range of smaller 
ports with poor facilities in the vicinity of the theatre of operations could also be used as 
SPOD’s, because small, well equipped feeder vessels would now be involved in the 
marine transportation adventure. This arrangement can also be employed in 
humanitarian aid operations but has limited use in refugee evacuation as immigration 
laws might create insuperable obstacles (Personal experience). 
 
Using commercial ports away from the theatre of operations as NATO hub ports would 
logically result in significantly lower war risk insurance costs because these ports would 
most likely be outside any declared war-risk zone. 
 
Nations having smaller logistics requirements and budgets will benefit greatly from the 
NATO hub concept in conjunction with liner service contracts. Liner companies will 
give a more competitive price to a larger volume of cargo coming from multiple clients 
as opposed to a single nation searching the market to charter in specific ships (NATO, 
2004b). 
 
If during sustainment, additional or revised requirements are identified because of 
changing operation needs, they can be easily met by the liner company to and from the 
country of origin on a scheduled liner vessel. 
 
The economies of scale speak for themselves along with other financial benefits derived 
from the use of the hub system. Nations will only be paying for cargo carried, known as 
slots, rather than empty space - dead freight - on an individually chartered vessel. 
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Much has been written on the idea and the concept.  It works well in many situations 
but not in all.  Basically, during the planning stages it can be easily decided whether the 
concept should be used or not. In general terms it is workable for material 
transportation and not for refugee evacuation where people are being transported. 
Geography is both its advantage and its drawback.  Nevertheless, the hub and spoke 
concept should be incorporated into every operation as a fallback position in case the 
discharging ports, convenient to the theatre of operations, become inoperable.  The 
commercial air, sea and road transport markets have the expertise, not only to 
accommodate the military in existing hubs and the flexibility to incorporate military 
destinations in their range of spoke ports, but also to set up and operate ad hoc hubs to 
facilitate specific operations. This concept is easily transposed into a multi-modal 
concept as used by both the commercial trucking companies and the commercial 
airlines. As an analogy, a holidaymaker rarely goes directly to a Mediterranean holiday 
island resort, but flies to the main capital ‘hub’ airport and catches a smaller feeder 
aircraft to the final destination (NATO, 2004b). 
 
8.   The NATO War Risk Scheme 
The NATO War Risk Scheme is a useful arrangement displaying foresight and 
flexibility of use, providing security for all parties involved in a NATO operation in a 
war or war-like zone where commercial war risks insurance is no longer available 
according to NATO directives (NATO, 2007a, 2007b). Regrettably, few nations have 
truly grasped the concept and tremendous operational and financial saving provided by 
this scheme.  Statistically, if one considers the amounts paid for war-risk insurance by 
nations when chartering vessels for operations over the last twenty years, and compares 
it to the impeccable record, that is, no reported losses, then one can see where the ever- 
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tightening military budget is throwing money away. Any zero-cost scheme must have 
financial benefits (NATO, 2007a). 
 
The four main advantages of the NATO War Risk Scheme outlined by NATO (2005a) 
were: 
 
•   No premium is payable by the NATO member or the shipowner 
•   The maximum liability cover for contracting parties is US dollars one hundred 
fifty million per vessel per incident 
•   There is secondary seamen’s cover 
•   The insured value is the commercially insured war-risk cover as set fourteen 
days prior to coming into force of the indemnification provisions of the scheme 
 
The main dispute within NATO concerns the need to harmonize the marine war-risk 
scheme with those of aviation and land-based schemes. This harmonization also 
incorporated criteria for Entry into Force, Denunciation and Termination. The proposed 
clauses were agreed to by the working groups of NATO producing a text (NATO, 
2005b). Below are relevant clauses: 
 
 
Article VII – Entry into Force 
This Agreement is subject to ratification, acceptance, or approval by states that 
are members of NATO.  Each instrument of ratification, acceptance, or approval 
shall be deposited with the Office of the Legal Advisor in the Office of the 
Secretary General.  This Agreement shall enter into force thirty days after the 
Office of the Legal Advisor has received instruments of ratification, acceptance, 
or approval from all members of NATO.  The Council shall notify all members of 
NATO of the date when this Agreement enters into force. 
 
Article VIII – Denunciation 
Any contracting party may denounce this Agreement by written notification to 
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the Office of the Legal Advisor, which will notify all other contracting parties of 
such notification of denunciation and the date of the receipt thereof.  A 
denunciation shall take effect one year after receipt by the Office of the Legal 
Advisor. 
 
Article IX – Termination 
This Agreement shall terminate if and when it is denounced by NATO members 
whose aggregate contribution to NATO’s civil budget under the NATO Common-
Funded Cost Share Arrangements reaches thirty percent. In the event of 
denunciations aggregating less than thirty percent, the NATO members that 
remain bound by this Agreement shall meet to adjust their shares of 
indemnification as prescribed in Article II 
(NATO, 2005b, p. 5). 
Apart from small changes in some other articles that are required to allow for changing 
circumstances and world security situations, the scheme is workable and practical and it 
is in line with the protocols of the Athens convention. Changes need to be made to 
incorporate a wide range of ever-changing economic sanctions imposed by the United 
States of America and the European Union affecting the payment of claims to benefit a 
persona non grata or someone who is associated with, or is on, the Presidential Order 
list of sanctioned persons. 
 
Regrettably, the ‘powers that be’ voted to shelve the scheme until such time that it is 
required or becomes a necessity to facilitate an operation when commercial war-risks 
insurance is unavailable. In this scheme no premium is paid by any nation that charters 
a sealift asset for an operation. However, if there is a casualty, as explained in previous 
chapters, then all the members of the operation will pay according to the percentage of 
the NATO civil budget allocated to that nation. 
 
9.   The Market Advisory panel 
The invaluable information provided by the highly professional panel of the Transport 
Group (Ocean Shipping) experts is highly sought after in the commercial market and 
yet this information was provided to the NATO Senior Civil Emergency Planning 
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Committee (SCEPC) and to the Movement and Transportation Group (M&TG) through 
the NATO Senior NATO Logistics Committee (SNLC) at no cost in the form of the 
Commercial Ship Availability Assessment Report, AC/329(EAPC)N(2013)0014) 
(NATO, 2014a).  Ship owners and operators pay dearly for this market assessment 
information as it can make or break any business venture. This report is produced twice 
a year, at the beginning of the year and mid-term; it would be a foolish military planner 
who ignored the facts on market values and fluctuations in the semi-annual report. 
However, from 2013, in order to further improve the usefulness of this report, each 
section on each ship type closes with a trend prediction for the following six months 
(Personal participation, June 2013). This information when used correctly can assist in 
operational planning and judging when to enter the commercial sealift market. This is a 
living document which continually requires more feedback from the military and 
national movement planners; if the panel knew which parts are more useful or what 
parts need more detail, this could probably be one of the most useful planning tools in 
the marine transportation toolbox. 
 
10.  Cooperation with CAPC, PBIST and PBOS 
The three NATO Transportation committees formerly known as (PBOS) Planning 
Board of Ocean Shipping, (CAPC) Civil Aviation Planning Committee and (PBIST) 
Planning Board of Inland Surface Transport are now all joined under one main 
Committee known as the Transport Group (TG) with the three subcommittees as 
described above. This is part of NATO’s substantial transformation both in military and 
civilian areas that have taken place since the fall of the Berlin Wall. 
 
To a certain extent cooperation is increasing as the multi-modal transportation demands 
of the military are evolving. This integration and/or co-operation, although limited by 
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fundamental differences in each mode of transport -land, sea or air - is inevitable and 
will eventually lead to the multi-modal solution becoming the norm as opposed to the 
exception. 
 
There are significant differences in the three forms of transportation as indicated by the 
above committees and planning boards (these differences have been briefly touched 
upon in Chapter 3), nevertheless, the three committees meet jointly in plenary and at 
working group level approximately three times a year (Personal participation, 2001-
2016). 
 
This chapter has discussed how to access and utilise the available commercial sealift 
assets in order to deal with the expected and actual demand in a practical and workable 
manner and to resolve the strategic sealift shortfall. This simplified method is suitable 
for both pre- and post- Wales Summit levels of expectations (NATO, 2014g). In the 
final chapter, suggestions will be made based on conclusions from this research as to 
the way forward for further investigation and proactive improvements in anticipation of 
the potential increase in requirements and levels of expectation as globalization’s  
impact on the level of security that citizens have come to expect. 
 
5.7   Conclusion 
This chapter presented two case studies and various findings related to the proposed 
theoretical framework. A handbook to assist in the implementation of this framework 
was also introduced. The final chapter provides a discussion of the findings, and certain 
limitations of our research. 
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CHAPTER 6: 
 
DISCUSSION ANALYSIS and CONCLUSION 
 
 
6.1   Introduction 
 
The contribution of this study to the literature on civil/military integration for strategic 
sealift is the use of two case studies for developing the purpose of identifying a specific 
framework that can be used in a practical and cost effective manner and the associated 
optimal practices. 
 
The main objective of this study is to examine how a military movement and 
transportation desk officer should integrate the commercial shipping market assets and 
services into strategic sealift, in a practical and cost effective manner for strategic 
deployment, re-deployment and humanitarian aid. 
 
To accomplish this we set the following objectives: 
•   To identify the relevant issues 
•   To develop a model that allows military sealift personnel to efficiently and cost-
effectively procure shipping assets 
•   To validate the model, assessing its functional competence and 
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•   To evaluate the outcomes, process and the model 
 
6.2  Study Overview 
This research focuses on two main areas, namely the civil merchant navy and the 
military sealift capabilities. It investigates the potential for the seamless integration of 
the above sealift capabilities for defence, humanitarian aid and refugee evacuation. This 
is a relatively new and unchartered territory so there is rather limited literature to review 
and cite. 
 
The literature review showed that there are limited studies that analyze the indicated 
topic and propose solutions for the integration and use of civil/military synergies. 
However, there are two somewhat relevant studies: 
•   Joint Strategy and Strategic Sealift for the Next Century. This study 
looked at the commercial sealift available in 1998 for use in supporting 
the US Department of Defense, analyzing the availability of the 1996 
MSA passed by congress and the VISA subsidy project managed by the 
DoT (Ernest and Bobby, 1998). 
 
•   Strategic Sealift for Desert Shield not a Blueprint for the Future. This 
study examines the Strategic Mobility Policy of the US Department of 
Defense in the 1980’s and suggests that it should be modified by 
reducing the National Defense Reserve Fleet and revitalizing the 
merchant marine industry (Bright and Hale, 1991). 
 
 Although both these papers refer to strategic sealift, neither addresses the primary and 
secondary research questions of this thesis. 
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To examine the above research questions we employed a two-stage process based on a 
variety of research methods. In Phase One, an analysis of the historical record was 
presented.  The theoretical framework was then developed (Chapter Five). During 
Phase Two, the theoretical framework was tested for its validity/usability and fine-tuned 
by making use of two case studies. 
 
6.3   Discussion of Results 
 
It is evident from the historical record and case studies that such synergies in the use of 
commercial sealift assets are possible and in fact have been used for centuries to 
enhance and/or augment nationally owned sealift assets (grey hulls) in many military 
sealift deployment operations. This thesis investigated in detail a fairly narrow aspect of 
strategic sealift as it applies to humanitarian aid, refugee evacuation and strategic 
defence and it identified a potential NATO sealift shortfall. 
 
During the Cold War the basic requirement was for ‘macro forces over micro distances’. 
Since the fall of the Berlin wall and the disappearance of the recognized enemy along 
with the heightened awareness of security risks, the basic requirement has shifted to 
‘micro forces over macro distances’ as discussed in NATO (2015c) Plenary September 
28-29 2015 (personal participation). In contrast, in 2015, during a Russian military 
exercise, one hundred and twenty thousand troops along with their heavy artillery 
equipment were deployed within seventy-two hours; this was a wake-up call for the 
Wales Summit which then emphasized the need for rapid deployment, with the 
overriding demand being “speed, speed and speed” (NATO, 2015c). 
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Military, and especially transportation, planners must not only be aware of all tools in 
the transportation toolbox, but also must be able to assess to what extent a particular 
tool is to be used and how it can complement and enhance the rest of the tools 
employed. This must be done in the context of the maritime transportation adventure in 
hand, in accordance with current strategic and humanitarian requirements and, more 
importantly, consistent with the military and/or civilian leaders’ levels of expectation. 
The combination of civilian and military sealift tools inevitably leads to the 
development of synergies and the benefits therefrom. This thesis has attempted to 
demonstrate how the transportation desk officer can exploit such synergies for the 
enhancement of any sealift operation both financially and in its efficiency. 
 
From a practical point of view the first step must be to identify all the available and/or 
appropriate tools, which will undoubtedly be different for each nation and for each 
particular operation. Subsequently, the transportation planner and decision maker 
should understand the possible benefits to be gained from the civil/military synergies 
created. This understanding, however, is not enough; in order to maximize the benefit 
from the potential use an awareness of how to access and integrate any particular tool or 
a combination of tools is paramount. In Chapter Two, not only were the basic workings 
and the main features of the commercial shipping market introduced but also possible 
methods for accessing the services  and the synergies available for the benefit of the 
nation performing the maritime transportation operation. 
 
It has been conclusively demonstrated in Chapter Three that the integration of 
commercial sealift assets into civil/military, nationally-led operations is not only 
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feasible, but to a significant extent, financially and operationally beneficial. Often it is 
the only viable solution where the sealift requirement can only be met by incorporating 
commercial ‘know-how’ and commercial assets. This is especially true in areas where, 
for example, the military or a nation itself cannot be represented for political reasons, or 
the financial situation of that nation prevents it from maintaining a ready fleet of grey 
hulls for every possible eventuality in the marine transportation arena. The financial 
benefit from utilizing synergies in any field has been well-documented. 
 
Both case studies have also demonstrated that not only is the use of commercially 
owned sealift assets a viable solution, but it can also provide a benefit both financially 
and practically for the operation as a whole, as well as reducing the responsibility and 
liability to a minimum for the nation making the donation. 
 
The theoretical framework (as demonstrated in Chapter Five, Section 1) was presented 
and discussed with key participants that were involved in Case Study One and Case 
Study Two. A number of questions were posed to them with the purpose of examining 
the possible use or not of the proposed theoretical framework.  It appears from both 
case studies that the theoretical framework proposed by the researcher can be of 
assistance in view of civil/military integration for strategic sealift.  According to the 
participants, the theoretical framework provides a simple guide to the marine 
transportation planner of how to decide which assets from the transportation toolbox 
should or could be used to perform and/or enhance a sealift operation where the benefit 
of the civil/military synergies has been acknowledged and approved for use. 
 
The main question being asked on the subject of strategic sealift for defence, 
humanitarian aid or refugee evacuation is based on the Head of States’ decision in the 
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NATO Comprehensive Approach, as approved at the Bucharest Summit in 2008 
(NATO, 2008b): Based on operational experience, NATO has concluded that it cannot 
meet all the complex challenges associated with the level of ambition of maintaining 
the alliance’s security. Therefore, members of the alliance must include other assets, 
both from within and outside the Euro-Atlantic alliance, in all aspects of the alliance’s 
security, defence, humanitarian aid and refugee evacuation and on all levels be it 
political, military or civilian. 
 
Findings from both case studies indicated that both respondents anticipate that the 
proposed framework could provide a reliable methodology for NATO as it could assist 
them in prioritizing their actions in case of civil/military integration. There is also an 
advantage in the opportunity to coordinate actions between the receiving country and 
only one actor, NATO, rather than several different authorities. In that aspect, the 
proposed framework adds value to the civil/military integration for strategic sealift and 
as Respondent B stated: “as it describes the road to achieve successful results for 
strategic sealift”. 
 
The North Atlantic Treaty was signed in Washington in 1949 and created an alliance for 
collective defence as defined under article 51 of the United Nations Charter. The treaty 
is of indefinite duration. According to the rules of the alliance (NATO, 2006) and more 
specifically Chapter 4 ‘Common-funding Resources, Budgets and Financial 
Management’, strategic sealift is financially covered by the nation providing the sealift, 
while NATO does not own any sealift assets nor does it budget for sealift contributions 
by willing nations. In the early 2000’s when funding was not an issue, the world 
economy was booming, nations were rich, sealift freight rates were high and the 
problem was actually the availability of scarce sealift assets. When the freight market is 
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high it is difficult to secure the services of any vessel that is enjoying the security of 
reliable and substantial financial returns from the open commercial freight market; in 
such a situation the military often has to pay a premium to have a vessel released from a 
long term contract to perform a military sealift requirement.  Our research shows that 
the development of funding mechanisms is also crucial for the purpose of dealing with 
disaster relief issues, rather than NATO and allies utilizing their defence budget. In that 
way, the participation and willingness from defence ministries of various countries to 
deploy their military capabilities in such emergencies will eventually increase. 
 
The proposed framework can also assist in locating more valuable assets during a sealift 
operation. That could be achieved while avoiding duplication of effort because various 
command centres have connections to different markets. Respondent B specifically 
stated:  
Following the flowchart procedure, it provides you the ability to access all the 
available assets through MCCE, the market individually or by AMSCC, but also 
the AMSCC pool of vessels (a genuine capability already in place). 
 
According to the respondents, the proposed framework could provide a potential 
financial benefit when employed during sealift operations. On the one hand, it could 
work as a large pool of resources which could result in increased competition between 
interested parties. Therefore, the requesting party could choose to employ a ship closer 
to their requirements but also at a competitive price. On the other hand, the flowchart 
highlights ways to avoid duplication of actions which inevitably leads to financial 
savings. 
 
Apart from the ‘act of God’ circumstances (Respondent A), the proposed framework 
could be a useful mechanism in assembling the most appropriate tools for strategic 
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sealift, in the planning and also in the implementation of the required operations. 
 
A practical ‘handbook’ procedure is also introduced for the purpose of assisting the 
alliance or national movement procurement officer in completing the required 
movement task in a cost effective and efficient manner in accordance with the proposed 
framework. The handbook’s aim is to take them through all the steps from assessing the 
requirement to selecting the appropriate vessel along with using the appropriate contract 
of carriage and procurement and operation of the vessel. 
 
6.4   Concluding Contributions 
 
There are several contributions from the above research for those involved in 
civil/military integration for strategic sealift and humanitarian aid. These are as follows: 
 
1.   Empirical verification of the feasibility and efficiency of civil/military integration 
for strategic sealift with emphasis on financial benefits and resource optimization; 
2.   Demonstration that optimization techniques are capable of delivering higher quality 
and superior overall outcomes for all parties involved 
3.   Introduction and verification of a theoretical framework that could be suitable to 
NATO operations by combining tools, procedures, and capabilities of civilian origin 
for the purpose of supporting military operations and 
4.   The introduction of a practical handbook that could assist the alliance or national 
movement procurement officer in completing the required movement task in a cost-
effective and efficient manner via several rational and appropriate steps 
 
The conclusions to this research can assist the military and civilian players in a sealift 
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event at the planning stage, the sustainment and the end game stage. The build-up of 
resources at the theatre of operations usually occurs over time (NATO, 2014f), however 
once hostilities or humanitarian aid events are concluded there is a rush to close down 
and stop the expenditure. Just as in the rapid deployment (NATO, 2015c) where the 
initial deployment must be fast so does the redeployment need to be rapid in order to 
stop the expenditure. The additional options and methodology introduced by this 
research gives the transportation planner, both military and civilian, the alternatives that 
increases the probabilities of being able to contract financially beneficial and efficient 
sealift assets. This may seem an obvious extension of the transportation officers’ duties 
but for him it is not only daunting to delve into the unknown commercial market but 
could create greater difficulties for the mission if done incorrectly. 
 
6.5   Limitations of the Study 
 
Along with any research project the present one too is subject to certain limitations. 
First, research done in the field of civil/military integration for strategic sealift is 
limited. Therefore, there is a lack of reliable data from previous studies which presents 
a significant obstacle to finding trends and corresponding patterns. Consequently, the 
researcher must depend to a large extent on historical analysis and personal 
participation in various committees as a source of information. 
 
A further constraint on gathering information for the purpose of this thesis was the 
sensitive nature of some of the data which meant that officials were reluctant to have 
information disclosed in a public document. 
 
The sample size used in this thesis was a limitation itself. It would be desirable if the 
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sample to be used for testing the proposed theoretical framework were larger and 
included more NATO officials from various countries, nations and cultures. Testing the 
proposed framework could then be made more reliable. Hence, the robustness of our 
results could have been improved if more participants at different levels had been 
available. 
 
Another reservation is the qualitative nature of this thesis, mainly because of the self-
reported data that can rarely be independently verified. Although the researcher took all 
necessary steps to avoid bias there is always the possibility that various mistakes were 
made during the interviews. 
 
6.6 Recommendations for Further Research 
 
The conclusions and recommendations of this thesis on civil/military cooperation 
cannot be definitive. This is true due to the ever-changing requirements of the military 
and their civilian masters, as well as to the technological advancements in the area of 
transportation along with the constantly increasing environmental restrictions. 
 
Further research is needed following each NATO summit in order to assess the newly 
prescribed levels of expectation agreed upon by political leaders as the political map of 
the world evolves and is affected by global events such as epidemics, conflicts, 
terrorism, natural disasters and mass human migration. Indeed, mass human migration, 
is one of the fundamental causes of environmental and political change inasmuch as 
humans are the most aggressive and destructive invasive species. Therefore, by 
implication, political objectives are ever-changing and require constant revision and 
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review in all sectors of defence and security including strategic sealift. 
 
Not only are requirements continually changing but the entire transportation concept is 
evolving into a multi-modal transportation model as discussed in NATO (2015b) 
Plenary September 28-29 2015 (personal participation). This means that suppliers of 
transportation services will increasingly provide more fully-integrated and 
comprehensive door-to-door services encompassing air, sea and land transportation. 
Therefore, suppliers move closer to the requirements of the military transport planners 
who want a simple ‘one-stop-shop’ concept for strategic lift. This involves collection 
from storage depots with land transportation to a SPOE, followed by the sea voyage and 
then land transportation to the theatre of operations. This multi-model concept will 
require further research as to the efficiency and optimum acquisition procedure in order 
to attain the levels of expectation and efficiency that are currently enjoyed on the sealift 
segment of the transportation operation. 
 
Another important element for future research could be the use of actual data. For 
instance, in assessing the efficiency of operations, other measures of effectiveness may 
be proposed based  on actual operational data such as the percentage of ships available, 
activation and vessel turnaround time, financial benefits, as well as operating cost data. 
 
The move towards a permanent and ex ante arrangement between the military and the 
civilian transportation providers should be the main thrust of political leaders and it 
should be able to provide reliable and efficient solutions to current and future multi-
modal transportation requirements. 
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6.7   Implications and Conclusion 
 
There are several implications that emerge from the above research for those involved 
in civil/military integration for strategic sealift. This thesis presents the following 
contributions: 
 
•   Empirical verification of the feasibility of civil/military integration for strategic 
sealift with emphasis on financial benefits and resource optimization 
•   Demonstration that optimization techniques are capable of delivering higher quality  
and superior overall outcomes for all parties involved 
•   Introduction and verification of a theoretical framework that could be suitable to 
NATO operations by combining tools, procedures, and capabilities of civilian origin 
for the purpose of supporting military operations and 
•   The introduction of a practical handbook that could assist the alliance or national 
movement procurement officer in completing the required movement task in a cost-
effective and efficient manner via several rational and appropriate steps 
	  
	  
	  
 
 
 
  
209 
 
APPENDIX 1 
   
Table 5: Ship Visits              
 
 
                
  
SHIP TYPE SHIP NAME DATE 
Ro/Ro  
Stern/Quarter ramp NEPTUNE THELISIS 
28/12/2016 
PIRAEUS 
PCTC 
Movable car decks NEPTUNE KEFALONIA 
21/12/2016 
PIRAEUS 
GENERAL CARGO  DIMITRAKIS AUG 1999 PIRAEUS 
HEAVY LIFT DEVO SEP 2000 GIBRALTAR 
BULK CARRIER UNITED STARS JAN 2017 DURBAN 
CONTAINER 
GEARLESS BFT MELODY 
JAN 2017 
PIRAEUS 
CONTAINER 
GEARED CONSHIP GEM 
FEB 2017 
ALGECIRAS 
CONTAINER 
FEEDER CONSHIP ECO 
JAN 2017 
PORT SAID 
RO/PAX BLUE STAR VI JULY 2016 PIRAEUS 
CRUISE SHIP MYTILINE AUG 2016 PIRAEUS 
REEFER  GEORGIAN REEFER SEP 2016 ROTTERDAM 
TANKER CHEROKEE JAN 2017 MILFORD HAVEN 
TUG PACIFIC BUCCANEER MARCH 2015 PIRAEUS 
FLO/FLO BIG LIFT MARCH 2011 THAILAND 
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Appendix 2: Research Questionnaire  
 
Dear [Name withheld], 
 
I trust you and your family are well. 
 
Further to our today’s telephone conversation, I am in the process of researching my 
PhD thesis on the integration of the Merchant Navy into the Military Sealift command 
of each nation or jointly into a NATO operation through the MSCC. 
 
In this regard, after examining 2 case studies of acquisition of Sealift assets for an 
actual operation I concluded that it was necessary to create a flowchart to assist the 
Transportation Desk officer in selecting the sealift asset. 
 
This is similar in principal to the flowchart at the end of my TOOLBOX paper that I 
wrote for TG(OS) 
 
I attach the final version of the Flowchart and request your feedback as to its 
applicability and suitability for strategic sealift. 
For consistency in my research below please find some standard questions: 
 
For the attached flowchart for use in Strategic sealift: 
 
1. Is it applicable for NATO sealift operations 
 
2. Is it suitable for NATO military operations 
 
3. Is it relevant to NATO led operations 
 
4. Can it be used also for Humanitarian aid and refugee evacuation. 
 
5. Does it assist in locating more assets 
 
6. Will it be also of financial benefit. 
 
7. Would you recommend its use. 
 
Please do not just give one word answers, your comments and insight will be very 
useful for my study and research. 
 
Kind regards 
G. D. Pateras 
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Appendix 3 
 
Case Study 1: Hungarian Sealift 
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Appendix 4 
 
Case Study 2: Polish Sealift
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